N
Ned Latham
Guest
Sylvia Else wrote:
> keithr0 wrote:
----snip----
And that (the rarity of updates) is the deciding factor. Given that the
updates must be checked individually, onsite updates would probably be
cheaper than remote updates anyway.
> keithr0 wrote:
----snip----
It's not rocket surgery, you sign all messages with a 2048 bit RSA
private key, that positively identifies the sender. Add a pseudo random
rolling code to prevent replay attacks and wrap the whole lot in a 256
bit AES. Not hard at all really, it just takes a bit more effort.
The problem here is that then it's only as secure as the private key is,
which means that the integrity of the traffic light system depends on
hackers not getting access to the key.
Given that it shouldn't be necessary to update the critical firmware
anyway, other than for things like changes to speed limits (affects the
yellow/orange timing), which are local in nature, it's far safer just
not to allow remote updates at all.
And that (the rarity of updates) is the deciding factor. Given that the
updates must be checked individually, onsite updates would probably be
cheaper than remote updates anyway.