Driver to drive?

[Le Chaud Lapin]

On Dec 18, 6:22 pm, spop...@speedymail.org (Steve Pope) wrote:

Le Chaud Lapin  <jaibudu...@gmail.com> wrote:

So the excuse that there was "not enough time" is not an an excuse,
IMO.

Probably encryption was not in the requirements.  It would of
course be illegal for a defense contractor to add features
just because they thought those features were important...
they must trace back to a contractual requirement.

I'll try to remember that the next time I'm designing a spacecraft for
NASA:

"Hey...Tyrone...I know they said Mars... but do you think they'd be OK
with a Saturn swing-around just for kicks?"

These guys have meetings ad nauseum. Things that would take you and me
to think about an make a decision in 4 hours, they discuss for four
months. Everything is deliberate. Everything is known. NSA and other
goverment agencies know all about what they are doing, as they are
doing it.

If crypto was not in the spec, the decision was deliberate. Since it
was not in the spec, the decision to not put it in was deliberate,
which is stupid, because it would have been easy, even in 1990, given
the amount of money involved.

Note that it does not take an entire team to do crypto. I could rattle
off the names of 10 (prominent) individuals who could have done the
crypto part single-handedly and likely not have made a mistake. My
guess is that such individuals would have been content with a
fraction, say, 1%, of the $1+ billion spent:

http://postmanpatel.blogspot.com/2006/04/global-hawk-uav-delays-cost-overruns.html

-Le Chaud Lapin-

 

[JosephKK]

On Sun, 13 Dec 2009 21:20:26 +1100, "APR" <I_Don't_Want@Spam.com> wrote:

"Bill Sloman" <bill.sloman@ieee.org> wrote in message
news:14910c77-6d8e-400d-8f58-25a9d4166a83@n35g2000yqm.googlegroups.com....
On Dec 11, 10:31 pm, Raveninghorde <raveninghorde@invalid> wrote:
On Fri, 11 Dec 2009 12:18:06 -0800, John Larkin

http://wattsupwiththat.com/2009/12/08/the-smoking-gun-at-darwin-zero/

This is an entertaining exercise in examining raw data.

Bill, have a look at the video in the following link. You can download the
data yourself, from what is supposed to be a most reputable source, and do
your own analysis.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F_G_-SdAN04

Doesn't this make a a light come on or are you still in the dark.

Thanks. It well documents what data was presented when i was in school in the 1960s.

 

[JosephKK]

On Sun, 13 Dec 2009 10:21:47 -0800, John Larkin <jjlarkin@highNOTlandTHIStechnologyPART.com> wrote:

On Sun, 13 Dec 2009 21:20:26 +1100, "APR" <I_Don't_Want@Spam.com
wrote:


"Bill Sloman" <bill.sloman@ieee.org> wrote in message
news:14910c77-6d8e-400d-8f58-25a9d4166a83@n35g2000yqm.googlegroups.com....
On Dec 11, 10:31 pm, Raveninghorde <raveninghorde@invalid> wrote:
On Fri, 11 Dec 2009 12:18:06 -0800, John Larkin

http://wattsupwiththat.com/2009/12/08/the-smoking-gun-at-darwin-zero/

This is an entertaining exercise in examining raw data.

Bill, have a look at the video in the following link. You can download the
data yourself, from what is supposed to be a most reputable source, and do
your own analysis.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F_G_-SdAN04

Doesn't this make a a light come on or are you still in the dark.


At last, some real climate science!

John

Less than 1000 years, less than 100 years, it is not climate. I learned
of urban heat islands some 40 years ago and they were centuries old news
then. Nor is anything that does not span 1000 years climate. Climate
runs from kiloyears to megayears.

 

[Archimedes' Lever]

On Thu, 17 Dec 2009 18:54:53 -0800 (PST), David Schwartz
<davids@webmaster.com> wrote:

On Dec 17, 6:33 pm, Le Chaud Lapin <jaibudu...@gmail.com> wrote:

Passing encrypted video over a satellite network built for unencrypted
analog video is not a trivial challenge. As far as I know, there
exists no scheme to do this that has not been broken already. The
problem is that encryption works partly by diffusing information so
that no part of the output looks like any part of the input. The
satellite link is filled with errors and distortion that have to be
contained to retain adequate video quality.

Maybe I misunderstand, but the system, based on this link:

http://www.skygrabber.com/en/skygrabber.php

...looks like it is entirely in the digital domain.

They're grabbing it later in the system, but if you want it encrypted
later in the system, you have to encrypt it earlier in the system.

If that is true, encryption, under the scenarios required by US DoD,
would take maybe 3 weeks using Rijndael or other symmetric cipher for
a rough run, and maybe a month more by a crypto expert to remove the
fatal flaws.

There is no place in the system to put such a cipher. The only
practical way to do is to encrypt the analog uplink. The satellite-
based system from the uplink from the Predator to the downlink to the
operator is simply not encryption-capable. Essentially, the problem is
basically that they chose a completely unsuitable system to handle the
image downlink to the operator.

DS

Real simple. Make it TCP/IP and use IP encryption, just like the
government and military does everywhere else.

As far as your claim of knowing what they did implement... I have
serious doubts that you do. Your simple, blanket statement that it "is
simply not encryption capable" is about as uninformed and stupid as it
gets.

ANY data stream can be EASILY encrypted, and that at a very strong
level.

 

[Archimedes' Lever]

On Thu, 17 Dec 2009 18:55:33 -0800 (PST), Le Chaud Lapin
<jaibuduvin@gmail.com> wrote:

On Dec 17, 8:15 pm, glen herrmannsfeldt <g...@ugcs.caltech.edu> wrote:
In comp.dsp Mark <makol...@yahoo.com> wrote:
(someone wrote)

Passing encrypted video over a satellite network built for unencrypted
analog video is not a trivial challenge. As far as I know, there
exists no scheme to do this that has not been broken already.

(snip)

um,, is that why General Instrument was able to do it did it 15
years ago for HBO?

He said "that has not been broken already".  As far as I know,
both the analog in digital encryptions have been broken.

It slows down most people, though, so it still works.

When has 256-bit Rijndael been broken? Or 128-bit for that matter? Or
RC6? Or many other symmetric ciphers?

The usual analog encryption reverses the polarity of some scan
lines and/or frames.  It isn't hard to figure out fairly reliably
a polarity reversal.

Take a look at the SkyGrabber site. It looks like the whole thing is
based on satellite Internet access, which of course, is entirely in
the digital domain:

http://www.skygrabber.com/en/skygrabber.php

-Le Chaud Lapin-

The original "VideoCipher" was never broken.

There WERE decoding chips being sold by the fab house that made them,
out the back door at night, while they made legit chips during the day,
but that early MPEG2 encrypted stream has still yet to have been broken.

That goes double, triple, and quadruple for the subsequent
"Videocipher2" and the now in use "Digicipher I" and "Digicipher II"

None of you "any encryption method can be broken" IDIOTS have EVER even
come close. Look at the streams, and the "false keys" will throw you
every time, and that is just ONE of the mechanisms in place.

So your "any cipher can be broken" mindset is flawed and there is
proof.

There are at least ten current cipher modes out there that you dopes
will never even come close to EVER breaking.

 

[David Schwartz]

On Dec 18, 10:00 am, Le Chaud Lapin <jaibudu...@gmail.com> wrote:

I took a quick look, and did not find any specifics, but once the
information is digital, it is a done deal, as the only excuses
remaining would be:

1. Not enough power for cipher operations.
2. Overhead of padding consumes too much bandwidth for data link.
3. No place to put the encryption devce.

The uplink from the Predator is analog. The downlink from the
satellite is digital. There is no accessible point between the two to
put the encryption device.

DS

 

[David Schwartz]

On Dec 18, 12:25 pm, Rick Jones <rick.jon...@hp.com> wrote:

It is my understanding that as wizzy as "things military" are, they
tend to be built from components that rather lag in performance
compared to what is available to civilians.  That is, "mil spec"
processors and what not are not at the forefront of the performance
curve.

Not just that, but equipment that operates in space has to be space-
qualified. Last I checked, the fastest space-qualified CPUs were
comparable to 66MHz Pentiums. And power and heat budgets on a
satellite are tight.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Predator_drone

suggests the first ones at least entered service in 1995, which means
they were probably prototypes a couple years earlier, which suggests
they were designed with stuff from the late '80s.

The issue is that the design was changed. At first, it was assumed
that latency was not super-critical. The idea was that you would use a
direct link during takeoff and landing and for normal flight, a few
seconds of latency is tolerable. it was later discovered both that the
latency wasn't that tolerable and that you might not want to put your
operators where the Predator takes off and lands. This required a
"quick change" to the system with no ability to modify the satellites
already deployed.

DS

 

[Le Chaud Lapin]

On Dec 18, 7:25 pm, David Schwartz <dav...@webmaster.com> wrote:

On Dec 18, 10:00 am, Le Chaud Lapin <jaibudu...@gmail.com> wrote:

I took a quick look, and did not find any specifics, but once the
information is digital, it is a done deal, as the only excuses
remaining would be:
1. Not enough power for cipher operations.
2. Overhead of padding consumes too much bandwidth for data link.

3. No place to put the encryption devce.

The uplink from the Predator is analog. The downlink from the
satellite is digital. There is no accessible point between the two to
put the encryption device.

Where on the Internet/etc. does it say that?

Also, CNN is quoting a military official implying that encryption was
possible, but would have slowed the link:

http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/12/17/drone.video.hacked/index.html

"The official said that many of the UAV feeds need to be sent out live
to numerous people at one time, and encryption was found to slow the
real-time link. The encryption therefore was removed from many feeds."

This statement he makes, btw, is bogus. Symmetric ciphers, even in
1990, are so fast, they are hardly the bottleneck in system. Signing
the packets, OTOH, would have been problematic.

-Le Chaud Lapin-

 

[Archimedes' Lever]

On Thu, 17 Dec 2009 21:41:46 -0800 (PST), Le Chaud Lapin
<jaibuduvin@gmail.com> wrote:

A thought:

If the terrorists can see and interpret the video, that means:

1. The protocol is decipherable.

No, it means they (the idiots that claim to have hacked it) found an
open stream that was NOT ever encrypted. All they succeeded in doing was
finding a carrier. No technical prowess required whatsoever.

2. The protocol is encipherable.

No. It is more likely not encrypted at all.

3. It is theoretically possible to inject bogus data into the stream.

Absolutely not. The GPS timestamps are going to keep that from ever
happening. Just because the video is able to be seen, that doesn't mean
that there was not more data included with each frame. In fact, I am
sure that there is.

 

[Archimedes' Lever]

On Thu, 17 Dec 2009 21:41:46 -0800 (PST), Le Chaud Lapin
<jaibuduvin@gmail.com> wrote:

With some very clever software engineering, it would be possible to
feed the satellite with bogus images that are superpositions of actual
video images and computer-generated animations.

No, it would be absolutely NOT possible.

 

[Paul Hovnanian P.E.]

Fred Abse wrote:

[snip]

"About 12 gauge" is hardly an engineering statement.

That's how I met my future father-in-law. ;-)

--
Paul Hovnanian mailtoaul@Hovnanian.com
------------------------------------------------------------------
Incorrigible punster -- Do not incorrige.

 

[Archimedes' Lever]

On Thu, 17 Dec 2009 21:41:46 -0800 (PST), Le Chaud Lapin
<jaibuduvin@gmail.com> wrote:

I just hope the image decompression software at the receiving end does
not have any buffer-overflow vunerabilities. But NSA is supposed to
catch things like that.

Considering all the other crap you have spewed, I doubt seriously that
you know a goddamned thing about what the NSA wants or does, much less
how they operate.

 

[Archimedes' Lever]

On Thu, 17 Dec 2009 22:09:31 -0800 (PST), David Schwartz
<davids@webmaster.com> wrote:

Cannot be done. The satellite that the predator talks to only supports
analog video.

Are you sure?

General instrument was able to digitize, compress, and send no less
than 12 standard 6MHz wide analog video signals up to a bird that was
only for analog TV signals, and they effectively increased satellite
channel capacity ten fold.

I do not think that you have thought this through very well.

Digital signals can be passed over analog carriers, and are, every day,
no problem.

It is all analog at some point.

 

[Archimedes' Lever]

On Fri, 18 Dec 2009 06:20:40 +0000 (UTC), glen herrmannsfeldt
<gah@ugcs.caltech.edu> wrote:

The original question was on analog video, which is somewhat
harder to encrypt without affecting the picture.

Bullshit.

 

[Archimedes' Lever]

On Thu, 17 Dec 2009 22:51:35 -0800 (PST), robert bristow-johnson
<rbj@audioimagination.com> wrote:

or PORN!!! make these hardcore Islamists watch some hardcore porn!!!
titles like "Under the Burka" or something like that. or US daytime
TV hits like Genital Hospital. that would be *really* cool.

them DARPA guys are pretty clever.

r b-j

It's national Take a bath in a vat of pig's blood day!

 

[HiggsField]

On Fri, 18 Dec 2009 05:56:55 -0500, "Michael A. Terrell"
<mike.terrell@earthlink.net> wrote:

Rick Jones wrote:

In comp.protocols.tcp-ip Mark <makolber@yahoo.com> wrote:
Passing encrypted video over a satellite network built for
unencrypted analog video is not a trivial challenge. As far as I
know, there exists no scheme to do this that has not been broken
already. The problem is that encryption works partly by diffusing
information so that no part of the output looks like any part of
the input. The satellite link is filled with errors and distortion
that have to be contained to retain adequate video quality.

um,, is that why General Instrument was able to do it did it 15 years
ago for HBO?

Is it "known" that the GI stuff (irony isn't cracked?


You do know there were two levels of Videocipher? VC-1 was designed
for military applications.

Total bullshit. It was designed for backhaul work. It was also used
by companies like General Motors, to feed training seminars, etc. to all
their dealerships. They were one of the first OTA educational systems of
that depth.

ALL the major networks ended up using it, and that is what made GI the
de facto standard, and is why they were UNsuccessfully sued as a
monopoly. Uplink encoding is used by any content provider, and they must
use GI gear because that is what all the birds use. So they ARE a
monopoly, by default, but it is not their fault all the networks went
with their gear.

VC-II was a very scaled down version done for
HBO in the early '80s.

VC-I was in use in 1983 and from then on.

It was retired on the last day of last year, 2008.

VC-II (1985)"was done for" satellite receivers, uplink encoders and
decoders, and backhaul work, not just for HBO. It was retired in 1993 as
piracy had to be nipped out of the system. That was VC-II RS and that is
where the false keys and rolling keys and such came from. Then came
DigiCipher and DigiCipher II.

I installed one of the first VC-II units for
beta testing for HBO at United Video in Cincinnati, Ohio. That would
make it 25 years.

It appears that you understand basic math.

VC-II was hardware items for cable system operators, sure, but it was
ALSO hardware items for use in end user satellite set-top boxes, which
have nothing to do with cable.

 

[Archimedes' Lever]

On Fri, 18 Dec 2009 05:58:13 -0500, "Michael A. Terrell"
<mike.terrell@earthlink.net> wrote:

glen herrmannsfeldt wrote:

In comp.dsp Mark <makolber@yahoo.com> wrote:
(someone wrote)

Passing encrypted video over a satellite network built for unencrypted
analog video is not a trivial challenge. As far as I know, there
exists no scheme to do this that has not been broken already.
(snip)

um,, is that why General Instrument was able to do it did it 15
years ago for HBO?

He said "that has not been broken already". As far as I know,
both the analog in digital encryptions have been broken.

It slows down most people, though, so it still works.

The usual analog encryption reverses the polarity of some scan
lines and/or frames. It isn't hard to figure out fairly reliably
a polarity reversal.

-- glen

Videocipher-I was digital video & audio. Videocipher-II was analog.

You're an idiot.

 

[Archimedes' Lever]

On Fri, 18 Dec 2009 11:02:41 +0000 (UTC), glen herrmannsfeldt
<gah@ugcs.caltech.edu> wrote:

In comp.dsp Michael A. Terrell <mike.terrell@earthlink.net> wrote:
(snip)

Videocipher-I was digital video & audio. Videocipher-II was analog.

And then there was the system that adds a sine wave to the
video signal such that the sync is not the lowest level anymore,
and wonders around enough that you won't try watch it.

-- glen

That was not encryption.

That was called "In-band gated sync scrambling".

 

[HardySpicer]

On Dec 18, 4:01 pm, Le Chaud Lapin <jaibudu...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Dec 17, 8:14 pm, krw <k...@att.bizzzzzzzzzzz> wrote:

On Thu, 17 Dec 2009 18:05:15 -0800 (PST), Le Chaud Lapin
Maybe they should leave it as it is. That way, the terrorists could
put it up on YouTube. Maybe there is a Hollywood show in it...

Perhaps it was intentional.  They can sell electronics to the
terrorists.  Who knows what backdoors lurk...

Check out the list of PCI adapters required by PC to receive satellite
feed at bottom of page:

http://www.skygrabber.com/en/skygrabber.php

If I were to design a backdoor, I would put it in the hardware. Of
course, this would mean that:

1. One of the listed manufacturers is actually a wolf in sheep's
clothing: DoD posing as a legitimate company.
2. DoD has contracts unders some Homeland Security act with all the
manufacturers to put in backdoors for units sold to regions inhabited
by terrorist.

#2 is more likely, as #1 would depend on getting lucky that terrorist
chose your adapter and not someone else's.

A hardware-resident virus on PC can pretty much do anything it wants
with the PC.

-Le Chaud Lapin-

That's assuming that your side ever even saw it before it blew
something up. I am surprised that terrorists haven't used drones - so
simple. Even model aircraft could od a little damage and they have
spread spectrum comms now.


Hardy

 

[Archimedes' Lever]

On Fri, 18 Dec 2009 09:36:52 -0500, PeterD <peter2@hipson.net> wrote:

On Thu, 17 Dec 2009 17:44:12 -0800 (PST), Mark <makolber@yahoo.com
wrote:



Passing encrypted video over a satellite network built for unencrypted
analog video is not a trivial challenge. As far as I know, there
exists no scheme to do this that has not been broken already. The
problem is that encryption works partly by diffusing information so
that no part of the output looks like any part of the input. The
satellite link is filled with errors and distortion that have to be
contained to retain adequate video quality.

DS

um,, is that why General Instrument was able to do it did it 15 years
ago for HBO?

Mark


They didn't do the video, just the audio. Video was a very simple
inversion technique, that was trivial to break. The audio was DES (so
they said) encrypted, but there were several holes in the system that
rendered it a bit less secure.

You absolutely have no clue what was done or how or why. GI encrypted
the entire 6MHz wide video signal, you dope. Maybe you are thinking of
"OnTV". That was in-band gated synch scrambling and the audio was not
digitized OR encrypted... it was simply shifted and not processed by the
tuner unless the gate is shifted back where it belongs.

Here... ALL of these were around and failed as well.

Older television encryption systems

* Oak Industries

Oak Orion was originally used for analog satellite television pay channel
access in Canada. Was innovative for its time as it used digital audio.
It has been completely replaced by digital encryption technologies. Was
used by Sky Channel in Europe between the years 1982 and 1987. Oak
developed related encryption systems for cable TV and broadcast pay TV
services such as ON TV. The Oak systems used a sine wave added to the
video signal to interfere with the video sync and relocated audio to a
sub-carrier.

* Leitch Technology

Leitch Viewguard is an analog encryption standard used primarily by
broadcast TV networks in the North America. Its method of scrambling is
by re-ordering the lines of video (Line Shuffle), but leaves the audio
intact and listenable. Terrestrial broadcast CATV systems in Northern
Canada used this conditional access system for many years. It is only
occasionally used today on some satellite circuits because of its
similarity to D2-MAC and B-MAC.

* B-MAC

B-MAC has not been used for DTH applications since Primestar switched to
an all-digital delivery system in the mid-1990s.

* VideoCrypt

Analogue cut and rotate scrambling system with smartcard based
conditional access system, used in 1990s by several European satellite
broadcasters, mainly British Sky Broadcasting. Was also used by Sky New
Zealand (Sky-NZ). One version of Videocrypt (VideoCrypt-S) had the
capability of scrambling sound. A soft encryption option was also
possible where the encrypted video could be transmitted with a fixed key
and any VideoCrypt decoder could decode it.

* RITC Discret 1

System based on horizontal line delay and audio scrambling. Each line of
video was pseudorandomly delayed by either 0 nS, 902 nS or 1804 nS. (Line
Delay) First used in 1984 by French channel Canal Plus, it was widely
compromised after the December 1984 issue of "Radio Plans" magazine
printed decoder plans.

* SATPAC

Used by European channel FilmNet the SATPAC system interfered with the
horizontal and vertical synchronization signals and transmitted a signal
containing synchronization and authorization data on a separate
subcarrier. The system was first used in September 1986 and saw many
upgrades as it was easily compromised by pirates. By September 1992,
FilmNet changed to D2-MAC EuroCrypt.

* Telease MAAST / Sat-Tel SAVE

Added an interfering sine wave of a frequency (circa 93.750 kHz) to the
video signal. This interfering signal was approximately six times the
frequency of the horizontal refresh. It had an optional sound scrambling
using Spectrum Inversion. Used in the UK by BBC for its world service
broadcasts and by the now defunct UK movie channel "Premiere".

* Payview III

Used by German/Swiss channel Teleclub in the early 1990s, this system
employed various methods such as video inversion, modification of
synchronization signals and a pseudo line delay effect.

* D2-MAC EuroCrypt

Conditional Access system using the D2-MAC standard. Developed mainly by
France Telecom, the system was smartcard based. The encryption algorithm
in the smartcard was based on DES. It was one of the first smart card
based systems to be compromised.

* Nagravision analog system

An older Nagravision system for scrambling analog satellite and
terrestrial television programs was used in the 1990s, for example by the
German pay-TV broadcaster Premiere. In this line-shuffling system, 32
lines of the PAL TV signal are temporarily stored in both the encoder and
decoder, and read out in permuted order under the control of a
pseudorandom number generator. A smartcard security microcontroller (in a
key-shaped package) decrypts data that is transmitted during the blanking
intervals of the TV signal and extracts the random seed value needed for
controlling the random number generation. The system also permitted the
audio signal to be scrambled by inverting its spectrum at 12.5 kHz using
a frequency mixer.