Boeing 737 Max design error

On Tuesday, May 7, 2019 at 2:51:50 PM UTC-4, Tom Gardner wrote:

On 07/05/19 14:55, Martin Brown wrote:

I think there probably are flight configurations where you can pretty much rule
out stalling altogether.

One important one is when there is zero wing loading, either
because the plane is in a parabolic arc (think "vomit comet" )
or because the stick is pushed forward sufficiently for
the plane to be "forced over the top at 0G".

Typical. After getting nasty and disagreeing, now you admit there are
indeed identifiable situations where we know the plane can't be stalling,
which of course is exactly what I said.
So now answer the question. We know from flight data that a 737 has
been traveling level at 300 MPH for 30 secs. Can it be stalling?

 

[Tom Gardner]

On 07/05/19 19:40, trader4@optonline.net wrote:

I posed the challenge to the dissenters here to show us how a plane
that's been flying level for 30 secs at 300 MPH can suddenly be
stalling.

It would help if you had some experience flying aircraft.

It would help if you had been taught by competent instructors
that require you to recover after an aircraft has "departed
controlled flight", because such conditions can easily be
encountered, must be recognised, and dealt with.

Since you have neither, trying to educate you would be a
waste of our time.

If you are prepared to educate yourself, I suggest
Wolfgang Langewiesche's "Stick and Rudder; An
Explanation of the Art of Flying".

 

On Tuesday, May 7, 2019 at 2:47:55 PM UTC-4, Tom Gardner wrote:

On 07/05/19 18:45, Banders wrote:
On 05/07/2019 05:57 AM, trader4@optonline.net wrote:
On Tuesday, May 7, 2019 at 12:33:45 AM UTC-4, Banders wrote:
On 05/06/2019 11:55 AM, trader4@optonline.net wrote:

Mushing has nothing to do with what I stated.  Explain to us how a 737
that's been going 300 MPH in level flight for 30 seconds can be stalling.
It can't.

Not during those 30 seconds perhaps, but wind shear can change things in
an instant.

Again, explain to us how any wind shear on this planet, can cause a plane
that is in level flight, at 300 MPH, for the last 30 seconds to stall.

Does this link work?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supercell#/media/File:Supercell.svg

You would be lucky to have the wings stall rather than be torn off.

Bear in mind that trader4 appears not to have any
experience of flying aircraft, and hence no experience
of the strange unexpected meteorological effects that
can be encountered.

So then explain to us how a 737 that's been flying for 30 secs
at 300 MPH in level flight can suddenly stall, requiring MCAS to activate.
Cite for us when this has happened.

Even with my limited experience, I've been in situations
which have surprised co-pilots that have been an instructor
for over half a century.

But I'm sure trader4 won't let that reality deter him
from his confident announcements about how aircraft
do (and don't) fly.

You're just sore because I have the facts and also hold the pilots
partly responsible for what happened. Out of 7, at least 4 could not
identify a runaway trim problem and take the simple steps, that are
supposed to be a memory item, to deal with it.

 

[Tom Gardner]

On 07/05/19 09:37, Jan Panteltje wrote:

On a sunny day (Mon, 6 May 2019 21:52:18 -0700) it happened Riley Angel
4736angel@pm.me> wrote in <HMqdncp446aekkzBnZ2dnUU7-N3NnZ2d@supernews.com>:

On 2019-05-06 06:42, Jan Panteltje wrote:
I have read lately it was, it is anyways in the sense that it did not detect the output to ever tilt the thing more and more.
Looks like the dumbest loop you can ever write.
It did not check angular position (I think they added that now, only takes a 1$ MEMS chip),
and it had no redundancy.

Swing a $1 MEMS chip round your head. Which angular position is which
now? An aircraft in flight is essentially a free body with only gravity
as a reference, which can be confused by any other sort of acceleration
force.

Most toy drones, including mine a bit less toy now, use these chips
and keep perfectly horizontal, so know about attitude.
Calibrated before takeoff, like an pressure based altimeter.

Now put the aircraft in, say, a turn where it is pulling 1G.
What direction does the MEMS sensor indicate is "down"?

I've done turns at 3G for a minute or so, and "down"
definitely wasn't towards the earth!

 

On Tuesday, May 7, 2019 at 9:59:09 AM UTC-4, Martin Brown wrote:

On 06/05/2019 23:14, trader4@optonline.net wrote:
On Monday, May 6, 2019 at 5:23:24 PM UTC-4, Lasse Langwadt Christensen wrote:
mandag den 6. maj 2019 kl. 22.59.28 UTC+2 skrev tra...@optonline.net:
On Monday, May 6, 2019 at 4:12:21 PM UTC-4, Lasse Langwadt Christensen wrote:

if the force needed to trim up is so high you can hardly move the trim wheel won't the electric trim be useless as well?

Very good question, but obviously the electric does still work, because
on these flights they were able to keep bringing trim back up and MCAS
was able to push it down. How you reconcile those, IDK. Also, if it
really was impossible for that Ethiopian co-pilot to turn the trim
wheel, seems there is more wrong there than just MCAS. It would imply
that on any 737, if you have a runaway trim and it goes to hard trim
in either direction, you may not be able to counter it by the stated
trim procedure.

I saw this snipped from the 737 Flight Crew Training Manual, chapter Non-Normal Operations/Flight Controls, sub heading Manual Stabilizer trim:

"Excessive air loads on the stabilizer may require effort by both pilots to correct mis-trim. In extreme cases it may be necessary to aerodynamically relieve the air loads to allow manual trimming. Accelerate or decelerate towards the in-trim speed while attempting to trim manually."

Well, that answers one question. Apparently it's known and accepted that
with enough trim and speed, you can't wind it by hand. Which makes the
MCAS design all the more worse. A weathervane blowing in the wind can
force the nose down hard, continually and if it's hard enough and
you just follow the runaway trim procedure, you might not be able
to recover period. Even worse, if the AOA is screwed, like the LA one
was, reading 20 deg on the ground, when does MCAS try to kill you?
Just as you're retracting the flaps, which means right after takeoff,
at low altitude, where there may not be enough time to figure it out
and recover.

Which again brings us back to the question of why the recommendation if
the thing goes haywire after retracting the flaps is not to extend them
again and increase engine power again. MCAS isn't active when the flaps
and lift enhancers are deployed for takeoff and landing.

Fuel economy is irrelevant when you are fighting just to stay in the air
against an automated system that is trying to crash the plane.

--
Regards,
Martin Brown

Probably for simplicity and because MCAS could run amok at altitude too.
But I agree, adding to the instructions that extending flaps as
an option would seem a good idea and it;s simple and would work fast,
unlike winding trim wheels. This fatal trap is a perfect setup.
No checking by the software for incorrect AOA reading while on the
ground. Rely on just one, it's stuck at 20 deg. So, you takeoff and
at low altitude you retract the flaps and wham, plane goes amok,
trying to dive into the ground. It's just stunning that could come out
of Boeing. And if it could happen on this program, why not on other
new Boeing planes?

 

[Tom Gardner]

On 07/05/19 14:55, Martin Brown wrote:

I think there probably are flight configurations where you can pretty much rule
out stalling altogether.

One important one is when there is zero wing loading, either
because the plane is in a parabolic arc (think "vomit comet" )
or because the stick is pushed forward sufficiently for
the plane to be "forced over the top at 0G".

 

[Tom Gardner]

On 07/05/19 18:45, Banders wrote:

On 05/07/2019 05:57 AM, trader4@optonline.net wrote:
On Tuesday, May 7, 2019 at 12:33:45 AM UTC-4, Banders wrote:
On 05/06/2019 11:55 AM, trader4@optonline.net wrote:

Mushing has nothing to do with what I stated.  Explain to us how a 737
that's been going 300 MPH in level flight for 30 seconds can be stalling.
It can't.

Not during those 30 seconds perhaps, but wind shear can change things in
an instant.

Again, explain to us how any wind shear on this planet, can cause a plane
that is in level flight, at 300 MPH, for the last 30 seconds to stall.

Does this link work?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supercell#/media/File:Supercell.svg

You would be lucky to have the wings stall rather than be torn off.

Bear in mind that trader4 appears not to have any
experience of flying aircraft, and hence no experience
of the strange unexpected meteorological effects that
can be encountered.

Even with my limited experience, I've been in situations
which have surprised co-pilots that have been an instructor
for over half a century.

But I'm sure trader4 won't let that reality deter him
from his confident announcements about how aircraft
do (and don't) fly.

 

On Tuesday, May 7, 2019 at 9:59:07 AM UTC-4, Sylvia Else wrote:

On 7/05/2019 11:52 pm, trader4@optonline.net wrote:
On Tuesday, May 7, 2019 at 8:20:34 AM UTC-4, Sylvia Else wrote:
On 7/05/2019 9:38 pm, DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org wrote:
Lasse Langwadt Christensen <langwadt@fonz.dk> wrote in
news:466ef7dc-0503-4b47-8485-71d8825dd7c5@googlegroups.com:

The biggest issue to me is that there was no release switch to
return
pilot control.

there is, two switches to turn off electric trim and the pilots
are supposed to know how to handle run away trim by memory


I know what is there. You do not understand my statement.

I do not like an actuator arm locked onto my elevator. That
removes my control and an emergency cicumstance does not restore
control, it merely gives up as the controlling element. The pilot
still then must manually actuate a mecahnism at a much slower rate
than needed, to get back to stick control.

If there is one, it needs to have a FULL release and not be a
manual screw requiring manual return. If it gets released fully,
the pilot's elevator control return is a mere stick push.


The trim is a normal part of the aircraft's control system, and it
doesn't have a fixed correct position to which it could be restored. It
has to be adjusted frequently during the flight depending on many
factors. In the 737, the trim is adjusted by having the tailplane driven
by a jackscrew. The only way that the trim can be restored to its
currently correct state after something has driven wrongly it is to turn
the jackscrew the other way. Once you've disabled the power to the
jackscrew motor, human power is the only way it can be done.

I may be wrong, but I believe there is still hydraulic assist or similar
to the jackscrew for a number of reasons, one of which is that you could
not exert enough force to turn it by hand. I think the electric cutoff
to the trim disables a small motor that moves the trim wheels, which in
turn drive the motor that moves the jackscrew.



The trim wheels rotate very quickly when operated by the motor. I've
taken this to be because the turn ratio has to be that high so that the
pilots can turn it by hand if they need to.

Anything powered that is capable of rotating the jackscrew is going to
have a potential failure mode where it rotates it when it shouldn't.

Sylvia.

I looked into how it's designed. Looks like the cables from the trim
wheels drive the trim mechanism directly, as do a motor. So you're
right.

https://www.satcom.guru/2018/11/stabilizer-trim.html

 

[Lasse Langwadt Christense]

tirsdag den 7. maj 2019 kl. 20.40.27 UTC+2 skrev tra...@optonline.net:

On Tuesday, May 7, 2019 at 9:55:34 AM UTC-4, Martin Brown wrote:
On 07/05/2019 08:17, Jasen Betts wrote:
On 2019-05-07, Riley Angel <4736angel@pm.me> wrote:
On 2019-05-06 06:42, Jan Panteltje wrote:
I have read lately it was, it is anyways in the sense that it did not detect the output to ever tilt the thing more and more.
Looks like the dumbest loop you can ever write.
It did not check angular position (I think they added that now, only takes a 1$ MEMS chip),
and it had no redundancy.

They already had an artificial horizon. The thing that was missing was
any kind of sanity check on the validity of the AoA sensor output.

And just yesterday we learned that Boeing learned way back in 2017
that the AOA disagree light didn't work unless the plane had the
AOA display option. So there
was a warning light bulb that would not go on, unless that plane
had the AOA display option, which they were charging for. Boeing
planned to fix it in a software update, but that never happened
before the crashes. Previously it was said that they offered the
disagree light and the display as options. Putting this together,
it sounds like you could pay for the disagree light, but it didn't
actually work, unless you had the display option too.




There was also a major discrepancy between what Boeing told the FAA MCAS
would do in terms of how much adjustment and what it did in actuality.
This is unforgivable at multiple levels. No-one will ever trust the FAA
again outside of the USA. They were in bed with Boeing and prepared to
keep planes flying they knew to be dodgy even after the second crash.

It certainly looks like there was a cozy relationship. But on the other
hand, if Boeing didn't tell the FAA that they had increased the action
by 3X, IDK how FAA would know.



Finally Boeing have been forced to admit they knew about this problem
and the AoA vulnerability more than a year before the first crash but
had convinced themselves that it wasn't a safety critical problem.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-48174797


Have to be careful there about which problem you're talking about.
This is about the AOA disagree light not working in some planes,
which I talked about above. Not sure what level of urgency was
needed to fix that, given that many of the Max apparently don't have
the disagree light at all. I'd say they should have put out an alert
to operators though. Doesn't seem like that would have made a difference
in the crashes though, from what I saw. For one thing, pilots were
never told about MCAS, how it uses the AOA sensors, etc. Which raises
the question, on the planes that had the disagree light, what did
the pilots thing the AOA and this light all about? Many planes didn't
display AOA, so then what's up with the light and WTF were they supposed
to think that it was for?



Apparently they said "it did not jeopardise flight safety" which is true
in normal operation but completely untrue when the dodgy AoA sensor goes
haywire and MCAS puts the plane into an almost unrecoverable power dive.

If the pilots knew about MCAS and had a working disagree light, I wonder
what would have happened with the crash flights. LA taxied out with one
AOA showing 20 deg, so if it had the light and if the light worked,
what would they have done?





It is an example of the fix being far more dangerous than the original
problem that it was supposed to address.

+1




Swing a $1 MEMS chip round your head. Which angular position is which
now? An aircraft in flight is essentially a free body with only gravity
as a reference, which can be confused by any other sort of acceleration
force.

It's worse than that. An aircraft in flight does not have gravity as a
reference, what keeps you in your seat is the reaction to lift, and
lift is perpendicular to the wings, not the ground.

That said whilst the GPS system is working you also have some pretty
good independent numbers for ground speed and rate of climb that are
reliable and are referenced to an external reference frame. Airspeed
indicators have been known to cause crashes when they malfunction too
but they can also provide a sanity check against the risk of stalling.

I posed the challenge to the dissenters here to show us how a plane
that's been flying level for 30 secs at 300 MPH can suddenly be
stalling. Of course the more complex you make the software to decide
between normal and abnormal, the more failure that can induce. Seems
a far better solution is that if the two AOA disagree, then MCAS turns
itself off and notifies the pilots. Or put in a third one and vote.




I think there probably are flight configurations where you can pretty
much rule out stalling altogether. Notably when the nose is pointing
down and the plane is already gaining speed by losing height.

Since the problem only arises in normal flight mode I am surprised that
the SOP for zapping MCAS misbehaviour on take-off was not to extend
flaps again and increase engine thrust - then you get the benefit of
full servo control of all the flight surfaces and MCAS is disabled.

Well, that's a damn good point too. I said before that since the
trouble started just as the flaps came off, when the pilots couldn't
figure out what was going on, you'd think trying flaps again might
be a logical idea. But what you raise doesn't make Boeing look
very smart again. Because on takeoff, just after the flaps have
been retracted, it would sure be a hell of a lot easier to re-deploy
them to disable MCAS than to turn off the trim and try to wind it
back from nose down, with limited altitude. I wonder if Boeing
had made that the procedure, if the Ethiopian pilots would have
done it? Maybe not, I don't think there is any evidence anything
was said about MCAS. But I agree that telling pilots that using
flaps is an option would have been a good idea. I guess they at
least did tell the pilots that MCAS only works with no flaps,
so pilots might have picked it up that way.

there is a speed limit for extending flaps

 

[Tom Gardner]

On 07/05/19 19:58, trader4@optonline.net wrote:

On Tuesday, May 7, 2019 at 2:47:55 PM UTC-4, Tom Gardner wrote:
On 07/05/19 18:45, Banders wrote:
On 05/07/2019 05:57 AM, trader4@optonline.net wrote:
On Tuesday, May 7, 2019 at 12:33:45 AM UTC-4, Banders wrote:
On 05/06/2019 11:55 AM, trader4@optonline.net wrote:

Mushing has nothing to do with what I stated.  Explain to us how a 737
that's been going 300 MPH in level flight for 30 seconds can be stalling.
It can't.

Not during those 30 seconds perhaps, but wind shear can change things in
an instant.

Again, explain to us how any wind shear on this planet, can cause a plane
that is in level flight, at 300 MPH, for the last 30 seconds to stall.

Does this link work?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supercell#/media/File:Supercell.svg

You would be lucky to have the wings stall rather than be torn off.

Bear in mind that trader4 appears not to have any
experience of flying aircraft, and hence no experience
of the strange unexpected meteorological effects that
can be encountered.

So then explain to us how a 737 that's been flying for 30 secs
at 300 MPH in level flight can suddenly stall, requiring MCAS to activate.
Cite for us when this has happened.




Even with my limited experience, I've been in situations
which have surprised co-pilots that have been an instructor
for over half a century.

But I'm sure trader4 won't let that reality deter him
from his confident announcements about how aircraft
do (and don't) fly.

You're just sore because I have the facts and also hold the pilots
partly responsible for what happened. Out of 7, at least 4 could not
identify a runaway trim problem and take the simple steps, that are
supposed to be a memory item, to deal with it.

I'm not sore, but I don't have the time to educate you in
how aircraft do (and don't) fly.

It would help if you had some experience of flying aircraft.

It would help if you had been taught by competent instructors
that require you to recover after an aircraft has "departed
controlled flight", because such conditions can easily be
encountered, must be recognised, and dealt with.

*Since you have neither, trying to educate you would be a
waste of our time.*

*If you are prepared to educate yourself*, I suggest
Wolfgang Langewiesche's "Stick and Rudder; An
Explanation of the Art of Flying".

 

[Tom Gardner]

On 07/05/19 20:14, trader4@optonline.net wrote:

On Tuesday, May 7, 2019 at 3:05:18 PM UTC-4, Tom Gardner wrote:
On 07/05/19 19:40, trader4@optonline.net wrote:
I posed the challenge to the dissenters here to show us how a plane
that's been flying level for 30 secs at 300 MPH can suddenly be
stalling.

It would help if you had some experience flying aircraft.



In other words, the answer is that it can't be stalling
and you know it. If not, I'll reissue the challenge, explain to us
how a 737 that's been flying level for 30 secs can suddenly be
stalling......

You're like an incompetent mechanic or HVAC tech that thinks only
they can understand anything about fixing cars or HVAC systems.
They get all pissed off when they find out that there are bright
people who know the facts, can sort out truth from BS and actually
fix their own cars and HVAC. And then they get sore, real sore.
You're sore too because I put part of the blame for the accidents
on the pilots, who could not identify runaway trim and follow the
procedure. That's a fact.

It would help if you had been taught by competent instructors
that require you to recover after an aircraft has "departed
controlled flight", because such conditions can easily be
encountered, must be recognised, and dealt with.

Since you have neither, trying to educate you would be a
waste of our time.

If you are prepared to educate yourself, I suggest
Wolfgang Langewiesche's "Stick and Rudder; An
Explanation of the Art of Flying".

 

trader4@optonline.net wrote in
news:13ccb619-d461-4462-b15e-e158680db6d2@googlegroups.com:

Wrong again. Anyone who has followed this knows that MCAS only
works by using the trim.

More stupid reading comprehension issues.

The TRIM SYSTEM is used. That is the system it is tied into.


The MCAS 'trim system' moves the ENTIRE TAIL PLANE. Trim tabs do
not recover a plane from a stall.

That is why Boeing put out the directive
after the first crash, LA, to use the RUNAWAY TRIM PROCEDURE

Yes, idiot, because it is TIED in with the electric trim system.
They trim little tabs all over the plan. MCAS, however is a much
larger 'trim element'. It is the entire tailplane.

if
MCAS screwed up again. And we know it works, the LA flight the
previous day, the jump seat pilot told the dummies flying to turn
off the trim, they did, they adjusted it manually, the plane flew
on to it's destination.

You keep reiterating stupid shit about what they do here. I am
talking about what the sytem does. It does it fast. Turning it
back by hand is DECIDEDLY too fucking slow or we would not be
dicussing crash scenarios.

Damn you are thick, boy!

Wrong, always wrong.

Childish again, you fat failed tradertard fuck. Always childish.
You need to grow the fuck up.

 

trader4@optonline.net wrote in news:13ccb619-d461-4462-b15e-
e158680db6d2@googlegroups.com:

Thanks for further demonstrating that you're clueless about what trim
is even about.

I know more about it than you do.

Hell, I learned more about it on my flight simulator than you have in
all your "I wanna be an expert" attempts at getting up to speed on it.
Yet another failure for you.

 

trader4@optonline.net wrote in
news:ba0dbf80-f9a1-4de7-b610-c4689efd2326@googlegroups.com:

That's what we were talking about, your silly proposal for yet
another bandaid,

You stupid fuck. You have no clue and my idea is not a bandaid,
you whimpy zero mechanical aptitude fuck.

> your cutter offer.

That is YOU, dipshit. I never said a damned thing about a cutter,
and what the fuck is "an offer"?

Since you claim that the
existing mechanical trim and the runaway trim procedure is totally
inadequate,

You are a goddamned idiot. You, motherfucker, are an inadequate
example of a human. That is why your mother should be put in
prison. You are not human. You are a piece of shit which that
stupid slut forgot to flush.

please provide us the accident data over the last 50
years that supports that.

You are one stinky thick piece of shit, boy.

 

[Lasse Langwadt Christense]

onsdag den 8. maj 2019 kl. 00.13.16 UTC+2 skrev DecadentLinux...@decadence.org:

trader4@optonline.net wrote in
news:80d34090-d67d-418b-8552-4316f23526fc@googlegroups.com:

Yes, great idea. McDonald Douglas used that idea in the DC-10.
Instead of a jackscrew to drive the flaps, they used a hydraulic
PISTON. Which of course is what we actually call it. In 1979 a
DC-10 full of passengers taking off from O'Hare had an engine fall
off, which in turn damaged the hydraulic lines in the wing. The
flaps retracted. Guess what happened next.

Wrong, always wrong.

You are a goddamned idiot.

Flaps on large passenger planes, for your information, ARE actuated
by hydraulic cylinders.

screws actuated by hydraulic motors,https://youtu.be/cld62K4ntbk

 

trader4@optonline.net wrote in news:e6e39425-fab4-4bfa-a06e-
0e173fbef6c6@googlegroups.com:

Of course you did. You proposed another complication to intervene,
the cutter-offer.

Go away, little boy. You are too stupid to participate in this
discussion.

Explosive bolts and the like are not complicated, but for you a salt
shaker is complicated.

You are 100% clueless about avionic systems.

 

trader4@optonline.net wrote in news:03a722fa-c31a-4e26-afc3-
fb1d37e807c6@googlegroups.com:

> like "wrong", or "this is incorrect" and nothing more.

Funny... that is what you do. I have proof.

You just did it in this series of stupid posts you just got done
spilling into the group.

You are the group jackass. You sit on your fat ass in front of a PC
sucking in some more calories and getting ever fatter, all the while
posting your pathetic horseshit here.

But you stalk me and my posts with your one liners. Good job, you
hypocritical fucktard.

 

trader4@optonline.net wrote in
news:d6cd5150-70ee-4ac7-b5c3-4f72a40d4da7@googlegroups.com:

They've already been flying for decades and so far, I've not seen
a crash attributable to a fly-by-wire failure. If you have some
to show us, please present them.

You are an idiot. There are many.

The B1 bomber, is one major one.

Military planes have been fly by wire since the F-16, but not
passenger planes until more recently.

They were having crashes in their first tests back in '81.

That is mil planes.

How many passenger planes do you think are that way?

"you have not seen" a whole lot of things TraderTard4.

 

trader4@optonline.net wrote in
news:d6cd5150-70ee-4ac7-b5c3-4f72a40d4da7@googlegroups.com:

That is EXACTLY what is there now. In all these planes, the
electric trim buttons on the controls were working and were used
many times to move the trim back to where it should be. Is it
rocket science to get it near normal and then turn off the cutoff
switches? Geez.

Nice convenient ignorance of the time factor, AGAIN.

Obviously a pilot decided change cannot be implemented fast enough,
or we would not be discussing crashes, we would be discussing a huge
error found by a complaining pilot.

 

[Lasse Langwadt Christense]

tirsdag den 7. maj 2019 kl. 23.50.53 UTC+2 skrev DecadentLinux...@decadence.org:

trader4@optonline.net wrote in news:de422837-121d-4ec2-a304-
6f0397665697@googlegroups.com:

one of which is that you could
not exert enough force to turn it by hand.

More proof that you are an idiot. A screw is a very precise
engineering design. The threads utilize the shear strength of the
material they are cut on to move huge elements requiring huge forces
with a mere rotational force. Screw threads impart linear change in
a per turn manner. Each rotation moves the screw one thread pitch
further. Tons of linear force and movement force IS applied and it
does not require tons of force in the screw's rotation.

You prove over and over that you do not have the mechanical
aptitude to even be in the discussion.

IF there were your special "hydraulic assist" mechanisms in place,
then there would be no need for the manual dial at all. The pilot
could merely activate the recovery switch and hold it until the
dial back finishes.

That would actually work.

But you certainly do not know enough about the mechanical realm to
even make valid speculations. You failed to keep your weight
down... You failed at 'trading'. You have absolutely zero grasp of
physics. What is next, child? You gonna give the whole group a
primer on how hard it is to turn a screw?

https://youtu.be/aoNOVlxJmow?t=1m25s