Chip with simple program for Toy

[Daniel Mandic]

J.A. Legris wrote:

How about pain that is felt and recognizable as such, but which fails
to induce the ordinary responses of escape and misery? This is what
happens when morphine and other opiates are given and it is readily
distinguished from the analgesia induced by local anesthetics, where
the both the pain and its effects are gone. I used to think all pain
relief was the same, and when they gave me morphine for an extremely
painful dislocated elbow it still hurt like hell, but it just didn't
seem to matter any more. What's more, pain is an effective antidote
for an overdose of opiates.

Hi J.A.!



Anti-Pain can help a quite time.
E.g. having tooth-ache and nipping the Fingers on queasy points with
the nails, or biting into the small fingers nailplate, with the
needle-shaped tooth till a red-point with collected blood appears, and
so on.



Best regards,

Daniel Mandic

 

[Daryl McCullough]

J.A. Legris says...

How about pain that is felt and recognizable as such, but which fails
to induce the ordinary responses of escape and misery? This is what
happens when morphine and other opiates are given and it is readily
distinguished from the analgesia induced by local anesthetics, where
the both the pain and its effects are gone. I used to think all pain
relief was the same, and when they gave me morphine for an extremely
painful dislocated elbow it still hurt like hell, but it just didn't
seem to matter any more. What's more, pain is an effective antidote
for an overdose of opiates.

Daniel Dennett talks about exactly that sort of thing in the article:
"Why you can't make a computer that feels pain". I don't know an online
reference, but the article is discussed at
http://listserv.uh.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind9305&L=psyche-d&T=0&O=D&P=416
Here's a long quote:

<begin quote>
Dennett observes that the difficulties which arise when we try to construct
theories which conform to our pretheoretic intuitions about qualia in general,
and pain in particular, arise because these intuitions form an inconsistent
set. Hence, in the case of pain, we want our theories to deliver unto us
pain that is both *essentially awful*, that is, if it ain't awful then it
ain't pain, and *essentially incorrigible*, that is, if you think you're in
pain, then you are.

Now, it's easy to show that nothing can be both essentially awful and
essentially incorrigible. The case of the morphine patient, who insists
that, although the pain is as present and as intense as ever, that she does
not mind it, that is, that the awfulness has abated while the pain persists,
forces us to give up at least one of the two essential theses about pain.
But which one? The case can be described equally well from each of the camps:
adherents of the essential awfulness thesis, generally qualophiles of various
hues, can say that the patient is just mistaken about her inner state - it's
not really a state of being in pain (how could it be when she reports that
it isn't awful?). And of course, the essential incorrigibility theorists
can just deny this by giving up awfulness and claiming: Of course she's in
pain - she said she was, didn't she?

Dennett's point is that there is no non-arbitrary way of breaking this
deadlock, although in typical Dennett style he favours giving up *both*
theses (and why not?). Pain, says Dennett, isn't *essentially* anything.
We can *make a decision* about what we shall call pain. but it will be
just that: a decision. The facts of the case, that is, all our anecdotal
evidence about what pain is like, the facts about neurology as we have so
far discovered them, facts about how various anesthetic drugs work, and so
on (in other words, all the stuff that would go into making a functional
theory of pain), do not compel a particular interpretation upon us. Nor
will they ever do so.
</end quote>

--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY

 

[Glen M. Sizemore]

"Daryl McCullough" <stevendaryl3016@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:f2t39901uef@drn.newsguy.com...

J.A. Legris says...

How about pain that is felt and recognizable as such, but which fails
to induce the ordinary responses of escape and misery? This is what
happens when morphine and other opiates are given and it is readily
distinguished from the analgesia induced by local anesthetics, where
the both the pain and its effects are gone. I used to think all pain
relief was the same, and when they gave me morphine for an extremely
painful dislocated elbow it still hurt like hell, but it just didn't
seem to matter any more. What's more, pain is an effective antidote
for an overdose of opiates.

Daniel Dennett talks about exactly that sort of thing in the article:
"Why you can't make a computer that feels pain". I don't know an online
reference, but the article is discussed at
http://listserv.uh.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind9305&L=psyche-d&T=0&O=D&P=416
Here's a long quote:

begin quote
Dennett observes that the difficulties which arise when we try to
construct
theories which conform to our pretheoretic intuitions about qualia in
general,
and pain in particular, arise because these intuitions form an
inconsistent
set. Hence, in the case of pain, we want our theories to deliver unto us
pain that is both *essentially awful*, that is, if it ain't awful then it
ain't pain, and *essentially incorrigible*, that is, if you think you're
in
pain, then you are.

Now, it's easy to show that nothing can be both essentially awful and
essentially incorrigible. The case of the morphine patient, who insists
that, although the pain is as present and as intense as ever, that she
does
not mind it, that is, that the awfulness has abated while the pain
persists,
forces us to give up at least one of the two essential theses about pain.
But which one? The case can be described equally well from each of the
camps:
adherents of the essential awfulness thesis, generally qualophiles of
various
hues, can say that the patient is just mistaken about her inner state -
it's
not really a state of being in pain (how could it be when she reports that
it isn't awful?). And of course, the essential incorrigibility theorists
can just deny this by giving up awfulness and claiming: Of course she's in
pain - she said she was, didn't she?

Dennett's point is that there is no non-arbitrary way of breaking this
deadlock, although in typical Dennett style he favours giving up *both*
theses (and why not?). Pain, says Dennett, isn't *essentially* anything.
We can *make a decision* about what we shall call pain. but it will be
just that: a decision. The facts of the case, that is, all our anecdotal
evidence about what pain is like, the facts about neurology as we have so
far discovered them, facts about how various anesthetic drugs work, and so
on (in other words, all the stuff that would go into making a functional
theory of pain), do not compel a particular interpretation upon us. Nor
will they ever do so.

If I am understanding you correctly, the facts do compel a particular view.
The sorts of stimuli or conditions we call "painful" have a few different
functions - they elicit reflexes, they motivate operant escape (and their
termination reinforces behavior). In addition, we are trained to observe our
own behavior with respect to these sorts of functions. Independent variables
may alter each of these differently. Apparently - or at least this is Legris'
claim - morphine alters the motivational effects of some stimuli at doses
that do not alter the aspects of our behavior that we are responding to when
we "report pain." And, incidentally, radical behaviorism argues that we may
show reflexes and operant escape, but not necessarily be self-aware. I would
not make too many claims about the relative effects of drugs on these
different functions because I don't think the proper experiments have been
done.

/end quote

--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY

 

[Daryl McCullough]

Glen M. Sizemore says...

If I am understanding you correctly, the facts do compel a particular view.
The sorts of stimuli or conditions we call "painful" have a few different
functions - they elicit reflexes, they motivate operant escape (and their
termination reinforces behavior). In addition, we are trained to observe our
own behavior with respect to these sorts of functions. Independent variables
may alter each of these differently. Apparently - or at least this is Legris'
claim - morphine alters the motivational effects of some stimuli at doses
that do not alter the aspects of our behavior that we are responding to when
we "report pain." And, incidentally, radical behaviorism argues that we may
show reflexes and operant escape, but not necessarily be self-aware. I would
not make too many claims about the relative effects of drugs on these
different functions because I don't think the proper experiments have been
done.

Your two types of responses to pain (pain avoidance behavior versus verbal
reports) correspond to Dennett's two aspects of pain, that it is intrinsically
awful, and that it is incorrigible (someone cannot be mistaken about being
in pain). Morphine separates the two responses,
so that awfulness (as revealed by escape behavior) disappears while the
verbal reports continue. Dennett's question is whether a person under
morphine has pain or not. The answer is no, by escape behavior, but the
answer is yes by verbal behavior.

--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY

 

[Bob Eld]

"M." <m.horemans@skynet.be> wrote in message
news:464fff7a$0$13862$ba620e4c@news.skynet.be...

Hi,
for a small elektronic projekt I need to convert 5Vdc to 22-24Vdc at 100mA
max.
It has to be done on PCB and the area needs to be as small as possible.
Are there any special IC's available for this?

Thanks,
Marc

Purchase a ready to go DC to DC converter such as CD Technologies model
NDTD0512C. Check Mouser and Digikey. This part is PC mount, 0.6in wide by
1.27in long. It is 3 Watts, 5 volts in and dual 12 volts out, isolated.
Don't waste your time trying to design and build one. There are all kinds of
these available in various voltages and power level, etc.

 

[Glen M. Sizemore]

"Daryl McCullough" <stevendaryl3016@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:f2um1j029n2@drn.newsguy.com...
Glen M. Sizemore says...

If I am understanding you correctly, the facts do compel a particular
view.
The sorts of stimuli or conditions we call "painful" have a few different
functions - they elicit reflexes, they motivate operant escape (and their
termination reinforces behavior). In addition, we are trained to observe
our
own behavior with respect to these sorts of functions. Independent
variables
may alter each of these differently. Apparently - or at least this is
Legris'
claim - morphine alters the motivational effects of some stimuli at doses
that do not alter the aspects of our behavior that we are responding to
when
we "report pain." And, incidentally, radical behaviorism argues that we
may
show reflexes and operant escape, but not necessarily be self-aware. I
would
not make too many claims about the relative effects of drugs on these
different functions because I don't think the proper experiments have been
done.

Your two types of responses to pain (pain avoidance behavior versus verbal
reports) correspond to Dennett's two aspects of pain, that it is
intrinsically
awful, and that it is incorrigible (someone cannot be mistaken about being
in pain).

Actually, I mentioned three (reflexes, operant escape, and verbal response
under stimulus control of other relevant behavior) but, yes, Dennett's
description is a pale comparison to the rigorous (but brief) treatment I
provided. Also, and I don't know if this is really Dennett or you talking, I
am not really talking abut "responses to pain" (except, in a sense, the
third phenomenon I mentioned) but, rather, pain itself. Anyway, I won't go
off in that direction again right now. What I will go off on, for a moment,
is why I hate Dennett. The few things that he says that are worth saying are
consistent with Skinner's position, a position he has directly attacked
(through misrepresentation), both in the BBS issue called "The Canonical
Papers of BF Skinner" (CPS) and his "Skinner Skinned." The position on
"pain" that I have described was clearly stated by Skinner in 1945 (The
Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms) in a paper that Dennett
shit-mouthed in CPS. True, it is somewhat consistent with the philosophical
behaviorism of his mentor, Ryle, but his lack of scholarship - that borders
on plagiarism - is sickening. And, remember, it is consistent with, but says
less than, the behavioristic view.

Morphine separates the two responses,
so that awfulness (as revealed by escape behavior) disappears while the
verbal reports continue. Dennett's question is whether a person under
morphine has pain or not. The answer is no, by escape behavior, but the
answer is yes by verbal behavior.

Right. And here, of course, we see the consistency with both Ryle AND
Skinner. But again, it says so much less than the Skinnerian position, and
is so intellectually dishonest. Or perhaps he really is, speaking
colloquially, too stupid to see the connection.



But, more importantly, let me ask: if Dennett's philosophical observations
were to be considered in designing an experimental program to study pain
(especially in non-human animals), what would such a program look like? Here's
where Dennett's "style" is revealed as being derivative, but so much less.

 

[Daryl McCullough]

Glen M. Sizemore says...

What I will go off on, for a moment, is why I hate Dennett.
The few things that he says that are worth saying are
consistent with Skinner's position, a position he has directly attacked
(through misrepresentation), both in the BBS issue called "The Canonical
Papers of BF Skinner" (CPS) and his "Skinner Skinned."

Well, I feel exactly the opposite. The few things that behaviorists
say that are worth saying are those that are consistent with Dennett's
position.

--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY

 

[Glen M. Sizemore]

"Daryl McCullough" <stevendaryl3016@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:f2vd3h01icv@drn.newsguy.com...

Glen M. Sizemore says...
What I will go off on, for a moment, is why I hate Dennett.
The few things that he says that are worth saying are
consistent with Skinner's position, a position he has directly attacked
(through misrepresentation), both in the BBS issue called "The Canonical
Papers of BF Skinner" (CPS) and his "Skinner Skinned."

Well, I feel exactly the opposite. The few things that behaviorists
say that are worth saying are those that are consistent with Dennett's
position.

In the particular issue under consideration here, as I pointed out,
Skinner's position was laid out in 1945.

Exactly which aspects of the behaviorist position do you take umbrage with?
I would describe you as a Watsonian behaviorist.

--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY

 

[Glen M. Sizemore]

"Daryl McCullough" <stevendaryl3016@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:f2vd3h01icv@drn.newsguy.com...

Glen M. Sizemore says...
What I will go off on, for a moment, is why I hate Dennett.
The few things that he says that are worth saying are
consistent with Skinner's position, a position he has directly attacked
(through misrepresentation), both in the BBS issue called "The Canonical
Papers of BF Skinner" (CPS) and his "Skinner Skinned."

Well, I feel exactly the opposite. The few things that behaviorists
say that are worth saying are those that are consistent with Dennett's
position.

Thank you for the penetrating analysis of my post.

--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY

 

[Daryl McCullough]

Glen M. Sizemore says...

"Daryl McCullough" <stevendaryl3016@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:f2vd3h01icv@drn.newsguy.com...
Glen M. Sizemore says...
What I will go off on, for a moment, is why I hate Dennett.
The few things that he says that are worth saying are
consistent with Skinner's position, a position he has directly attacked
(through misrepresentation), both in the BBS issue called "The Canonical
Papers of BF Skinner" (CPS) and his "Skinner Skinned."

Well, I feel exactly the opposite. The few things that behaviorists
say that are worth saying are those that are consistent with Dennett's
position.

In the particular issue under consideration here, as I pointed out,
Skinner's position was laid out in 1945.

Yes, and I think Dennett's description is much better.

Exactly which aspects of the behaviorist position do you take umbrage with?

I object to the whole language of "reinforcement" and "operant conditioning".
I think that's a very poor way to think about learning.

--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY

 

[Daryl McCullough]

Daryl McCullough says...

Glen M. Sizemore says...

Exactly which aspects of the behaviorist position do you take umbrage with?

I object to the whole language of "reinforcement" and "operant conditioning".
I think that's a very poor way to think about learning.

To expand on what I don't like about behaviorism. Take almost any
incident involving human beings. For example:

Joe knows that his girlfriend loves blue roses, which are very rare.
Tomorrow is Valentine's Day.
Sam tells Joe that Bools Flower Shop is the only florist in town selling
blue roses.

With this information, it is not too difficult to predict that
Joe will visit or call Bools Flower Shop. Of course, it's not
certain (almost no predictions involving complex systems are
certain), but it's pretty likely. The prediction can be made
very simply:

1. Joe wants to please his girlfriend.
2. Joe believes that blue roses will please his girlfriend.
3. Joe believes that he can obtain blue roses from Bools Flower Shop.
4. Therefore, Joe is likely to go to Bools Flower Shop.

But this prediction involves mentalistic constructions such as
"wants to" and "believes that". Behaviorism explicitly rejects
such constructions. How, then, can behaviorism explain
the success of this prediction? How, considering a human behavior
to be a matter of stimulus/response, can behaviorism make such a
prediction?

I think it is obvious to anyone that the use of mentalistic constructions
does, in fact, provide a simple and powerful way to reason about the
behavior of human beings. The question for a science of behavior, to me,
is this: how can apparently intentional behavior arise from the
blind application of physical laws? Behaviorism to me seems to throw
out the most interesting thing about human behavior, which is that
mentalistic predictions seem to work.

--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY

 

[Daniel Mandic]

Daryl McCullough wrote:

I think it is obvious to anyone that the use of mentalistic
constructions does, in fact, provide a simple and powerful way to
reason about the behavior of human beings. The question for a science
of behavior, to me, is this: how can apparently intentional behavior
arise from the blind application of physical laws? Behaviorism to me
seems to throw out the most interesting thing about human behavior,
which is that mentalistic predictions seem to work.

Hi Daryl!


Nice thesis....



Our Brain is Bi-directional. I have stumbled one time, where I have had
left the time, to even recognize that my will wishes more to articulate
and say as I could have done. Something like a back-memory of
unfullfilled acts, limited by the Brain itself but remaining a single
thought (e.g. blue screen in WinNT, can be fetched by the COM serial
before the System hung, by an other operating Computer). Although, that
remnant wiped away very fast... maybe the self-security option of the
brain, that I should not make to much toughts about the temporarily
disfunction.



The watcher is in favor (advantage), compared to the actor, but one
single (e.g. wrong) act can cause a looooong watch ;-)



Kind regards,

Daniel Mandic

 

[Michael Olea]

Daryl McCullough wrote:

Daryl McCullough says...

Glen M. Sizemore says...

Exactly which aspects of the behaviorist position do you take umbrage
with?

I object to the whole language of "reinforcement" and "operant
conditioning". I think that's a very poor way to think about learning.

To expand on what I don't like about behaviorism. Take almost any
incident involving human beings. For example:

Joe knows that his girlfriend loves blue roses, which are very rare.
Tomorrow is Valentine's Day.
Sam tells Joe that Bools Flower Shop is the only florist in town selling
blue roses.

With this information, it is not too difficult to predict that
Joe will visit or call Bools Flower Shop. Of course, it's not
certain (almost no predictions involving complex systems are
certain), but it's pretty likely. The prediction can be made
very simply:

1. Joe wants to please his girlfriend.
2. Joe believes that blue roses will please his girlfriend.
3. Joe believes that he can obtain blue roses from Bools Flower Shop.
4. Therefore, Joe is likely to go to Bools Flower Shop.

But this prediction involves mentalistic constructions such as
"wants to" and "believes that". Behaviorism explicitly rejects
such constructions. How, then, can behaviorism explain
the success of this prediction? How, considering a human behavior
to be a matter of stimulus/response, can behaviorism make such a
prediction?

At least you did not say "a matter of *simple* stimulus/response". Operant
conditioning is a function of 3 terms, not 2: a joint probability
distribution over stimulus, response, and consequences:

P(stimulus, response, consequence)

The particular form of that distribution of relevance to an organism is the
conditional distribution over consequences, given stimulus (or, more
generaly, "context", by which, I intend - so to speak, to suggest the
extended notion of "stimulus" involved in an analysis of behavior) and
response:

P(consequence | stimulus, response)

This acts as a selection pressure on the conditional distribution over
responses. And, if behavior is to "evolve", there must be variability in
the conditional distribution over responses:

P(response | "context")

Further, the "stronger" the selection pressure, the lower the variability -
response classes are more highly "conserved" (hence the observed,
approximate. "matching law").

Still further, the (signed) gain to cost ratio of consequences to responses
is not fixed (e.g. deprivation tends to boost the gain - how long has it
been since Joe last "pleased" his girlfriend?).

John Casey quoted Dawkins' remark that while evolution is a simple process,
environments are complex. Simple processes, acting in complex environments,
can have complex results.

I think it is obvious to anyone that the use of mentalistic constructions
does, in fact, provide a simple and powerful way to reason about the
behavior of human beings. The question for a science of behavior, to me,
is this: how can apparently intentional behavior arise from the
blind application of physical laws? Behaviorism to me seems to throw
out the most interesting thing about human behavior, which is that
mentalistic predictions seem to work.

The mental terms are useful, as predictors of future behavior, because they
amount to summaries of past behavior. What is "powerful" in this is that we
live in a universe where there is (or at least has been upto now) mutual
information between future and past: the entropy of the probability
distrubition over the future of a time series is reduced, given its past.
Moreover, not all "features" (stimulus dimensions) of the past convey equal
amounts of predictive information. In using the particular mental terms we
use, summarizing certain features of the past, we are doing a kind of
feature selection.

The problem with the mental terms comes when they are treated as
explanations rather than descriptions.

-- Michael

 

[Michael Olea]

Daryl McCullough wrote:

<...>

Joe knows that his girlfriend loves blue roses, ...

How does Joe come to know this? More basic - what does it mean that she
"loves" this or that? X loves Y, this I know, for McCullough tells me so.

To expand on what I mean by mental terms being summary descriptions of past
behavior, the claim that Joe's girlfriend loves blue roses is just
shorthand for her responses to roses in the past. To turn around and claim
that "love" explains those responses rather than summarizes them would be
circular reasoning. That love predicts her responses just means that her
past responses predict her future ones, not that "love" is a meaningful
variable in a science of behavior. Rather, the quantifiable variable is the
relation between stimulus, blue rose, and response (hugs and kisses, say,
which, presumably, act in turn as reinforcers for blue rose donating
behavior).

... which are very rare.

A form of deprivation, boosting the "gain", the "strength" of blue roses as
reinforcers (the Invisible Hand in the Wealth of Relations).

Tomorrow is Valentine's Day.

Context - a signal over probable consequences (presumably negative ones, if
Joe fails to act: possibly outright aversive stimuli, and/or loss of
positive reinforcers).

Sam tells Joe that Bools Flower Shop is the only florist in town selling
blue roses.

Another stimulus, Sam's verbal behavior, signaling a new conditional
distribution over probable consequences of response classes (e.g. phoning
or visiting Bools rather than, say, FDA) predicated on past consequences of
responses to Sam's utterances.

With this information, ...

Information being a reduction in uncertainty, quantifiable as the difference
in entropy of a distribution before and after an event.

... it is not too difficult to predict that
Joe will visit or call Bools Flower Shop.

Only if we make a number of unstated assumnptions.

Of course, it's not
certain (almost no predictions involving complex systems are
certain), but it's pretty likely. ...

What quantifiable variables influence the reliability of the prediction?

... The prediction can be made very simply:

Only by the fiat of making simplifying assumptions. Maybe Joe will take her
to a French restaurant, order champagne, cognac, give her a diamond ring,
and propose marriage. Or maybe he will take her out to shoot pool and slip
drugs in her beer. We don't know Joe al that well. I knew a woman, Cynthia,
who married a guy after he offered $1000 of crack as a wedding present. She
got married, got the crack, arranged to have the guy jumped (for a small
amount of crack), kept (most of) the present, and died of a heart attack
within a week. Cynthia loved roses - and Lotto tickets. She was 49. (No, I
was not involved in any of this - I heard about it from "Sam". I knew
Cynthia because she rented me a room for a few months.)

1. Joe wants to please his girlfriend.

A summary of Joe's past behavior, and an implicit operant: "please".

2. Joe believes that blue roses will please his girlfriend.

A summary of relations between Joe's past behavior and that of his
girlfriend.

3. Joe believes that he can obtain blue roses from Bools Flower Shop.

A summary of relations between Joe's and Sam's past behavior.

4. Therefore, Joe is likely to go to Bools Flower Shop.

How likely? What quantifiable variables influence the reliabilty of the
prediction?

But this prediction involves mentalistic constructions such as
"wants to" and "believes that". ...

Among others (knows, loves, ...). What the prediction actually involves,
just to horse a deadbeat, is that the past predicts the future.

... Behaviorism explicitly rejects such constructions.

As explanations, yes, as descriptors, I don't think so.

... How, then, can behaviorism explain
the success of this prediction? ...

By quantifying relations between observables?

-- Michael

 

[Daniel Mandic]

Radium wrote:

AFAIK, photonic circuits produce less heat than electric circuits.
However I am aware that even when photonics becomes the norm [i.e. if
is does], electricity will still be necessary for power supply.

That's all seen in Star Wars. Maybe you can go on with the Lightbeam
Monitor, fast as Lightspeed. This device you will need for your
Lightcomputer, otherwise it makes no sense at all.

The strongest chain is only so strong as its weakest limb.



Best regards,

Daniel Mandic

 

[Michael A. Terrell]

Daniel Mandic wrote:

Radium wrote:

AFAIK, photonic circuits produce less heat than electric circuits.
However I am aware that even when photonics becomes the norm [i.e. if
is does], electricity will still be necessary for power supply.

That's all seen in Star Wars. Maybe you can go on with the Lightbeam
Monitor, fast as Lightspeed. This device you will need for your
Lightcomputer, otherwise it makes no sense at all.

The strongest chain is only so strong as its weakest limb.
LINK.

--
Service to my country? Been there, Done that, and I've got my DD214 to
prove it.
Member of DAV #85.

Michael A. Terrell
Central Florida

 

[Michael A. Terrell]

Bob Myers wrote:

"Michael A. Terrell" <mike.terrell@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:46555795.3072E763@earthlink.net...
SteveH wrote:

Or he could just stop talking bollocks


He would implode. Do you have any idea what kind of mess that would
make?

Not to mention the paperwork that would then be involved....

Paperwork is no problem, as long as it doesn't involve an ISO 9001
audit. I REALLY HATE ISO 9001 audits!



BTW, while I was stationed at Ft Rucker Alabama in the early '70s the
base clinic was overloaded so I had to take another solider to a
civilian doctor off base. I was waiting in the air conditioned waiting
room when two big civilians walked in and saw me in uniform. They headed
straight for me, to pick a fight. I stood up and told them that I was
required by law to tell them that I had been trained by the US Army to
kill with my bare hands, and that I would fight, but that I only fought
to the death.

I glanced at my watch and told them I had to be somewhere in 22
minutes, and had to leave in 10 minutes. I smiled at the moron in the
back and told him to go call the coroner, that his friend would be dead
within seven minutes if he still wanted to fight.

Just then my friend came out of the back and asked what was going
on. I sighed and said, "These morons want me to fight the big one.".
He said, "Oh, God, Not again!". I shrugged and said, "I've already
warned them that I only fight to the death". He turned to look at them
and said, "Dammit! The last time you killed someone, it took us two
full weeks to to the damn paperwork before they let us go!". You should
have seen them trying to get out of the building. It was like Moe and
Curly of the 'Three Stooges' trying to push their way out through a door
that opened in.


A good bluff is better than a good fight, any day!


--
Service to my country? Been there, Done that, and I've got my DD214 to
prove it.
Member of DAV #85.

Michael A. Terrell
Central Florida

 

[Meat Plow]

On Thu, 24 May 2007 15:02:04 -0700, digitalplusmail@gmail.com wrote:

Everything you want to find out about air conditioning: history,
applications, installation, repair, maintenance. All tapes: central,
mini-split, portable, window, car. And descriptions about many most
popular producers.

http://airconditioninginfo.blogspot.com/

How about ammonia for a large sub zero storage facility? The kind that use
V12 Cat diesel engines to pump the ammonia around.

And why the fuck did you spam this into an electronics group?

--
#1 Offishul Ruiner of Usenet, March 2007
#1 Usenet Asshole, March 2007
#1 Bartlo Pset, March 13-24 2007
#10 Most hated Usenetizen of all time
#8 AUK Hate Machine Cog
Pierre Salinger Memorial Hook, Line & Sinker, June 2004
COOSN-266-06-25794

 

[phaeton]

On May 24, 5:02 pm, "digitalplusm...@gmail.com"
<digitalplusm...@gmail.com> wrote:

Everything you want to find out about air conditioning: history,
applications, installation, repair, maintenance. All tapes: central,
mini-split, portable, window, car. And descriptions about many most
popular producers.

http://airconditioninginfo.blogspot.com/

I'm cooking beans!

 

[Michael A. Terrell]

JackShepherd wrote:

When was the last time you read a copy of EE Times?

That must be your favorite porn magazine. You sure seem to get off
on it.


--
Service to my country? Been there, Done that, and I've got my DD214 to
prove it.
Member of DAV #85.

Michael A. Terrell
Central Florida