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Immortalist <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in news:89ed31b5-4cf0-49cc-
806e-dc4d6d752c84@v39g2000pro.googlegroups.com:
the apple perceived is red. That belief is not a conclusion derived from
any premises, but from the percept itself. Empirical beliefs are self-
justifying; I cannot doubt that I am perceiving something red in the shape
of an apple. I may well have doubts about what causes that percept, but I
cannot doubt that I have it. What may be causing it is another question.
806e-dc4d6d752c84@v39g2000pro.googlegroups.com:
The argument goes astray with #4. If I perceive a red apple, then I believeA central concept in science and the scientific method is that all
evidence must be empirical, or empirically based, that is, dependent
on evidence or consequences that are observable by the senses.
Empirical data are data that are produced by experiment or
observation.
"Empirical" as an adjective or adverb is used in conjunction with both
the natural and social sciences, and refers to the use of working
hypotheses that are testable using observation or experiment. In this
sense of the word, scientific statements are subject to and derived
from our experiences or observations.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empirical
1. Suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical
beliefs (a) which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose
justification does not depend on that of any further emperical
beliefs.
2. For a belief to be episemically justified requires that there be a
reason why it is likely to be true.
3. A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive
possession of such a reason.
4. A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he
believes with justification the premises from which it follows that
the belief is likely to be true.
5. The premises of such a justifying argument must include at least
one empirical premise.
6. So, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends
on the justification of at least one other empirical belief,
contradicting 1.
7. So, there can be no basic empirical beliefs.
This seems to eliminate the possibility of emperical justification of
any and all emperical beliefs. But it can lead to this untruthfullness
of human beliefs in three ways which deal with the apparent "regress"
of one belief depending upon another which depends upon another and so
on:
If the regress of emperical justification does not terminate in basic
emperical beliefs, then it must either:
(1) terminate in unjustified beleifs
(2) go on infinitely (without circularity)
(3) circle back upon itself in some way.
the apple perceived is red. That belief is not a conclusion derived from
any premises, but from the percept itself. Empirical beliefs are self-
justifying; I cannot doubt that I am perceiving something red in the shape
of an apple. I may well have doubts about what causes that percept, but I
cannot doubt that I have it. What may be causing it is another question.