J
Jonathan Kirwan
Guest
On Sun, 08 Oct 2006 10:49:27 -0500, John Fields
<jfields@austininstruments.com> wrote:
However, Captain Rogers was well informed about this situation before
ordering the shoot-down. His exec, Commander Foster, testified later
that he had informed Rogers this was an A300 -- the ISAR would have
completely imaged the engines and profile quite easily -- especially
at close to 10 miles out, which is when the launch order was given.
The aircraft was in a climbing attitude, as well, not descending, and
was in the commercial flight path. It had never "squawked a military
transponder code" as was initially claimed by the Reagan admin. That
was determined objectively through an examination of the data files
from over 50 French aircraft flying in the area at the time, among
other things. This ship was an AEGIS cruiser and was completely in
the data loop of other aircraft, including the French planes. They
pretty much KNEW what they were doing when Rogers ordered the kill.
Frankly, there was no good excuse. And this kind of event should not
ever happen. The bottom line is that the US, with the best people and
some of the best equipment on one of the more advanced surface vessels
(and AEGIS cruiser), with good information on the civilian flight
schedules at hand, with an aircraft that was close to "on time" and
flying along a proper corridor in a climbing attitude, was still shot
down. Certainly, no one should defend it.
Rogers had been chasing around some gun boats and had invaded the 12
mile limit around Iran. He had been warned at least twice (recorded
on tape) by an Omani vessel (friendly) to leave the area immediately.
He was an excessively aggressive Captain, pursuing his own wreckless
course, and was probably very much on edge at the time. He made a
very bad decision. It's now a standard chapter in a course of studies
about how such things can go very wrong.
Personally, I have no question (I know, because I talked with some who
were on board at the time) that the electronics intelligence folks
knew this was an airliner and that this was reported through the exec
to Rogers fully two minutes before the order was given. Rogers should
not have been where he was, doing what he was doing. He knew he was
violating good policy and good judgment and the wreckless result was
disasterous and inexcusable.
It's not something to defend in any way. Captain Rogers did NOT
exemplify proper behavior of a commanding officer in the US Navy.
Jon
<jfields@austininstruments.com> wrote:
No, we don't. At least, I sure hope not.snip
Ostensibly, an attack on the Vincennes.
Do you think we blow up commercial airliners for the fun of it?
However, Captain Rogers was well informed about this situation before
ordering the shoot-down. His exec, Commander Foster, testified later
that he had informed Rogers this was an A300 -- the ISAR would have
completely imaged the engines and profile quite easily -- especially
at close to 10 miles out, which is when the launch order was given.
The aircraft was in a climbing attitude, as well, not descending, and
was in the commercial flight path. It had never "squawked a military
transponder code" as was initially claimed by the Reagan admin. That
was determined objectively through an examination of the data files
from over 50 French aircraft flying in the area at the time, among
other things. This ship was an AEGIS cruiser and was completely in
the data loop of other aircraft, including the French planes. They
pretty much KNEW what they were doing when Rogers ordered the kill.
Frankly, there was no good excuse. And this kind of event should not
ever happen. The bottom line is that the US, with the best people and
some of the best equipment on one of the more advanced surface vessels
(and AEGIS cruiser), with good information on the civilian flight
schedules at hand, with an aircraft that was close to "on time" and
flying along a proper corridor in a climbing attitude, was still shot
down. Certainly, no one should defend it.
Rogers had been chasing around some gun boats and had invaded the 12
mile limit around Iran. He had been warned at least twice (recorded
on tape) by an Omani vessel (friendly) to leave the area immediately.
He was an excessively aggressive Captain, pursuing his own wreckless
course, and was probably very much on edge at the time. He made a
very bad decision. It's now a standard chapter in a course of studies
about how such things can go very wrong.
Personally, I have no question (I know, because I talked with some who
were on board at the time) that the electronics intelligence folks
knew this was an airliner and that this was reported through the exec
to Rogers fully two minutes before the order was given. Rogers should
not have been where he was, doing what he was doing. He knew he was
violating good policy and good judgment and the wreckless result was
disasterous and inexcusable.
It's not something to defend in any way. Captain Rogers did NOT
exemplify proper behavior of a commanding officer in the US Navy.
Jon