Chip with simple program for Toy

[Daryl McCullough]

Allan C Cybulskie says...

stevendaryl3...@yahoo.com (Daryl McCullough) wrote:

To act like a human, the zombie must yank it's hand away
when it touches something hot. So *something* is monitoring the
zombie's environment and acting on that information. How
is such monitoring to be distinguished from "having experience"?

Well, let's look at our own experiences. Imagine that your hand is
anaesthetized, and you're leaning on the stove, and someone says "Your
hand's on the hot burner". Or you smell flesh burning, and look down
to see that your hand's on the hot burner. Do you think that you
won't yank your hand away in that case? Do you agree that you didn't
have any pain experience at all?

Well, a person with anaesthetized hand will *not* be behaviorally
equivalent to a person with an unanaesthetized hand. So the zombies
that I'm talking about are (by assumption) behaviorally identical
to a normal human being.

If the zombie is just doing a deduction "Hey, my hand is getting
burnt. I should probably remove it." then it's not likely that he
will be behaviorally equivalent to a regular human.

In order to see the example, you have to actually LOOK at experiences
and determine what they are. Since you eschew introspection and work
only from an external view, you seem to be loathe to even examine
that.

No, I don't eschew introspection, but I don't believe that it
is an infallible guide to what is going on, either. I take Dennett's
"heterophenomenological" approach. The fact that I am able to
distinguish between two different situations, and that I call one
"feeling pain" but not the other is indeed an important clue as
to what's going on. Any complete model of the human mind must be
able to explain why people claim to be in pain in some circumstances
and not in others.

Basically, for the zombie, all that happens is that the brain state
changes and the behaviour changes, with no inner states or experiences
occurring at all.

What is the distinction between "brain states" and "inner states"?

The inner experience is the inner state. It may or may not be
equivalent to brain states. The basic idea is this: while it may or
may not be the case that inner states are, physically, nothing more
than brain states they are logically distinguishable since that
doesn't HAVE to be the case: it isn't logically necessary that brain
states be or produce inner experiences or feelings.

If the word "feelings" hasn't been defined, then it's *logically*
possible that rocks have feelings or that the number 7 has feelings.
If you are relying exclusively on introspection for your primary
notion of what a "feeling" is, then I don't see how you can ever
generalize that notion to someone besides yourself. On the other
hand, you certainly can generalize to others by using functional
roles: What plays the same (or similar) role for another person
that feelings play for you.

It depends on why you want such an explanation. If you are interested
in building intelligent robots, then "as if" mentality is good enough.

But why can't I then claim that MIND isn't required either, and that's
what you really mean?

It's not what I really mean, because that assumes that the
word "mind" has a unique referent, which isn't at all clear
to me. You can say that it is perfectly clear to you what
*YOUR* mind is, but that doesn't actually mean that the
word "mind" as applied to others *BESIDES* yourself has a
clear referent.

You're trying to generalize from a single instance, and there
is no unique way to do that.

The question is if "other apparently conscious beings" are really
conscious, in the sense that they really have experiences.

I'm claiming that the phrase "really have experiences" doesn't
have a unique meaning. So your question doesn't have an answer.
It depends on what counts as "really having experiences", and
you haven't specified what counts (in any noncircular way).

--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY

 

[Aly]

"Pete" <news@petesworld.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
news:ev5koa$5c2$1$8300dec7@news.demon.co.uk...

There was this idea in Elektor magazine last year.

http://www.elektor.com/Default.aspx?tabid=28&year=2006&month=5&art=53039

Pete

Thanks Pete, looking into this now

Lots of info going on here, certainly enough to give someone pointers on
Google Groups in the future.

Aly

 

[John Larkin]

On Fri, 06 Apr 2007 23:51:11 +0200, K2 <news4k@arcor.de> wrote:

Hi Guys,

under:

http://www.avxcorp.com/docs/techinfo/eqtant.pdf

you can find some basics about the 'ESR' of a Capacitor.

A formula is shown describing the 'ESR' as: Rp/((2*Pi*f*Cp*Rp)^2+1)
and the 'ESC' is : Cp+1/((2*Pi*f*Rp)^2*Cp)



I guess, that the basic model looks like this:

|| __________ __________
--------o----------||--------o-----|__________|-------|==========|----
| || Cp | Rs Ls
| ___________ |
|---|___________|----|
Rp


My first Questions:

Is the formula for the ESR correct??
Paralleling Cp and Rp should result into an impedance of:
Rp/sqrt(1+(2*Pi*f*R*C)^2)

Or NOT????


My second Question:

I don't have a glue how the 'ESC' has to be calculated at all.
What is the idea behind that?



So long


Karsten

ESR = Rs.

I have no idea what ESC stands for.

Avoid tantalums. They tend to explode.

John

 

[Rupert]

On Mar 30, 1:16 pm, stevendaryl3...@yahoo.com (Daryl McCullough)
wrote:

I think that's completely wrong. Pain is only pain because
of the sort of behavior that it leads to. If you could completely
disconnect pain from behavior, it wouldn't be pain anymore.

Suppose that some sophisticated brain surgery rewired your
brain so that the sensation of tasting sweetness and
the sensation of pain were switched. So tasting sweetness
causes pain, and stubbing your toe causes you to taste
sweetness. But the rewiring also made the corresponding
change in behavior, so that you tend to flinch when you
taste sweetness, but you tend to seek out pain (especially
painful ice-cream).

Even if we assume that, as you contend, there's no hard problem of
consciousness, it's not inconceivable that we might develop a theory
of consciousness on which such a hypothetical scenario might make
sense, and still be distinguishable from the actual scenario. (Or,
alternatively, we might develop a theory of consciousness which
explains why such a hypothetical scenario is impossible). You can't
just crudely say that pain and tasting sweetness are logically tied to
the behaviours we normally associate with them. We haven't yet
developed a detailed explanation of why pain and the taste of
sweetness generally cause the reactions they do. When we have such an
explanation, we might be able to make sense of how things could be
different.

 

[David Harmon]

On 6 Apr 2007 16:54:57 -0700 in sci.electronics.basics,
dave_mallon123@hotmail.co.uk wrote,

Just curious to what you think of this idea of extending the range.

A leisure battery from a scrap yard 12v 110 amp - Ł30
A fast charger 22amp from Argos - Ł40
A 12v to 36 dc to dc convertor - Ł70
A current limiting diode.

Ł30 sounds like way too much for a knackered battery that will
probably last a few more weeks in heavy use.
Offer Ł30 for three of them, then wire them in series.

 

[Bill Hobba]

"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
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Bill Hobba wrote:
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Bill Hobba wrote:
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PD wrote:
On Mar 27, 3:08 pm, "RichD" <r_delaney2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Mar 24, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com
wrote:

The universe and everything in it however isn't circular -
It indeed is.This is in fact very well known and
understood.
yeah the speed of light is an invariant in an inertial
frame,
well how do we know what is an inertial frame or not?
Look mate these issues are pretty fundamental and
unresolved.
An inertial frame is a collection of objects
which are not accelerating with respect to one another.

What's the problem?
Your description is a problem.

Stomp on your gas pedal in your car.
During the acceleration, the passenger seat, the radio, the
cup
holder, the steering wheel, and the door latch comprise a
collection
of objects which are not accelerating with respect to one
another.
Does this collection represent an inertial frame?

PD

The distinction made in elementary texts is flawed. An
accelerating car and a non-accelerating car are both already
in a non-inertial frame wrt to the perpendicular acceleration
of gravity.
Sure - by definition inertial frames can not contain gravity.
But it is obvious such will not affect the outcome.

In an accelerating car, any and all objects fixed to a
surface perpendicular to the acceleration of the car are still
in an inertial frame of reference wrt that surface.
No they aren't - the acceleration breaks the isotopy of an
inertial frame regardless of its direction.

How is that a different situation than with gravity?
When gravity is present space-time is curved. However by
definition an inertial frame obeys Euclidian geometry for
stationary points and lines; hence gravity is immediacy
precluded. If you are accelerating wrt to an inertial frame the
force such a frame exerts on you will have a direction and so
break the assumed isotropy of an inertial frame - so such frames
can not be inertial. Inertial frames are very special and have
specific properties.
Sure, but you ignored the example of sitting on the Earth's
surface in your previous comment. Insomuch as the Earth is an
inertial frame (yes I know it isn't really, but it is dealt with
as such on a regular basis in textbooks and labs), so is the
uniformly accelerating car with the slanted surface as I described
above.
No it is not inertial - even as a good approximation - you cant get
rid of the force eof acceleration that way. The only way to make
an accelerating car on the earth approximately inertial is to let
it free fall - it will not be strictly inertial due to tidal
forces.
But that is true of any other object or set of objects on the
surface of the Earth as well. My slanted surface inside the car
takes the place of the surface of the earth. What fundamental
difference is there?
It is an inertial frame contain factious forces, and gravity modelled
as a force. Either one breaks the isotropy of an inertial frame. An
inertial frame containing gravity is not inertial - it is an inertial
frame containing gravity. A class full of water is not an empty
class - it is a class containing water. But for many considerations
we can ignore the water and consider it the same as an empty class eg
in saying - see that glass over there? A frame attached to the earth
is not an inertial frame - it is an inertial frame containing
gravity. For many practical purposes we can consider it inertial and
ignore the gravity eg since the gravity is so weak it will have
negligible effect on light so we can consider it inertial for the
purpose of measuring the speed of light. I am sure you think of
countless others. As I said before you are confused about semantic
context.. When considering experiments done on earth as being in an
inertial frame we are assuming the fact it is not strictly inertial
has no practical effect eg if demonstrating conservation of momentum
using dry ice pucks we are not considering movement vertically so in
that context it can be considered inertial. That is not to say it is
an inertial frame in a direction perpendicular to the vertical as you
are asserting - a non inertial frame in non inertial regardless of
how you look at it - but in certain contexts it can be considered
inertial.
Which was my point. Whatever experiments you can conduct on the
surface of the earth, you could conduct on the slanted surface inside
the accelerating car with the same results/caveats.
So?

Bill
Amd the surface of the earth is often pointed to as an inertial frame of
reference, even though it really isn't.

I very carefully explained to you that within the context of what is
being discussed it can be considered to be one. For example, a point has
position and no size, but that doesn't stop people drawing diagrams
containing them and solving problems in geometry. Do you really think
the fact the points in those diagrams have an actual size affects one
iota the validity of the result? This is really basic stuff that should
have been explained when you were about 10.


And, as I pointed out, in the context of claiming that an accelerating car
is a non-inertial frame of reference, while claiming that the ground IS,
that the claim was flawed, as you are willing to admit on one hand, and
then not admit on the other.

As I pointed out your inability to conceptualise and abstract away
inessentials will not enable you to make progress in physics; just like a
failure to realize that the points drawn in a diagram used to resolve
problems in geometry having an actual size does not affect the result. If
you can't see what is obvious to a 10 year old - so be it. But just as flat
earth nuts can't see what is obvious to anyone else does not affect the fact
the earth is not flat, you inability to understand that the earth is not a
strictly inertial frame in no way affects the conclusions drawn from
assuming it is in inertial for many problems. The problems for which such
is the case are often utterly and tritely obvious, which is why it is often
never mentioned - eg the case mentioned by PD of the accelerating car -
simply imagine the car on a road in interstellar space and you will obtain
exactly the same result. It will only be mentioned when it is not trivially
obvious and some elaboration is required to see it. This is a very common
fact about the semantics of the way we communicate - so common and obvious
few would ever consider it worthy of being pointed out - except maybe to
anal 'armchair' philosophy types.

Bill

The slanted inner surface of the accelerating car is just as good (or bad)
an approximation of an inertial frame of reference as the surface of the
earth is. As I put it before you got into this rambling thread:

The distinction made in elementary texts is flawed.

 

[Chris]

On Apr 6, 6:54 pm, dave_mallon...@hotmail.co.uk wrote:

Hi,

In the last few days,
I've bought a 22 inch electric bike 2nd hand for Ł120.

It's been pretty impressive so far imho.

Problem is,
as people probably already know, is the battery...

At the moment,
it does 12 miles at 17 mph quite comfortably with no input from the
rider.
(36v 12 amp lead acid battery)

Just curious to what you think of this idea of extending the range.

A leisure battery from a scrap yard 12v 110 amp - Ł30
A fast charger 22amp from Argos - Ł40
A 12v to 36 dc to dc convertor - Ł70
A current limiting diode.

ie 12v at 110amps,
probably equals 36 volt at 30amp = 2 times as far = 25 miles,
(taking into account the extra weight and the loss of electric
convertion)

but I reckon it should be good for an approx range of 30 miles of
effortless riding.

Any comments? Ideas?

Thanks,
Dave

Apart from the probably disappointing conversion efficiency, and the
lowered range due to increased weight, most DC-to-DC converters have a
really tough time with inductive loads like motors. I'd consider it
likely you'll smoke the converter.

If you want increase range, it might be a better idea just to scout
around for a better 12V battery with a higher A-h rating. You'll
still have to pay the penalty for increased weight, but as long as
your weight plus the additional battery weight is less than the bike's
rated maximum, you'll come out ahead.

Cheers
Chris

 

[Bill Hobba]

"RichD" <r_delaney2001@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1175568855.648953.246300@e65g2000hsc.googlegroups.com...

On Mar 31, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:
Kevin, you have made claims about inertial frames of
reference, acceleration, and the equivalence principle,
containing 'fundamental, unresolved' logical problems.

GR contains no fundamental unresolved problems.

err, your kidding right?
I dont have time to go into it right now, but trust me, there are quite a
few unresolved issues.

OK, we trust you, and we concede the debate to your
unassailable rhetoric and reasoning.

You're too tough, Kev.

Your attention is drawn to a post a did I did on this very issue in
sci.physics.relativity, and reposed to by well respected relativity expert,
Steve Carlap. The issue of if there is fundamental unresolved problems in
GR is one purely of semantics about what is meant by 'fundamental unresolved
issues'. His view, and mine as well, is there aren't any.

Thanks
Bill

--
Rich

 

[Bill Hobba]

"RichD" <r_delaney2001@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1175568588.050052.133110@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...

On Mar 30, "Bill Hobba" <rubb...@junk.com> wrote:

snip

Now here's a conundrum for you - when standing on flat
ground, you feel your weight, i.e. there is a force
acting on you, yet you are not moving. Hence there
is a positive force, but zero acceleration!

Sure there is a positive force - but what made the force of gravity go
away?
And if you include that guess what the net force is? Try thinking a
little
clearer.

It is my experience that the ability to detect sarcasm
is a useful indicator of IQ.

Quite possibly

Thanks
Bill

Chew on that one, Grasshopper... while Newton rolls
his eyes...


--
Rich

 

[Lawson English]

Bill Hobba wrote:
[...]

As I pointed out your inability to conceptualise and abstract away
inessentials will not enable you to make progress in physics; just like a
failure to realize that the points drawn in a diagram used to resolve
problems in geometry having an actual size does not affect the result. If
you can't see what is obvious to a 10 year old - so be it. But just as flat
earth nuts can't see what is obvious to anyone else does not affect the fact
the earth is not flat, you inability to understand that the earth is not a
strictly inertial frame in no way affects the conclusions drawn from
assuming it is in inertial for many problems.

I see, so the following shows that I don't understand that the Earth is
not a strictly inertial frame?

The distinction made [between accelerating car
and the Earth's surface] in elementary texts is flawed.

 

[Chris]

On Apr 6, 8:12 pm, "Chris" <cfoley1...@yahoo.com> wrote:

On Apr 6, 6:54 pm, dave_mallon...@hotmail.co.uk wrote:





Hi,

In the last few days,
I've bought a 22 inch electric bike 2nd hand for Ł120.

It's been pretty impressive so far imho.

Problem is,
as people probably already know, is the battery...

At the moment,
it does 12 miles at 17 mph quite comfortably with no input from the
rider.
(36v 12 amp lead acid battery)

Just curious to what you think of this idea of extending the range.

A leisure battery from a scrap yard 12v 110 amp - Ł30
A fast charger 22amp from Argos - Ł40
A 12v to 36 dc to dc convertor - Ł70
A current limiting diode.

ie 12v at 110amps,
probably equals 36 volt at 30amp = 2 times as far = 25 miles,
(taking into account the extra weight and the loss of electric
convertion)

but I reckon it should be good for an approx range of 30 miles of
effortless riding.

Any comments? Ideas?

Thanks,
Dave

Apart from the probably disappointing conversion efficiency, and the
lowered range due to increased weight, most DC-to-DC converters have a
really tough time with inductive loads like motors. I'd consider it
likely you'll smoke the converter.

If you want increase range, it might be a better idea just to scout
around for a better 12V battery with a higher A-h rating. You'll
still have to pay the penalty for increased weight, but as long as
your weight plus the additional battery weight is less than the bike's
rated maximum, you'll come out ahead.

Cheers
Chris- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

Sorry -- get a higher A-h *36V* battery (or put three higher A-h 12V
batteries in series to make 36V total).

Cheers
Chris

 

[Phil Allison]

"K2"

http://www.avxcorp.com/docs/techinfo/eqtant.pdf

you can find some basics about the 'ESR' of a Capacitor.

A formula is shown describing the 'ESR' as: Rp/((2*Pi*f*Cp*Rp)^2+1)
and the 'ESC' is : Cp+1/((2*Pi*f*Rp)^2*Cp)

** The formulae applies to fig 4 which shows a perfect capacitor in
parallel with a resistor.

I guess, that the basic model looks like this:

|| __________ __________
--------o----------||--------o-----|__________|-------|==========|----
| || Cp | Rs Ls
| ___________ |
|---|___________|----|
Rp

** No.

Fig 4 does not show what you drew.

My first Questions:

Is the formula for the ESR correct??

** For the case shown in of fig 4 only.

My second Question:

I don't have a glue how the 'ESC' has to be calculated at all.
What is the idea behind that?

** To make the parallel and serie scircuits bahave the same at the frequency
of interest.

Same impedance and same phase angle.




........ Phil

 

[Jean-Yves]

In article <4616c0a4$0$15942$9b4e6d93@newsspool4.arcor-online.net>,
K2 <news4k@arcor.de> wrote:

Hi Guys,

under:

http://www.avxcorp.com/docs/techinfo/eqtant.pdf

you can find some basics about the 'ESR' of a Capacitor.

A formula is shown describing the 'ESR' as: Rp/((2*Pi*f*Cp*Rp)^2+1)
and the 'ESC' is : Cp+1/((2*Pi*f*Rp)^2*Cp)



I guess, that the basic model looks like this:

|| __________ __________
--------o----------||--------o-----|__________|-------|==========|----
| || Cp | Rs Ls
| ___________ |
|---|___________|----|
Rp


My first Questions:

Is the formula for the ESR correct??
Paralleling Cp and Rp should result into an impedance of:
Rp/sqrt(1+(2*Pi*f*R*C)^2)

Or NOT????


My second Question:

I don't have a glue how the 'ESC' has to be calculated at all.
What is the idea behind that?



So long


Karsten

some beginning of the answer... :
http://members.ozemail.com.au/~bobpar/k7214.pdf

regards,

--
Jean-Yves.

 

[Daniel Mandic]

partso2@yahoo.com wrote:

On Apr 5, 11:00 am, "Daniel Mandic" <daniel_man...@aon.at> wrote:
Kevin Aylward wrote:
My information is that brain size has maxed out. The idea is that
signals take to long to transverse bigger brains,.

hmmm, that must explain the Whales capability to talk at long
distances, without the need of Internet.

What makes you think they don't use the internet? I once heard a
recording of their signals, and couldn't make up a single word.
Apparently they're aided by telepathy to understand each other. And
that was the usual way of communication in the internet's early days,
when the web lagged severely and you just had to guess what's on the
page you're trying to download...

Best Regards,

Daniel Mandic

Today, when I search for a homepage, I am still trying to type in the
URL, just idea-minded... before I set to search the right url, on some
search-sites.



No, I meant the Whale is the Master of the Brain on Earth. No other
mammal do have such a big one.
I think the global warming is the right approach for the survival of
the Whales.



Best regards,

Daniel Mandic

 

[MassiveProng]

On Sat, 07 Apr 2007 00:29:55 GMT, David Harmon <source@netcom.com>
Gave us:

On 6 Apr 2007 16:54:57 -0700 in sci.electronics.basics,
dave_mallon123@hotmail.co.uk wrote,
Just curious to what you think of this idea of extending the range.

A leisure battery from a scrap yard 12v 110 amp - Ł30
A fast charger 22amp from Argos - Ł40
A 12v to 36 dc to dc convertor - Ł70
A current limiting diode.

Ł30 sounds like way too much for a knackered battery that will
probably last a few more weeks in heavy use.
Offer Ł30 for three of them, then wire them in series.

Also, he would need a 12V to 40V converter as 36V is not enough to
charge 3 12V lead acid batteries in series. This is a bad idea for
many reasons.

Also much cheaper and more "replenishing" to charge each
individually with a single 12V charger meant for the purpose. Leaving
them in series and charging all three as a single battery can lead to
a "memory effect" where the slight differences in internal resistance
of each battery can (and will) lead to one or two of them not
receiving a full charge. More like a fool charge! Final charged
voltage slowly creeps downward.

One can create a watchdog circuit that can be placed on all three
while seriesed, and apply the 12V charge (13.8V actually) to that
circuit, and let it trickle charge the battery array, topping off each
battery as needed.

 

[Joe Durnavich]

Allan C Cybulskie writes:

This is what my objection is: Pain can't just be the behaviour
normally produced by pain because that behaviour can be produced in
cases where pain was not experienced. So pain is something more than
that, and you cannot simply claim -- at a minimum -- that if something
acts as if it is in pain it really is. It may not be.

I think the problem is in the question itself: What is pain? Philosophy
tends to ask such questions, but they mislead you into looking for a
distinct "something" that is the referent of the word "pain". Notice here,
Allan, that you talk about pain indirectly: Pain must be something other
than behavior.

No, pain is the name we give to the phenomenal experience that occurs
due to certain environmental stimuli and causes certain behaviours to
occur.

I would say that it is a brain state that
occurs due to environmental stimuli and causes behaviors.
Adding "phenomenal experience" doesn't add anything.

Sure it does: the feeling itself. Which is what everyone except you
calls pain.

What feeling is that? Can you say? How do you know you have been calling
the right feeling "pain" all these years? Perhaps the feeling you have is
different from what the rest of us have. Would you then be wrong about
what pain is?

The problem, and I see a bit of it with Daryl, too, is that you both want
to reduce pain to a specific "something". But pain-language doesn't lend
itself to that except, perhaps, metaphorically. Daryl, however, recognizes
that the wider context is what is ultimately relevant.

Daryl: What do you mean by "a brain state"? In Photoshop, red might be
encoded as the RGB triplet (255, 0, 0). Is the "pain brain state"
something like that? In the brain, might (255, 0, 0) be intense pain, and
(0, 255, 0) the state for intense fear? Is the difference between pain and
fear to be found in a study of those two triplets?

--
Joe Durnavich

 

[Glen M. Sizemore]

"Joe Durnavich" <joejd@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:4hdf139t3tg20alj411nm7qn32g319uimg@4ax.com...

Allan C Cybulskie writes:

This is what my objection is: Pain can't just be the behaviour
normally produced by pain because that behaviour can be produced in
cases where pain was not experienced. So pain is something more than
that, and you cannot simply claim -- at a minimum -- that if something
acts as if it is in pain it really is. It may not be.

I think the problem is in the question itself: What is pain? Philosophy
tends to ask such questions, but they mislead you into looking for a
distinct "something" that is the referent of the word "pain". Notice
here,
Allan, that you talk about pain indirectly: Pain must be something other
than behavior.

No, pain is the name we give to the phenomenal experience that occurs
due to certain environmental stimuli and causes certain behaviours to
occur.

I would say that it is a brain state that
occurs due to environmental stimuli and causes behaviors.
Adding "phenomenal experience" doesn't add anything.

Sure it does: the feeling itself. Which is what everyone except you
calls pain.

What feeling is that? Can you say? How do you know you have been calling
the right feeling "pain" all these years? Perhaps the feeling you have is
different from what the rest of us have. Would you then be wrong about
what pain is?

The problem, and I see a bit of it with Daryl, too, is that you both want
to reduce pain to a specific "something". But pain-language doesn't lend
itself to that except, perhaps, metaphorically. Daryl, however,
recognizes
that the wider context is what is ultimately relevant.

Yet, "pains" must have sufficient "family resemblance" for there to be
generalization to novel circumstances. I won't comment on Cybulski's
position right now - there is just too much wrong with it. Daryl's position
is somewhat like methodological behaviorism, arguing, I think, that "feeling
pain" is, in fact, something real, but it is to be left out of a scientific
analysis. What is missed, of course, is the view that objective vs.
subjective is a matter of accessibility, not ontology. "Subjective
experience" can be dealt with in terms of the science of stimulus control;
we are trained to respond to parts of the world and to, thereby, "become
aware of them," and part of the world that we respond to is accessible only
to one person. There is no difference, from a behavioral process standpoint,
between responding to someone else's behavior or responding to one's own,
except for the contact that can be made. Because of this, we may respond to
aspects of our own behavior that only we can see, but "consciousness" in th
sense of "self-awareness" is simply a matter of ou own bhavior, public or
private, exerting operant stimulus control over some other response.

Daryl: What do you mean by "a brain state"? In Photoshop, red might be
encoded as the RGB triplet (255, 0, 0). Is the "pain brain state"
something like that? In the brain, might (255, 0, 0) be intense pain, and
(0, 255, 0) the state for intense fear? Is the difference between pain
and
fear to be found in a study of those two triplets?

--
Joe Durnavich

 

[Glen M. Sizemore]

"Allan C Cybulskie" <allan_c_cybulskie@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:1175860787.953601.141120@y66g2000hsf.googlegroups.com...

On Mar 31, 5:11 pm, "Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsizemo...@yahoo.com> wrote:

"Allan C Cybulskie" <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote in
messagenews:1175374355.966635.251410@n59g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...



On Mar 28, 4:49 pm, "Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsizemo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
"Daryl McCullough" <stevendaryl3...@yahoo.com> wrote in message

news:eueeep0rmt@drn.newsguy.com...

Kevin Aylward says...

I'm saying that you can give an evolutionary explanation for
*behavior*, because behavior affects survival and reproduction.
You can give an evolutionary explanation for brain structures
that give rise to those behaviors. So as long as you are
identifying
consciousness with "the brain structures necessary to produce
such and such behavior" then I think it's fine to invoke
evolution as an explanation for consciousness. That's my preferred
approach. Consciousness is just another name for a sophisticated
process of modeling the world and acting on that model.

Consciousness, is more. A kick in the balls *hurts*.

But we don't know whether that is "more" or not.

Just how is that accounted for by "a sophisticated process
of modeling the world and acting on that model"?

You haven't really said what it would *mean* to account
for it. We can certainly account for the fact that a kick
in the balls causes a person to grab his crotch, to scream,
to keel over, to strike back, to avoid situations in which
that sort of thing happens. What, exactly, are you thinking
is left to account for?

I don't know what Kevin is thinking, but I'll tell you what is
unaccounted
for: the verbal response "That hurts." Accounting for that is the key
to
"self-awareness," and it is reasonably well understood by a few
people.

The verbal response is irrelevant: I can produce that verbal statement
without pain being anywhere near present. In fact, I just did it now,
while typing. And again.

And that would require a different explanation than the one in which
someone
is actually "reporting pain."

But from the outside, it's the same verbal response.

No it isn't. You think it is because you don't understand the definition of
an operant response class. If responses are affected differently by
independent variables they are, in general, different response classes.
There are many different response classes that topographically resemble,
say, "I am in pain," but that has no bearing on the fact that the response
"I am in pain" is sometimes a response to our own behavior. That is the sort
of instance we are interested in - or, at least, I think that we agree that
what is of interest is, speaking colloquially, "true reports of pain," not
someone reading a slip of paper that says "Say 'I am in pain.'" or someone
who has acquired the ability to mimic a languages phonemes copying someone
saying "I am in pain." These responses are not of interest because they are
not the same response class as that which is called colloquially "true
reports of pain," not because NO response is relevant.

It's only if you
turn to the inside and introspection that you note that you need a
different explanation and get an inkling of what that explanation
might be. Thus, the verbal response is irrelevant.

No, what is not of interest is responses that resemble the one in question
topographically, but not functionally. My position, which could b summed up
as:



When we introspect "pain" we are observing our own responses to stimuli that
would be called "painful" or "pain-producing" from a third-person
perspective (as in reflexive hand withdrawal, grimaces, responding which
escapes a stimulus - especially if accompanied by species-typical grimaces,
squeaks, etc. and even, ironically, verbal reports). Further, some aspects
of the kinds of behavior produced by interaction with the "painful stimuli"
(i.e., the responses we may come to report) may be unobservable to others.
Those behavioral aspects (both public and private) are, potentially,
"discriminative stimuli" that can control the response "I am in pain," and
any that do control that verbal response, do so because the person (or
non-human animal) has been exposed to the appropriate contingencies.



This view may be wrong, but not because of your sophomoric counter-examples.
They are meaningful only if one assigns behavior to categories based, not on
how it is altered as a function of independent variables, but on its
superficial appearance.

It does not change the view that when we are
trained to "report pain" we are made "conscious of it."

Actually, the reverse argument is more reasonable: that we are
constantly conscious of feeling pain and that that experience is used
to train reporting pain. In short, people look at the situations we
are in, conclude that they are likely to produce pain, and then train
children to express it as pain.

That is not "the reverse argument." Most of it is, in fact consistent with
my thesis except for your insistence that "they were always conscious of
it." Since consciousness must, in the third person, be determined (or
guessed at) by observations of behavior, there is no way to say whether the
contingencies that we arrange to "train the reporting response" merely train
the person (or non-human animal) to report that of which they are already
aware, or if training the reporting response is how the awareness itself
comes to be (which is, as I understand it, the radical behaviorist
position). You are free to take the alternative position but not, I think,
free to assert that it is the "more reasonable" view.

This potentially causes confusions if
the child isn't really feeling pain and thus associates it with some
other feeling.

This is a sort of corollary of Skinner's view. The accuracy of reporting a
private stimulus depends on how well correlated it is with what the verbal
community uses to train the response.

Now, you COULD be talking about "consciousness of consciousness",
where we are consciously introspecting our pain experiences to
determine the qualities we have. THIS might follow your model since
we'd have to understand that it's important before wanting to examine
it, especially for pain.

The issue is not really what it is called, since people simply choose
definitions for "awareness" and "consciousness." The issue is whether or not
my position is relevant to what philosophers, who are interested in
"qualia," are talking about. I assert, at minimum, that we would not "have
qualia" if we were not exposed to contingencies that make our own responses
function as discriminative stimuli for verbal operants.

That is, our own
response to "painful stimuli" would not discriminatively control any
behavior if the contingencies that generate such discriminative behavior
were not arranged.

I think you'll need to translate this into non-behaviouristic English,
since one translation of this is that if we didn't have pain events,
we'd never learn how to react to them, and that's so obviously true
that it can't be what you mean (no one disputes that).

No, that is not what I am saying. A non-human animal, or a human not
suitably trained, could show all sorts of behavior that we take as "showing
the animal is in pain" but it would not have "qualia." This is because the
animal may show reflexive behavior, or operant escape and avoidance, without
acquiring a response to these responses. A (true) report of pain is not a
reflex, and it is not reinforced by the elimination or reduction of some
condition as in escape and avoidance; it is an operant that is under
stimulus control of aspects of those kinds of responses. Things that we call
"pain-generating" produce reflexes, their reduction or elimination
reinforces responses (escape and avoidance), but they do not automatically
produce "qualia" or, at least, what it appears philosophers are talking
about when they use the word "qualia." Now, of course, you may define qualia
as something that, for example, must be there in order for escape and
avoidance to occur, but that is simply giving qualia an attribute that, by
definition, renders my position "wrong" a priori.

The fact that it's a verbal response ain't very interesting unless you
say what it's a response TO. And it's a response to a feeling of
pain. And that's what the problem here is, and that's what's not
accounted for.

No, it is a response to other responses.

Irrelevant. If the feeling of pain is a response, it still doesn't
mean that it isn't a specific response -- ie a feeling

So, you are saying that "a feeling" is really a response to a "specific
response." Hmmm, somehow that sounds mysteriously like what I have been
saying, except my definition of "specific response" would be functional
rather than topographical.

-- and
therefore my statement is correct and meaningful.

It is meaningful if you agree that a feeling occurs when there is "a
response to a response" or, more technically, when an operant is brought
under stimulus control of aspects of the animal's behavioral repertoire.
IMO, observations, and some laboratory data suggest that we do not
automatically respond to aspects of the world and this, in turn, suggests
there is something that happens during the relevant environmental exposure
that makes us respond to some aspect of the world as an aspect of the world.
Our own behavior, it is argued, is just another aspect of the world but we
do not respond to it as such until the proper discriminative contingencies
are arranged. That is, we are not conscious of our own behavior until the
proper contingencies are arranged.

>

 

[Joe Durnavich]

Glen M. Sizemore writes:

"Joe Durnavich" <joejd@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:4hdf139t3tg20alj411nm7qn32g319uimg@4ax.com...

The problem, and I see a bit of it with Daryl, too, is that you both want
to reduce pain to a specific "something". But pain-language doesn't lend
itself to that except, perhaps, metaphorically. Daryl, however,
recognizes
that the wider context is what is ultimately relevant.

Yet, "pains" must have sufficient "family resemblance" for there to be
generalization to novel circumstances.

Yes, to point out that pain doesn't have to be a distinct entity is not to
say that it is a fiction.

I won't comment on Cybulski's
position right now - there is just too much wrong with it. Daryl's position
is somewhat like methodological behaviorism, arguing, I think, that "feeling
pain" is, in fact, something real, but it is to be left out of a scientific
analysis.

I find that the words "real" and especially "exists" tend to lead to more
confusion than clarity in philosophical discussions. People want to
resolve the issue by narrowing down to a single something when sometimes it
is better to step back and consider the entire person getting on with his
life in his environment.

What is missed, of course, is the view that objective vs.
subjective is a matter of accessibility, not ontology. "Subjective
experience" can be dealt with in terms of the science of stimulus control;
we are trained to respond to parts of the world and to, thereby, "become
aware of them,"

So, I smell smoke, I go to investigate and I discover that a garbage can
has caught on fire. I get a fire extinguisher and put the fire out. The
burning garbage can and my interaction with it are what constitutes my
awareness.

and part of the world that we respond to is accessible only
to one person. There is no difference, from a behavioral process standpoint,
between responding to someone else's behavior or responding to one's own,
except for the contact that can be made. Because of this, we may respond to
aspects of our own behavior that only we can see, but "consciousness" in th
sense of "self-awareness" is simply a matter of ou own bhavior, public or
private, exerting operant stimulus control over some other response.

Now in regards to pain, do I likewise investigate and discover this "some
other response" of mine? That is, do I find out that I am in pain?

--
Joe Durnavich

 

[Joe Durnavich]

partso2@yahoo.com writes:

The software (or algorithm) may have many
different physicalisations (if that's the word) - the electrons in my
brain, the magnetic polarity on the hard drive, some electric states
of registers of the computer's memory (if that's it) - a lot, lot
different arrangements of these as there're a lot of programming
languages and different platforms. Don't you think these are all
manifestations of the same entity?

No. This only shows that we can treat several different physical entities
in the same way. There doesn't have to be yet another entity that stands
for them all.

after all, if I steal your program
and code it in another language, and you sue me, can I claim that it's
a totally different magnetic polarity/electron arrangement (which is
true) and therefore has no relation to your original software? if so,
programmers should be grateful that there aren't many meaterialist
judges...

As kids we discovered a pinball machine that would accept either quarters
or pennies we flattened on railroad tracks. There doesn't have to a third
type of coin, some sort of "virtual coin", to explain why the machine would
give us credits for both quarters and flattened pennies.

--
Joe Durnavich