J
John Fields
Guest
On Wed, 04 Apr 2007 22:11:06 GMT, "BogusID" <BogusID@YesItIs.com>
wrote:
--
JF
wrote:
Why, whatever do you mean???
--
JF
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M
Michael A. Terrell
Guest
Missy wrote:
--
Service to my country? Been there, Done that, and I've got my DD214 to
prove it.
Member of DAV #85.
Michael A. Terrell
Central Florida
Hi, I'm an ignorant and useless Spammer
Michelle
--
Service to my country? Been there, Done that, and I've got my DD214 to
prove it.
Member of DAV #85.
Michael A. Terrell
Central Florida
R
RichD
Guest
On Apr 3, HMSBeagle <jsb...@andromeda.org> put
his shining duncehood on proud display:
Rich
his shining duncehood on proud display:
uhhhhhhhhhh........Whenever the active detector fails to click, the
experimenter deduces (or assumes) the electron
traversed the other slit. Thus, the interaction
occurs in the observer's mind!
There are several other interpretations of QM that
are as equally valid as the one you seem to be
trying to "prove" to us here.
I personally subscribe to the Quantum Decoherence
Interpretation, since you dont have to bother with
ontological questions and its easily shown how it
works on a chalkboard. It also contains no
references to "observesr" or "consciousness"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_decoherence
How does it explain the double slit experiment?
There is no double-slit experiment for electrons.
Yeah, Volume 3 of Feynman's 1963 website...You read about that on some website.
--The wave properties of electrons are determined
by some completely different experiment than
a diffraction grating.
Rich
D
Daniel Mandic
Guest
Kevin Aylward wrote:
distances, without the need of Internet.
Best Regards,
Daniel Mandic
hmmm, that must explain the Whales capability to talk at longMy information is that brain size has maxed out. The idea is that
signals take to long to transverse bigger brains,.
distances, without the need of Internet.
Best Regards,
Daniel Mandic
M
MassiveProng
Guest
On 4 Apr 2007 09:43:56 -0700, "Missy" <miss_missy_1981@yahoo.com> Gave
us:
Go back to being busy. Take your dumb shit elsewhere, twit.
us:
I've been busy
Go back to being busy. Take your dumb shit elsewhere, twit.
Guest
On Apr 5, 11:00 am, "Daniel Mandic" <daniel_man...@aon.at> wrote:
Apparently they're aided by telepathy to understand each other. And
that was the usual way of communication in the internet's early days,
when the web lagged severely and you just had to guess what's on the
page you're trying to download...
recording of their signals, and couldn't make up a single word.Kevin Aylward wrote:
My information is that brain size has maxed out. The idea is that
signals take to long to transverse bigger brains,.
hmmm, that must explain the Whales capability to talk at long
distances, without the need of Internet.
What makes you think they don't use the internet? I once heard a
Apparently they're aided by telepathy to understand each other. And
that was the usual way of communication in the internet's early days,
when the web lagged severely and you just had to guess what's on the
page you're trying to download...
Best Regards,
Daniel Mandic
M
Michael Black
Guest
"Anthony Fremont" (spam-not@nowhere.com) writes:
So I'm doing what you should have done in the first place and answering
this only where it belongs, in .basics
YOu assume there is some great design decision when a circuit uses
a 2N2222 or a 2N3904.
But the reality is that for whatever reasons, those have come into
common use, going back decades. Either someone picked them out of a databook
at some point, or they were especially easily to get. It might have
even been a simple as at some point in the distant past someone found
them on a scrap board, used them, and then wrote a construction article
that used them simply because he had them. Or, in the early days of
transistors, when it was all such a new thing, there'd be articles where
someone would go through the databook, extracting useful for hobbyist
devices, and maybe even cross-referencing them to price.
It doesn't particularly matter. After a certain time, those common
transistors were being picked because they were being picked. FOr a
lot of general applications, they were a general type of transistor
that worked. So someone needs a transistor, and they look at the
construction articles and "pick" a transistor based on what others
are using. Or, the places that sold to the hobbyist had started
carrying that device because they saw it was getting some use in
the hobby magazines, so it was likely to sell. Since it was easy
to get, it was easy to use. One didn't have to dig through datasheets
trying to decide.
Whether availability proceeded useage or the reverse, it all combined.
Lots and lots of transistor types, but generally only a handful are
seen in the hobby world because they are already being used and they
are available. What better reason to continue to use them?
The hobby magazines, when they were common, would basically publish
the same circuit every few years, with some variation. The variation
was usually because someone wanted to build the thing, and they didn't
have exactly what was in the last article, so they built it their
way with what they had on hand, and wrote about it. The magazines wanted
some basic type articles of things people might want, so that wireless
microphone or Grid Dip Oscillator or even regenerative receiver would
be published every few years and there'd be little variation but some.
SOmeone didn't "design" it, they'd usually pick a circuit out of a book
or magazine, and use what they had. They did require a certain amount
of background to know what substitutes would work in the circuit, but
it doesn't take very long to get a feel for that sort of thing.
So if the 2N2222 and 2N3904 (and things like the 2N706 before that, and
even the CK722 in the very early days of hobbyist use of transistors)
were chosen because they were available and cheap and commonly used,
then it's obvious that they aren't unique devices. They work
in a lot of cases because they are a pretty bland type of transistor,
being used in pretty bland and non-critical circuits.
That means an awful lot of other transistors work too. Which means that
someone could "choose" some "oddball" transistor simply because they have
it on hand and don't have a 2N2222 (odd as that might sound) and saw that
it was similar to the commonly used transistors.
IN some cases, somone might specify some general type transistor not
commonly seen because the circuit comes from a semiconductor manufacturer
and they want to promote that device.
Or a variant, a kit manufacturer that has construction articles in the hobby
magazines ends up finding a good generic device and can get a really good
price on them if they buy in enough quantity. PAIA Electronics used to
do this with their electronic music kits, putting in really oddball
transistors but then mentioning they could get them real cheap. But if
the transistors don't go into the places selling to hobbyists, then not
only is the single quantity price likely higher than the commonly available
devices, but they may not even be easy to get for the hobbyist.
What those common transistor types often mean is a code. It means "use a
general type NPN silicon transistor with no real outstanding specs because
they aren't needed". "A 2N2222? I can use that small signal transistor
I pulled off that VCR last week". Any time someone specifies a "1N34" diode,
it really means "use a small signal germanium diode here because it really
does need a germanium diode for this application". You hoard germanium
diodes as they become less and less available, but you don't care what
number they have (if they even have a number) and realistically the hobby
dealers could list a "1N34" and it really wouldn't matter what the part
actually is, because it is the code to say "this is a germanium diode
and if you need one, we can sell you one".
IN some cases, someone putting together something may even use the code in
reverse, using that house-branded transistor off that VCR and then specifying
a 2N2222 or something like that so others could build the circuit without
having to find that VCR and get that transistor.
Elektor magazine in Europe did (or maybe still does) institutionalize
all of this, where the schematics would often have transistors denoted
by "TUP" or "TUN" (I'm not sure I've got that right) which would mean
"Transistor, Universal, Pnp [or Npn]" and then on the page where they'd
explain their schematic symbols they'd have a bit about how the specific
type of transistor wasn't important, just the general range of transistor.
This doesn't mean one can do wholesale substitution without a care. It
means that when someone gains a level of understanding, they understand
what the parts are doing and they get an idea of what sort of
variation is acceptable (this isn't design, this is rule of thumb),
they can make substitutes. It also puts them in good stead for realizing
that a circuit over there is audio and can get away with a more leeway
than that circuit over there that is running at a very high frequency
and likely does need more care in layout, that it likely is more critical
of smaller variations, and the active devices may need to be a of a
better spec than generic transistors (or at the very least, you pull
the transistor off something that is using higher frequency transistors
like the rf preamplifier of an FM broadcast band radio). Or, you discern
from looking at the schematic that it's an audio power amplifier and a
low power generic transistor won't have the current capability required.
And you realize that you may need to make some slight adjustments when
you fiddle with things, to compensate for the changes you did make.
Just because a schematic shows 1.1K resistors doesn't mean you have
to use them, or that there's some "design" reason that they were used.
I once got a really good deal on a lot of 1.1K resistors, about thirty
years ago, and I use them because I have them and they have full leads.
For pretty much all useage, they work fine as "1K" resistors that others
might specify.
Michael
and .designI'm looking at this schematic and am wondering why the designer chose a
2N2369 over a 2N2222 or 2N3904? I looked at the datasheet for the 2N2369,
and I didn't see anythng amazing about jumping off the page. Did I miss
something. The maximum frequency expected would be under 30MHz.
http://homepage.eircom.net/~ei9gq/stab.html
He also makes a big deal out of the particular op-amp chosen as (what
appears to be) a simple voltage follower. Any reason that you all can think
of?
I refuse to answer a post that is cross-posted to sci.electronics.basics
So I'm doing what you should have done in the first place and answering
this only where it belongs, in .basics
YOu assume there is some great design decision when a circuit uses
a 2N2222 or a 2N3904.
But the reality is that for whatever reasons, those have come into
common use, going back decades. Either someone picked them out of a databook
at some point, or they were especially easily to get. It might have
even been a simple as at some point in the distant past someone found
them on a scrap board, used them, and then wrote a construction article
that used them simply because he had them. Or, in the early days of
transistors, when it was all such a new thing, there'd be articles where
someone would go through the databook, extracting useful for hobbyist
devices, and maybe even cross-referencing them to price.
It doesn't particularly matter. After a certain time, those common
transistors were being picked because they were being picked. FOr a
lot of general applications, they were a general type of transistor
that worked. So someone needs a transistor, and they look at the
construction articles and "pick" a transistor based on what others
are using. Or, the places that sold to the hobbyist had started
carrying that device because they saw it was getting some use in
the hobby magazines, so it was likely to sell. Since it was easy
to get, it was easy to use. One didn't have to dig through datasheets
trying to decide.
Whether availability proceeded useage or the reverse, it all combined.
Lots and lots of transistor types, but generally only a handful are
seen in the hobby world because they are already being used and they
are available. What better reason to continue to use them?
The hobby magazines, when they were common, would basically publish
the same circuit every few years, with some variation. The variation
was usually because someone wanted to build the thing, and they didn't
have exactly what was in the last article, so they built it their
way with what they had on hand, and wrote about it. The magazines wanted
some basic type articles of things people might want, so that wireless
microphone or Grid Dip Oscillator or even regenerative receiver would
be published every few years and there'd be little variation but some.
SOmeone didn't "design" it, they'd usually pick a circuit out of a book
or magazine, and use what they had. They did require a certain amount
of background to know what substitutes would work in the circuit, but
it doesn't take very long to get a feel for that sort of thing.
So if the 2N2222 and 2N3904 (and things like the 2N706 before that, and
even the CK722 in the very early days of hobbyist use of transistors)
were chosen because they were available and cheap and commonly used,
then it's obvious that they aren't unique devices. They work
in a lot of cases because they are a pretty bland type of transistor,
being used in pretty bland and non-critical circuits.
That means an awful lot of other transistors work too. Which means that
someone could "choose" some "oddball" transistor simply because they have
it on hand and don't have a 2N2222 (odd as that might sound) and saw that
it was similar to the commonly used transistors.
IN some cases, somone might specify some general type transistor not
commonly seen because the circuit comes from a semiconductor manufacturer
and they want to promote that device.
Or a variant, a kit manufacturer that has construction articles in the hobby
magazines ends up finding a good generic device and can get a really good
price on them if they buy in enough quantity. PAIA Electronics used to
do this with their electronic music kits, putting in really oddball
transistors but then mentioning they could get them real cheap. But if
the transistors don't go into the places selling to hobbyists, then not
only is the single quantity price likely higher than the commonly available
devices, but they may not even be easy to get for the hobbyist.
What those common transistor types often mean is a code. It means "use a
general type NPN silicon transistor with no real outstanding specs because
they aren't needed". "A 2N2222? I can use that small signal transistor
I pulled off that VCR last week". Any time someone specifies a "1N34" diode,
it really means "use a small signal germanium diode here because it really
does need a germanium diode for this application". You hoard germanium
diodes as they become less and less available, but you don't care what
number they have (if they even have a number) and realistically the hobby
dealers could list a "1N34" and it really wouldn't matter what the part
actually is, because it is the code to say "this is a germanium diode
and if you need one, we can sell you one".
IN some cases, someone putting together something may even use the code in
reverse, using that house-branded transistor off that VCR and then specifying
a 2N2222 or something like that so others could build the circuit without
having to find that VCR and get that transistor.
Elektor magazine in Europe did (or maybe still does) institutionalize
all of this, where the schematics would often have transistors denoted
by "TUP" or "TUN" (I'm not sure I've got that right) which would mean
"Transistor, Universal, Pnp [or Npn]" and then on the page where they'd
explain their schematic symbols they'd have a bit about how the specific
type of transistor wasn't important, just the general range of transistor.
This doesn't mean one can do wholesale substitution without a care. It
means that when someone gains a level of understanding, they understand
what the parts are doing and they get an idea of what sort of
variation is acceptable (this isn't design, this is rule of thumb),
they can make substitutes. It also puts them in good stead for realizing
that a circuit over there is audio and can get away with a more leeway
than that circuit over there that is running at a very high frequency
and likely does need more care in layout, that it likely is more critical
of smaller variations, and the active devices may need to be a of a
better spec than generic transistors (or at the very least, you pull
the transistor off something that is using higher frequency transistors
like the rf preamplifier of an FM broadcast band radio). Or, you discern
from looking at the schematic that it's an audio power amplifier and a
low power generic transistor won't have the current capability required.
And you realize that you may need to make some slight adjustments when
you fiddle with things, to compensate for the changes you did make.
Just because a schematic shows 1.1K resistors doesn't mean you have
to use them, or that there's some "design" reason that they were used.
I once got a really good deal on a lot of 1.1K resistors, about thirty
years ago, and I use them because I have them and they have full leads.
For pretty much all useage, they work fine as "1K" resistors that others
might specify.
Michael
B
Bob Myers
Guest
"RichD" <r_delaney2001@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1175748815.465976.230070@n76g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...
about citing some reputable authority? ;-)
Bob M.
news:1175748815.465976.230070@n76g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...
Well, sure, but all HE had was a Nobel Prize. HowYou read about that on some website.
Yeah, Volume 3 of Feynman's 1963 website...
about citing some reputable authority? ;-)
Bob M.
K
Kevin Aylward
Guest
partso2@yahoo.com wrote:
that one is a bit easier to change. That is, the "software" could reside as
firmware, or indeed as real hardware from the outset. Its only on a
practical matter than computers use software.
physical state that makes the computers different.
--
Kevin Aylward
ka@anasoftEXTRACT.co.uk
www.anasoft.co.uk
SuperSpice
The distinction between software and hardware at the machine level is simpleOn Apr 4, 8:33 pm, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:
part...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Apr 3, 9:09 pm, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com
wrote:
Bob Myers wrote:
"Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote in message
news:xLcQh.41626$Lz4.35150@newsfe7-gui.ntli.net...
[...] Software is
virtual. It only physically exists on some piece of hardware, but
its concepts transcends the hardware it resides on.
Strange statements from a materialist.... You actually admit
software isn't physical, it has some relation to physical reality
(hardware), and acts of physical things (you deny it below, but
don't you admit that a PC with software acts differently from one
without?).
Its not the software, its the physical embodiment of the software
that does the work.
Software when physicaliesed, is the electronic state in physical
hardware. A page of code on paper does absolutly nothing.
[...]
(note that these
statements also apply to various mathematical objects). How does
this get along with your materialist views?
No problem at all.
Software only "controls" things by virtue that is embodied in real
physical hardware. The best word I can think of is virtual. That is,
the information has abstract relevance, but without a physical
machine, the information is useless.
Okay, so your point is that software without hardware is useless, in
the physical sense (it may still be thought of as 'existing' and
having relations to other non-physical things, such as other
softwares. E.g., the SW could be said to be 'embodied' or 'part of'
another one. Here we actually talk of algorithms but I don't see the
difference in this context). But, yet, a computer without SW is also
useless.
that one is a bit easier to change. That is, the "software" could reside as
firmware, or indeed as real hardware from the outset. Its only on a
practical matter than computers use software.
No. The electronic state of the registers are physical. It is only this realSW (and other non-physical objects) must have proper means to
be physicaliesed (mind needs brain etc.) to be able to act physically,
but after all that, if there're two computers, identical in hardware
but still act differently, wouldn't you say that the difference is
non- physical?
physical state that makes the computers different.
--
Kevin Aylward
ka@anasoftEXTRACT.co.uk
www.anasoft.co.uk
SuperSpice
K
Kevin Aylward
Guest
partso2@yahoo.com wrote:
--
Kevin Aylward
ka@anasoftEXTRACT.co.uk
www.anasoft.co.uk
SuperSpice
No, I am certainly not a dualist. I never much liked fencing.On Apr 4, 8:33 pm, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:
part...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Apr 3, 9:09 pm, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com
wrote:
Bob Myers wrote:
"Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote in message
news:xLcQh.41626$Lz4.35150@newsfe7-gui.ntli.net...
[...]
Software only "controls" things by virtue that is embodied in real
physical hardware. The best word I can think of is virtual. That is,
the information has abstract relevance, but without a physical
machine, the information is useless.
I'll try to phrase my last post clearer. Hhmm. I'm not talking about
usefulness. You admit the information has relevance (btw it isn't
necessarily abstract) - doesn't it mean it has some sort of existance?
Let's put it that way. The software (or algorithm) may have many
different physicalisations (if that's the word) - the electrons in my
brain, the magnetic polarity on the hard drive, some electric states
of registers of the computer's memory (if that's it) - a lot, lot
different arrangements of these as there're a lot of programming
languages and different platforms. Don't you think these are all
manifestations of the same entity? after all, if I steal your program
and code it in another language, and you sue me, can I claim that it's
a totally different magnetic polarity/electron arrangement (which is
true) and therefore has no relation to your original software? if so,
programmers should be grateful that there aren't many meaterialist
judges...
If you agree there's some sort of abstract existance which can
influence the physical world, well, you may still not be a real
dualist,
--
Kevin Aylward
ka@anasoftEXTRACT.co.uk
www.anasoft.co.uk
SuperSpice
S
Stephen Harris
Guest
Bob Myers wrote:
I notice there is a section, 1-5 The interference of electron waves,
online, Feynman Lectures on Physics Volume 3 Chapter 01
phy.syr.edu/~czhang/book/feynman3/Ch01_1962-04-03_QuantumBehavior.pdf
"Now let us try to analyze the curve of Fig. 1-3 to see whether we
can understand the behavior of the electrons. The first thing we
would say is that since they come in lumps, each lump, which we may
as well call an electron, has come either through hole 1 or through
hole 2. Let us write this in the form of a "Proposition":
Proposition A: Each electron either goes through hole 1 or it goes
through hole 2." ...
"RichD" <r_delaney2001@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1175748815.465976.230070@n76g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...
You read about that on some website.
Yeah, Volume 3 of Feynman's 1963 website...
Well, sure, but all HE had was a Nobel Prize. How
about citing some reputable authority? ;-)
Bob M.
I notice there is a section, 1-5 The interference of electron waves,
online, Feynman Lectures on Physics Volume 3 Chapter 01
phy.syr.edu/~czhang/book/feynman3/Ch01_1962-04-03_QuantumBehavior.pdf
"Now let us try to analyze the curve of Fig. 1-3 to see whether we
can understand the behavior of the electrons. The first thing we
would say is that since they come in lumps, each lump, which we may
as well call an electron, has come either through hole 1 or through
hole 2. Let us write this in the form of a "Proposition":
Proposition A: Each electron either goes through hole 1 or it goes
through hole 2." ...
B
Bill Hobba
Guest
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:W_ZPh.5732$EJ6.1933@newsfe24.lga...
discussed it can be considered to be one. For example, a point has position
and no size, but that doesn't stop people drawing diagrams containing them
and solving problems in geometry. Do you really think the fact the points
in those diagrams have an actual size affects one iota the validity of the
result? This is really basic stuff that should have been explained when you
were about 10.
Bill
news:W_ZPh.5732$EJ6.1933@newsfe24.lga...
I very carefully explained to you that within the context of what is beingBill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:zJIPh.5459$EJ6.924@newsfe24.lga...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:%PEPh.163745$ia7.125119@newsfe14.lga...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:z3kPh.5338$EJ6.4779@newsfe24.lga...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:yyEOh.56905$mJ1.11700@newsfe22.lga...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:VHxOh.17280$nh4.11056@newsfe20.lga...
PD wrote:
On Mar 27, 3:08 pm, "RichD" <r_delaney2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Mar 24, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:
The universe and everything in it however isn't circular -
It indeed is.This is in fact very well known and understood.
yeah the speed of light is an invariant in an inertial frame,
well how do we know what is an inertial frame or not?
Look mate these issues are pretty fundamental and unresolved.
An inertial frame is a collection of objects
which are not accelerating with respect to one another.
What's the problem?
Your description is a problem.
Stomp on your gas pedal in your car.
During the acceleration, the passenger seat, the radio, the cup
holder, the steering wheel, and the door latch comprise a
collection
of objects which are not accelerating with respect to one
another.
Does this collection represent an inertial frame?
PD
The distinction made in elementary texts is flawed. An
accelerating car and a non-accelerating car are both already in
a non-inertial frame wrt to the perpendicular acceleration of
gravity.
Sure - by definition inertial frames can not contain gravity.
But it is obvious such will not affect the outcome.
In an accelerating car, any and all objects fixed to a surface
perpendicular to the acceleration of the car are still in an
inertial frame of reference wrt that surface.
No they aren't - the acceleration breaks the isotopy of an
inertial frame regardless of its direction.
How is that a different situation than with gravity?
When gravity is present space-time is curved. However by
definition an inertial frame obeys Euclidian geometry for
stationary points and lines; hence gravity is immediacy precluded.
If you are accelerating wrt to an inertial frame the force such a
frame exerts on you will have a direction and so break the assumed
isotropy of an inertial frame - so such frames can not be inertial.
Inertial frames are very special and have specific properties.
Sure, but you ignored the example of sitting on the Earth's surface
in your previous comment. Insomuch as the Earth is an inertial frame
(yes I know it isn't really, but it is dealt with as such on a
regular basis in textbooks and labs), so is the uniformly
accelerating car with the slanted surface as I described above.
No it is not inertial - even as a good approximation - you cant get
rid of the force eof acceleration that way. The only way to make an
accelerating car on the earth approximately inertial is to let it
free fall - it will not be strictly inertial due to tidal forces.
But that is true of any other object or set of objects on the surface
of the Earth as well. My slanted surface inside the car takes the
place of the surface of the earth. What fundamental difference is
there?
It is an inertial frame contain factious forces, and gravity modelled
as a force. Either one breaks the isotropy of an inertial frame. An
inertial frame containing gravity is not inertial - it is an inertial
frame containing gravity. A class full of water is not an empty
class - it is a class containing water. But for many considerations we
can ignore the water and consider it the same as an empty class eg in
saying - see that glass over there? A frame attached to the earth is
not an inertial frame - it is an inertial frame containing gravity.
For many practical purposes we can consider it inertial and ignore the
gravity eg since the gravity is so weak it will have negligible effect
on light so we can consider it inertial for the purpose of measuring
the speed of light. I am sure you think of countless others. As I
said before you are confused about semantic context.. When considering
experiments done on earth as being in an inertial frame we are assuming
the fact it is not strictly inertial has no practical effect eg if
demonstrating conservation of momentum using dry ice pucks we are not
considering movement vertically so in that context it can be considered
inertial. That is not to say it is an inertial frame in a direction
perpendicular to the vertical as you are asserting - a non inertial
frame in non inertial regardless of how you look at it - but in certain
contexts it can be considered inertial.
Which was my point. Whatever experiments you can conduct on the surface
of the earth, you could conduct on the slanted surface inside the
accelerating car with the same results/caveats.
So?
Bill
Amd the surface of the earth is often pointed to as an inertial frame of
reference, even though it really isn't.
discussed it can be considered to be one. For example, a point has position
and no size, but that doesn't stop people drawing diagrams containing them
and solving problems in geometry. Do you really think the fact the points
in those diagrams have an actual size affects one iota the validity of the
result? This is really basic stuff that should have been explained when you
were about 10.
Bill
L
Lawson English
Guest
Bill Hobba wrote:
car is a non-inertial frame of reference, while claiming that the ground
IS, that the claim was flawed, as you are willing to admit on one hand,
and then not admit on the other.
The slanted inner surface of the accelerating car is just as good (or
bad) an approximation of an inertial frame of reference as the surface
of the earth is. As I put it before you got into this rambling thread:
>>>>>>>>>>>> The distinction made in elementary texts is flawed.
And, as I pointed out, in the context of claiming that an accelerating"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:W_ZPh.5732$EJ6.1933@newsfe24.lga...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
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Bill Hobba wrote:
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Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
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Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
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PD wrote:
On Mar 27, 3:08 pm, "RichD" <r_delaney2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Mar 24, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:
The universe and everything in it however isn't circular -
It indeed is.This is in fact very well known and understood.
yeah the speed of light is an invariant in an inertial frame,
well how do we know what is an inertial frame or not?
Look mate these issues are pretty fundamental and unresolved.
An inertial frame is a collection of objects
which are not accelerating with respect to one another.
What's the problem?
Your description is a problem.
Stomp on your gas pedal in your car.
During the acceleration, the passenger seat, the radio, the cup
holder, the steering wheel, and the door latch comprise a
collection
of objects which are not accelerating with respect to one
another.
Does this collection represent an inertial frame?
PD
The distinction made in elementary texts is flawed. An
accelerating car and a non-accelerating car are both already in
a non-inertial frame wrt to the perpendicular acceleration of
gravity.
Sure - by definition inertial frames can not contain gravity.
But it is obvious such will not affect the outcome.
In an accelerating car, any and all objects fixed to a surface
perpendicular to the acceleration of the car are still in an
inertial frame of reference wrt that surface.
No they aren't - the acceleration breaks the isotopy of an
inertial frame regardless of its direction.
How is that a different situation than with gravity?
When gravity is present space-time is curved. However by
definition an inertial frame obeys Euclidian geometry for
stationary points and lines; hence gravity is immediacy precluded.
If you are accelerating wrt to an inertial frame the force such a
frame exerts on you will have a direction and so break the assumed
isotropy of an inertial frame - so such frames can not be inertial.
Inertial frames are very special and have specific properties.
Sure, but you ignored the example of sitting on the Earth's surface
in your previous comment. Insomuch as the Earth is an inertial frame
(yes I know it isn't really, but it is dealt with as such on a
regular basis in textbooks and labs), so is the uniformly
accelerating car with the slanted surface as I described above.
No it is not inertial - even as a good approximation - you cant get
rid of the force eof acceleration that way. The only way to make an
accelerating car on the earth approximately inertial is to let it
free fall - it will not be strictly inertial due to tidal forces.
But that is true of any other object or set of objects on the surface
of the Earth as well. My slanted surface inside the car takes the
place of the surface of the earth. What fundamental difference is
there?
It is an inertial frame contain factious forces, and gravity modelled
as a force. Either one breaks the isotropy of an inertial frame. An
inertial frame containing gravity is not inertial - it is an inertial
frame containing gravity. A class full of water is not an empty
class - it is a class containing water. But for many considerations we
can ignore the water and consider it the same as an empty class eg in
saying - see that glass over there? A frame attached to the earth is
not an inertial frame - it is an inertial frame containing gravity.
For many practical purposes we can consider it inertial and ignore the
gravity eg since the gravity is so weak it will have negligible effect
on light so we can consider it inertial for the purpose of measuring
the speed of light. I am sure you think of countless others. As I
said before you are confused about semantic context.. When considering
experiments done on earth as being in an inertial frame we are assuming
the fact it is not strictly inertial has no practical effect eg if
demonstrating conservation of momentum using dry ice pucks we are not
considering movement vertically so in that context it can be considered
inertial. That is not to say it is an inertial frame in a direction
perpendicular to the vertical as you are asserting - a non inertial
frame in non inertial regardless of how you look at it - but in certain
contexts it can be considered inertial.
Which was my point. Whatever experiments you can conduct on the surface
of the earth, you could conduct on the slanted surface inside the
accelerating car with the same results/caveats.
So?
Bill
Amd the surface of the earth is often pointed to as an inertial frame of
reference, even though it really isn't.
I very carefully explained to you that within the context of what is being
discussed it can be considered to be one. For example, a point has position
and no size, but that doesn't stop people drawing diagrams containing them
and solving problems in geometry. Do you really think the fact the points
in those diagrams have an actual size affects one iota the validity of the
result? This is really basic stuff that should have been explained when you
were about 10.
car is a non-inertial frame of reference, while claiming that the ground
IS, that the claim was flawed, as you are willing to admit on one hand,
and then not admit on the other.
The slanted inner surface of the accelerating car is just as good (or
bad) an approximation of an inertial frame of reference as the surface
of the earth is. As I put it before you got into this rambling thread:
>>>>>>>>>>>> The distinction made in elementary texts is flawed.
L
Lionel
Guest
On 5 Apr 2007 14:55:51 GMT, et472@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Michael Black)
wrote:
[...]
Very nice write-up, Michael, & extremely helpful for beginners.
If there's a FAQ for this group, your post should go in it.
--
W "Some people are alive only because it is illegal to kill them."
. | ,. w ,
\|/ \|/ Perna condita delenda est
---^----^---------------------------------------------------------------
wrote:
[...]
But the reality is that for whatever reasons, those have come into
common use, going back decades. Either someone picked them out of a databook
at some point, or they were especially easily to get.
[etc]
Very nice write-up, Michael, & extremely helpful for beginners.
If there's a FAQ for this group, your post should go in it.
--
W "Some people are alive only because it is illegal to kill them."
. | ,. w ,
\|/ \|/ Perna condita delenda est
---^----^---------------------------------------------------------------
A
Allan C Cybulskie
Guest
On Mar 31, 5:11 pm, "Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsizemo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
turn to the inside and introspection that you note that you need a
different explanation and get an inkling of what that explanation
might be. Thus, the verbal response is irrelevant.
constantly conscious of feeling pain and that that experience is used
to train reporting pain. In short, people look at the situations we
are in, conclude that they are likely to produce pain, and then train
children to express it as pain. This potentially causes confusions if
the child isn't really feeling pain and thus associates it with some
other feeling.
Now, you COULD be talking about "consciousness of consciousness",
where we are consciously introspecting our pain experiences to
determine the qualities we have. THIS might follow your model since
we'd have to understand that it's important before wanting to examine
it, especially for pain.
since one translation of this is that if we didn't have pain events,
we'd never learn how to react to them, and that's so obviously true
that it can't be what you mean (no one disputes that).
mean that it isn't a specific response -- ie a feeling -- and
therefore my statement is correct and meaningful.
But from the outside, it's the same verbal response. It's only if you"Allan C Cybulskie" <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote in messagenews:1175374355.966635.251410@n59g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...
On Mar 28, 4:49 pm, "Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsizemo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
"Daryl McCullough" <stevendaryl3...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:eueeep0rmt@drn.newsguy.com...
Kevin Aylward says...
I'm saying that you can give an evolutionary explanation for
*behavior*, because behavior affects survival and reproduction.
You can give an evolutionary explanation for brain structures
that give rise to those behaviors. So as long as you are identifying
consciousness with "the brain structures necessary to produce
such and such behavior" then I think it's fine to invoke
evolution as an explanation for consciousness. That's my preferred
approach. Consciousness is just another name for a sophisticated
process of modeling the world and acting on that model.
Consciousness, is more. A kick in the balls *hurts*.
But we don't know whether that is "more" or not.
Just how is that accounted for by "a sophisticated process
of modeling the world and acting on that model"?
You haven't really said what it would *mean* to account
for it. We can certainly account for the fact that a kick
in the balls causes a person to grab his crotch, to scream,
to keel over, to strike back, to avoid situations in which
that sort of thing happens. What, exactly, are you thinking
is left to account for?
I don't know what Kevin is thinking, but I'll tell you what is
unaccounted
for: the verbal response "That hurts." Accounting for that is the key to
"self-awareness," and it is reasonably well understood by a few people.
The verbal response is irrelevant: I can produce that verbal statement
without pain being anywhere near present. In fact, I just did it now,
while typing. And again.
And that would require a different explanation than the one in which someone
is actually "reporting pain."
turn to the inside and introspection that you note that you need a
different explanation and get an inkling of what that explanation
might be. Thus, the verbal response is irrelevant.
Actually, the reverse argument is more reasonable: that we areIt does not change the view that when we are
trained to "report pain" we are made "conscious of it."
constantly conscious of feeling pain and that that experience is used
to train reporting pain. In short, people look at the situations we
are in, conclude that they are likely to produce pain, and then train
children to express it as pain. This potentially causes confusions if
the child isn't really feeling pain and thus associates it with some
other feeling.
Now, you COULD be talking about "consciousness of consciousness",
where we are consciously introspecting our pain experiences to
determine the qualities we have. THIS might follow your model since
we'd have to understand that it's important before wanting to examine
it, especially for pain.
I think you'll need to translate this into non-behaviouristic English,That is, our own
response to "painful stimuli" would not discriminatively control any
behavior if the contingencies that generate such discriminative behavior
were not arranged.
since one translation of this is that if we didn't have pain events,
we'd never learn how to react to them, and that's so obviously true
that it can't be what you mean (no one disputes that).
Irrelevant. If the feeling of pain is a response, it still doesn'tThe fact that it's a verbal response ain't very interesting unless you
say what it's a response TO. And it's a response to a feeling of
pain. And that's what the problem here is, and that's what's not
accounted for.
No, it is a response to other responses.
mean that it isn't a specific response -- ie a feeling -- and
therefore my statement is correct and meaningful.
A
Allan C Cybulskie
Guest
On Mar 31, 5:24 pm, stevendaryl3...@yahoo.com (Daryl McCullough)
wrote:
anaesthetized, and you're leaning on the stove, and someone says "Your
hand's on the hot burner". Or you smell flesh burning, and look down
to see that your hand's on the hot burner. Do you think that you
won't yank your hand away in that case? Do you agree that you didn't
have any pain experience at all?
In order to see the example, you have to actually LOOK at experiences
and determine what they are. Since you eschew introspection and work
only from an external view, you seem to be loathe to even examine
that. But this simply means that you don't understand the issues that
philosophers AND cognitive scientists are struggling with.
equivalent to brain states. The basic idea is this: while it may or
may not be the case that inner states are, physically, nothing more
than brain states they are logically distinguishable since that
doesn't HAVE to be the case: it isn't logically necessary that brain
states be or produce inner experiences or feelings.
So we can ask the question if you can have brain states without inner
experiences accompanying them, and it seems that we can. It may not
be the case that we ever DO, but the possibility allows for zombies to
be considered as a reasonable thought experiment.
If you could even show that it isn't PHYSICALLY possible, you'd
probably end up rich and famous. Well, maybe famous [grin].
what you really mean?
I agree that you don't need phenomenal experience to build an
intelligent computer. My arguments here are basically against the
idea that you and others advocate that if you DID build an intelligent
robot THEN it would have phenomenal experience (or consciousness) in
all the interesting ways. I disagree with that. "As if" mentality
cannot capture what is interest about mind (basically by definition).
it. So how can it be a generalization of human mentality?
conscious, in the sense that they really have experiences. Because
for me that's what I want explained about human consciousness: the
thing that I CALL consciousness, which is the experience.
that led us to talk about and define consciousness in the first place:
phenomenal experiences. Thus, the pseudo-sock example. You can claim
that you don't care about phenomenal experiences, but you can't just
co-opt the definition of consciousness then to claim that the
philosophers are worrying about irrelevant things. In short, you
can't criticize the philosophers because they have a different
research project than you do, or at least not with anything stronger
than an opinion.
simply ignoring phenomenal experiences. This means, at a minimum,
that any machine that you build will not necessarily demonstrate that
a machine can have phenomenal experiences, since you won't have any
plans or any way to tell. So if you build an intelligent machine,
what will have to happen is that all of those philosophers will have
to get together to decide if it has phenomenal experiences or not.
You won't be able to tell (and won't care to tell).
The definition of consciousness that includes phenomenal experience
has been around for ages. Your theory is the Johnny-Come-Lately ...
and doesn't capture phenomenal experience.
socks aren't possible beyond a "I wouldn't care if the difference
you've identified existed or not", which is what you're doing.
wrote:
Well, let's look at our own experiences. Imagine that your hand isAllan C Cybulskie says...
stevendaryl3...@yahoo.com (Daryl McCullough) wrote:
Obviously, when people talk about zombies, they are
distinguishing between "as if" mental properties and
"real" mental properties. We can certainly all agree
that other humans behave as if they had sensation,
emotions, awareness, etc. But supposedly that isn't
enough to show that they have "real" mental experience.
But what does that mean? What does "real" mean in this
case? Presumably, it means "Like mine". But what notion
of "likeness" is appropriate here? Of course, no two
brains are alike, so no other brain is like mine, and
no other mind works precisely like mine. But what
range of differences is allowable for mentality to
be considered "real"?
The zombie example is clear on this: a case where there is no
experience at all.
To act like a human, the zombie must yank it's hand away
when it touches something hot. So *something* is monitoring the
zombie's environment and acting on that information. How
is such monitoring to be distinguished from "having experience"?
anaesthetized, and you're leaning on the stove, and someone says "Your
hand's on the hot burner". Or you smell flesh burning, and look down
to see that your hand's on the hot burner. Do you think that you
won't yank your hand away in that case? Do you agree that you didn't
have any pain experience at all?
In order to see the example, you have to actually LOOK at experiences
and determine what they are. Since you eschew introspection and work
only from an external view, you seem to be loathe to even examine
that. But this simply means that you don't understand the issues that
philosophers AND cognitive scientists are struggling with.
The inner experience is the inner state. It may or may not beSo: no inner speech, no inner reasoning, and no
phenomenal experiences. This is hard for us to imagine because almost
all of our knowledge and beliefs come from experience, so let me
clarify this slightly with an example: Imagine that all of your
experiences of colours come from a machine that pops up a set of text
in front of your eyes that says that the object is a particular
colour. The claimed experience of the zombie is something like
that ... except it doesn't even have the text.
Basically, for the zombie, all that happens is that the brain state
changes and the behaviour changes, with no inner states or experiences
occurring at all.
What is the distinction between "brain states" and "inner states"?
equivalent to brain states. The basic idea is this: while it may or
may not be the case that inner states are, physically, nothing more
than brain states they are logically distinguishable since that
doesn't HAVE to be the case: it isn't logically necessary that brain
states be or produce inner experiences or feelings.
So we can ask the question if you can have brain states without inner
experiences accompanying them, and it seems that we can. It may not
be the case that we ever DO, but the possibility allows for zombies to
be considered as a reasonable thought experiment.
If you could even show that it isn't PHYSICALLY possible, you'd
probably end up rich and famous. Well, maybe famous [grin].
But why can't I then claim that MIND isn't required either, and that'sThe further question is, why should anyone *care*
about the difference between "real" and "as if"
mentality?
Because what we want to explain when we want to explain mind is REAL
mentality. "As if" mentality is utterly meaningless when trying to
explain mind.
It depends on why you want such an explanation. If you are interested
in building intelligent robots, then "as if" mentality is good enough.
what you really mean?
I agree that you don't need phenomenal experience to build an
intelligent computer. My arguments here are basically against the
idea that you and others advocate that if you DID build an intelligent
robot THEN it would have phenomenal experience (or consciousness) in
all the interesting ways. I disagree with that. "As if" mentality
cannot capture what is interest about mind (basically by definition).
But it excludes phenomenal experience, or at least doesn't considerI'm using "as if" mentality as a generalization of human mentality.
it. So how can it be a generalization of human mentality?
The question is if "other apparently conscious beings" are reallySo explaining as if mentality is explaining a general phenomenon
of which human mentality is a special case. Whether that is good
enough or not depends on whether you are interested in issues that
apply to humans, but not to other apparently conscious beings.
conscious, in the sense that they really have experiences. Because
for me that's what I want explained about human consciousness: the
thing that I CALL consciousness, which is the experience.
And the philosopher's reply is that you're leaving out the main thingLet me try an analogy. Suppose we're talking about
socks. Some philosopher has a theory that there are true
socks and there are pseudo-socks. This philosopher
doesn't yet have any physical test to distinguish
true socks from pseudo-socks, and he *also* doesn't
have any explanation for why anyone would care whether
they are wearing true socks or pseudo-socks. But he
insists that there is a property of "intrinsic sockness"
that is not reducible to the physical facts. Why would
such a theory of socks make any sense? Why is the
possibility of zombies any different from the possibility
of pseudo-socks?
You have the case backwards. Here, the philosopher's have put forward
the question of what socks are. The materialist has put forward a
solution to that question. The philosopher then points out that under
the materialist's theory, you could have socks and pseudo-socks and
not be able to tell the difference.
I'm not sure which position you are calling the materialist position,
but in *my* view of mind, there is no possibility of a distinction
between mentality and pseudo-mentality. A being is conscious if it
has certain behavioral capabilities.
that led us to talk about and define consciousness in the first place:
phenomenal experiences. Thus, the pseudo-sock example. You can claim
that you don't care about phenomenal experiences, but you can't just
co-opt the definition of consciousness then to claim that the
philosophers are worrying about irrelevant things. In short, you
can't criticize the philosophers because they have a different
research project than you do, or at least not with anything stronger
than an opinion.
But you are simply rejecting it by definition, and in the processThe view that allows for the possibility of zombies is the view
that behavior is not sufficient for consciousness, that there are
necessary "inner states" that must accompany the behavior. I reject
that view, and I thereby reject the possibility of zombies.
simply ignoring phenomenal experiences. This means, at a minimum,
that any machine that you build will not necessarily demonstrate that
a machine can have phenomenal experiences, since you won't have any
plans or any way to tell. So if you build an intelligent machine,
what will have to happen is that all of those philosophers will have
to get together to decide if it has phenomenal experiences or not.
You won't be able to tell (and won't care to tell).
That's because your point of view is backwards to the real situation.Your reply here then basically
saying: "Why do I care about some philosophical argument about pseudo-
socks?" To which the philosopher replies: "Because if your theory was
right and captured all there was to know about socks, you should be
able to tell the difference between socks and pseudo-socks.".
That sounds completely backwards to me.
The definition of consciousness that includes phenomenal experience
has been around for ages. Your theory is the Johnny-Come-Lately ...
and doesn't capture phenomenal experience.
In that case, it makes sense to ask him why he things that pseudo-If someone denies that there *is* such a thing as intrinsic
sockness, and therefore denies the possibility of pseudo-socks,
how does it make sense to ask him how he would distinguish
socks from pseudo-socks?
socks aren't possible beyond a "I wouldn't care if the difference
you've identified existed or not", which is what you're doing.
A
Allan C Cybulskie
Guest
On Mar 31, 5:34 pm, stevendaryl3...@yahoo.com (Daryl McCullough)
wrote:
You and I are standing outside a building. You claim that the fire
alarm brings the fire department, and so therefore if the fire
department shows up the fire alarm was activated. So we're watching,
and the fire department shows up. And then someone wanders out from
inside the building and we ask them if the fire alarm was activated.
And they say "No". What we've done is show that saying "The fire
department showed up" is NOT equivalent to saying that the fire alarm
was activated, since it can happen without the fire alarm being
activated at all.
This is what my objection is: Pain can't just be the behaviour
normally produced by pain because that behaviour can be produced in
cases where pain was not experienced. So pain is something more than
that, and you cannot simply claim -- at a minimum -- that if something
acts as if it is in pain it really is. It may not be.
calls pain.
You can try to reduce it to the brain state, but so far that hasn't
been all that successful.
wrote:
Let's extend this example:Allan C Cybulskie says...
On Mar 29, 2:14 pm, stevendaryl3...@yahoo.com (Daryl McCullough)
wrote:
So what? I'm suggesting that once you've explained a causal
connection between (A) getting kicked in the crotch, and (B)
the behaviors that I described, then you've explained all there
is to explain about pain. The fact that the same behaviors can
arise in other circumstances doesn't affect this.
Sure it does: if I can fake those behaviours in those situations, it
means that you can't point at those situations and those behaviours
and say "That's pain." Because if the experience isn't there,
neither is the pain, as you've just admitted.
Look, let's consider a fire alarm. If there is a fire, you
pull the lever, an alarm sounds, and the fire department
shows up. There is a causal chain here: Presence of fire
gets you to pull the alarm, which brings the fire department.
Now, of course the fire department can show up even if
you *haven't* pulled the alarm.
Pain is like the fire alarm. It is an indication that
something needs to be done.
You and I are standing outside a building. You claim that the fire
alarm brings the fire department, and so therefore if the fire
department shows up the fire alarm was activated. So we're watching,
and the fire department shows up. And then someone wanders out from
inside the building and we ask them if the fire alarm was activated.
And they say "No". What we've done is show that saying "The fire
department showed up" is NOT equivalent to saying that the fire alarm
was activated, since it can happen without the fire alarm being
activated at all.
This is what my objection is: Pain can't just be the behaviour
normally produced by pain because that behaviour can be produced in
cases where pain was not experienced. So pain is something more than
that, and you cannot simply claim -- at a minimum -- that if something
acts as if it is in pain it really is. It may not be.
Sure it does: the feeling itself. Which is what everyone except you"Pain" is just
a name that we give for the causal relationship between
environmental stimuli and behaviors.
No, pain is the name we give to the phenomenal experience that occurs
due to certain environmental stimuli and causes certain behaviours to
occur.
I would say that it is a brain state that
occurs due to environmental stimuli and causes behaviors.
Adding "phenomenal experience" doesn't add anything.
calls pain.
You can try to reduce it to the brain state, but so far that hasn't
been all that successful.
D
Daryl McCullough
Guest
Allan C Cybulskie says...
fire department can show up even if you haven't pulled the alarm".
The implication is the other way around: *If* the alarm is
activated, *then* the fire department will eventually show up.
is the role it plays in the scenario: A person notices a fire.
He pulls the alarm. The fire department comes and puts out the
fire.
The alarm could be replaced by "Shooting off a flare gun" or
"Ringing a loud bell" or "shining the Bat Signal on the clouds".
There is nothing particularly "alarmlike" about the alarm. It's
just a convention.
I think that pain is the same sort of thing as an alarm.
Physical damage to the body triggers a certain response
pattern in the nervous system. This in turn triggers
certain behavior (or at modulates existing behavior).
There is nothing particularly "painlike" about the
response pattern. What makes it "pain" is the role
it plays in the scenario: Body is damaged, pain is
registered, body responds.
things. Is a fire alarm "something more" than a way of summoning
the fire department? Not really. That's its only significance.
There are other ways of summoning the fire department, but
the fire alarm is a particular, conventional way of doing it.
--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY
No, I specifically did *not* say that. I said "of course thestevendaryl3...@yahoo.com (Daryl McCullough) wrote:
Look, let's consider a fire alarm. If there is a fire, you
pull the lever, an alarm sounds, and the fire department
shows up. There is a causal chain here: Presence of fire
gets you to pull the alarm, which brings the fire department.
Now, of course the fire department can show up even if
you *haven't* pulled the alarm.
Pain is like the fire alarm. It is an indication that
something needs to be done.
Let's extend this example:
You and I are standing outside a building. You claim that the fire
alarm brings the fire department, and so therefore if the fire
department shows up the fire alarm was activated.
fire department can show up even if you haven't pulled the alarm".
The implication is the other way around: *If* the alarm is
activated, *then* the fire department will eventually show up.
My point is that what makes a particular object a "fire alarm"So we're watching, and the fire department shows up. And then
someone wanders out from inside the building and we ask them if
the fire alarm was activated. And they say "No". What we've
done is show that saying "The fire department showed up" is NOT
equivalent to saying that the fire alarm was activated, since
it can happen without the fire alarm being activated at all.
is the role it plays in the scenario: A person notices a fire.
He pulls the alarm. The fire department comes and puts out the
fire.
The alarm could be replaced by "Shooting off a flare gun" or
"Ringing a loud bell" or "shining the Bat Signal on the clouds".
There is nothing particularly "alarmlike" about the alarm. It's
just a convention.
I think that pain is the same sort of thing as an alarm.
Physical damage to the body triggers a certain response
pattern in the nervous system. This in turn triggers
certain behavior (or at modulates existing behavior).
There is nothing particularly "painlike" about the
response pattern. What makes it "pain" is the role
it plays in the scenario: Body is damaged, pain is
registered, body responds.
Calling it "something more" is a misleading way of sayingThis is what my objection is: Pain can't just be the behaviour
normally produced by pain because that behaviour can be produced in
cases where pain was not experienced. So pain is something more than
that, and you cannot simply claim -- at a minimum -- that if something
acts as if it is in pain it really is. It may not be.
things. Is a fire alarm "something more" than a way of summoning
the fire department? Not really. That's its only significance.
There are other ways of summoning the fire department, but
the fire alarm is a particular, conventional way of doing it.
--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY
P
Pete
Guest
There was this idea in Elektor magazine last year.
http://www.elektor.com/Default.aspx?tabid=28&year=2006&month=5&art=53039
Pete
http://www.elektor.com/Default.aspx?tabid=28&year=2006&month=5&art=53039
Pete
Guest
On Apr 5, 8:30 pm, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:
can be physicalised in many different ways). And it can affect a
computer's behaviour (after physicalised etc. - the computer's
behaviour follows the algorithm. Okay, this point needs a better
definition but I hope the idea's clear - anyawy the main point is that
it exists). And that it's a real thing? so real that it can put you in
jail, if you're an algorithm thief (or a SW thief) even though you
didn't steal/copy any physical thing (I mean you physicalised the
algorithm in a different language)?
Wouldn't you agree that mathematical objects exist? or do you think
mathematicians waste their time studing non-existing structures?
(unless of course you define 'existance' as material existance, in
which case we'll need to use another word, but the idea's the same).
Wouldn't you agree that an algorithm is non-physical? (abviously itpart...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Apr 4, 8:33 pm, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:
part...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Apr 3, 9:09 pm, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com
wrote:
Bob Myers wrote:
"Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote in message
news:xLcQh.41626$Lz4.35150@newsfe7-gui.ntli.net...
[...] Software is
virtual. It only physically exists on some piece of hardware, but
its concepts transcends the hardware it resides on.
Strange statements from a materialist.... You actually admit
software isn't physical, it has some relation to physical reality
(hardware), and acts of physical things (you deny it below, but
don't you admit that a PC with software acts differently from one
without?).
Its not the software, its the physical embodiment of the software
that does the work.
Software when physicaliesed, is the electronic state in physical
hardware. A page of code on paper does absolutly nothing.
[...]
(note that these
statements also apply to various mathematical objects). How does
this get along with your materialist views?
No problem at all.
Software only "controls" things by virtue that is embodied in real
physical hardware. The best word I can think of is virtual. That is,
the information has abstract relevance, but without a physical
machine, the information is useless.
Okay, so your point is that software without hardware is useless, in
the physical sense (it may still be thought of as 'existing' and
having relations to other non-physical things, such as other
softwares. E.g., the SW could be said to be 'embodied' or 'part of'
another one. Here we actually talk of algorithms but I don't see the
difference in this context). But, yet, a computer without SW is also
useless.
The distinction between software and hardware at the machine level is simple
that one is a bit easier to change. That is, the "software" could reside as
firmware, or indeed as real hardware from the outset. Its only on a
practical matter than computers use software.
Okay, so you DO want me to differ between algorithm and software.
can be physicalised in many different ways). And it can affect a
computer's behaviour (after physicalised etc. - the computer's
behaviour follows the algorithm. Okay, this point needs a better
definition but I hope the idea's clear - anyawy the main point is that
it exists). And that it's a real thing? so real that it can put you in
jail, if you're an algorithm thief (or a SW thief) even though you
didn't steal/copy any physical thing (I mean you physicalised the
algorithm in a different language)?
Wouldn't you agree that mathematical objects exist? or do you think
mathematicians waste their time studing non-existing structures?
(unless of course you define 'existance' as material existance, in
which case we'll need to use another word, but the idea's the same).
--
Kevin Aylward
k...@anasoftEXTRACT.co.ukwww.anasoft.co.uk
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