Driver to drive?

[John Larkin]

On Sun, 20 Dec 2009 06:36:54 +0000 (UTC), don@manx.misty.com (Don
Klipstein) wrote:

In <61527070-2f70-4e2b-b197-d1c6fee7f313@c3g2000yqd.googlegroups.com>,
Bill Sloman wrote in part:

On Dec 18, 8:08 pm, "JosephKK"<quiettechb...@yahoo.com> wrote:

SNIP to edit for space

That is what the politicians are trying to make it.  Did you not note
the lack of scientists at the Copenhagen meeting?

They weren't needed. The scientific case is closed. Most politicians
are busy working out how to deal with the consequences.

At this point, I would like to jump in to say that "the scientific case
is closed" for existence of AGW, and magnitude thereof is otherwise.

Or maybe even the sign.

John

 

[Fred Abse]

On Fri, 18 Dec 2009 20:05:45 -0700, Paul Hovnanian P.E. wrote:

Fred Abse wrote:

[snip]

"About 12 gauge" is hardly an engineering statement.

That's how I met my future father-in-law. ;-)

SNOOORT!

--
"Electricity is of two kinds, positive and negative. The difference
is, I presume, that one comes a little more expensive, but is more
durable; the other is a cheaper thing, but the moths get into it."
(Stephen Leacock)

 

[Le Chaud Lapin]

On Dec 20, 2:36 am, Eric Jacobsen <eric.jacob...@ieee.org> wrote:

On 12/19/2009 7:40 PM, Andrew Swallow wrote:





Eric Jacobsen wrote:
On 12/19/2009 12:24 PM, Archimedes' Lever wrote:
On Fri, 18 Dec 2009 19:04:59 -0600, krw<k...@att.bizzzzzzzzzzz> wrote:
{snip}

You're an idiot. Most digital links can handle up to 10 percent bit
error rate before correction coding fails to fix it.

Generally not. Raw BER for BPSK at 0dB is less than 10 percent, and
few codes can operate that far down. Even capacity-approaching codes
generally need input error rates higher than that.

Can you name a code and what code rate would be required to operate
with an input BER of 10e-1? I wouldn't think anyone would use a
deep-space code on a satellite because of bandwidth efficiency issues.

Tactical military links to a mobile destination are being specified
as static civilian links. An error rate of 1 in 10 on a battle
field is far from impossible. The military will simply have to live
with losing half their bandwidth to the FEC. The links also suffer
badly from block errors - a mixture of motor bike engines and
frequency hopping jammers. No need to be paranoid, the jammers have
operators who are out to get you.

Andrew swallow

The point was really that even from an advanced FEC standpoint an input
BER of 1 in 10 isn't practical to work with for the described
application.   Yielding half the bandwidth to FEC overhead is actually
practical, and using R = 1/2 coding over satellite channels is quite
common.   Using something like an R = 1/6 capacity-approaching code to
be able to handle such low input error rates is, I think, not practical.

So I think there's a lot of misinformation being thrown around this
thread, but that's probably not surprising anybody.

I was thinking the same thing.

If someone allows me to send 7 FEC bytes for every 1 byte of payload,
I could get reliable transmission over a salted wet noodle.

-Le Chaud Lapin-

 

[Steve Pope]

On Dec 20, 2:36 am, Eric Jacobsen <eric.jacob...@ieee.org> wrote:

The point was really that even from an advanced FEC standpoint an input
BER of 1 in 10 isn't practical to work with for the described
application.   Yielding half the bandwidth to FEC overhead is actually
practical, and using R = 1/2 coding over satellite channels is quite
common.   Using something like an R = 1/6 capacity-approaching code to
be able to handle such low input error rates is, I think, not practical.

Last I checked, such a channel is within the operating range of a rate
1/3 binary convolutional code...

Steve

 

[Andrew Swallow]

Son of a Sea Cook wrote:

On Sun, 20 Dec 2009 02:40:13 +0000, Andrew Swallow
am.swallow@btopenworld.com> wrote:

No need to be paranoid, the jammers have
operators who are out to get you.


The reason not to be paranoid is because "the jammers" will not be able
to "jam" tommorow's (today's) gear. Tommorrow's battle theaters will be
fast, secure, and clean and consistent links.

Not against a sophisticated enemy such as a member of the G20.

Andrew Swallow

 

[Tom Gootee]

On Dec 19, 11:01 pm, Le Chaud Lapin <jaibudu...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Dec 19, 9:02 pm, Tom Gootee <t...@fullnet.com> wrote:





On Dec 18, 3:22 pm, spop...@speedymail.org (Steve Pope) wrote:

Eric Jacobsen  <eric.jacob...@ieee.org> wrote:

On 12/18/2009 1:55 AM, Steve Pope wrote:
Le Chaud Lapin<jaibudu...@gmail.com>  wrote:
It should be noted that decrypting in non-real time, right now, in
December, 2009, is impossible using 256-bit AES.
WTF are you talking about?
I think he meant cracking it in real time.  Certainly decryption in
real-time isn't a big deal.  

Thanks, that makes sense.  I (as usual) was reading the sentence
too literally.

Steve

I think that he did mean what he said, that EVEN cracking it in NON-
real-time is also impossible.  However, that's probably wrong.
Someone told me that the time it takes to crack it might be down to
about 40 years or so, nowadays.

That's what I meant, but whoever told you 40 years probably needs to
do a little more work with crypto.

Unless the fundamental AES algorithm is cracked, a determination not
yet made by the top cryptographers in the world, no one will be
cracking 256-bit AES any time soon.

A attempted brute-force attack on 256-bit AES would border on
insanity.

See the following link:

http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/releases/aesq&a.htm

"Assuming that one could build a machine that could recover a DES key
in a second (i.e., try 2^55 keys per second), then it would take that
machine approximately 149 thousand-billion (149 trillion) years to
crack a 128-bit AES key. To put that into perspective, the universe is
believed to be less than 20 billion years old."

That's 128-bit AES. I leave it to the reader to figure out how long it
would take to brute-force search on 256-bit AES.

 Hint: It's greater than 149 trillion years. Add 30+ zeros.

Also note in the paragraph above that 2^55=36,028,797,018,963,968, so
this is a conservative proposition. You're talking about a machine
that can do 36 quadrillion decipherments per second. Having every
computational device on the planet at one's disposal would help a
little bit, but you're still talking about billions of trillions of
quadrillions of...yada..the age of the universe.

-Le Chaud Lapin-- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

How do you calculate those times?

Let's see. Just optimistically assuming that we could try 2^64 keys
per second, for simplicity, and that we have a 128-bit key, that would
take 2^64 seconds, since there would be 2^128 possible keys of 128
bits, and (2^128 keys) / (2^64 keys/sec) = 2^(128-64) seconds = 2^64
seconds. There are 60*60*24*365.25 = 31.5576x10^6 seconds per year.
If I "round that off" to 30x2^20 (= 31.45728x10^6), then it would take
2^64 seconds / (30x2^20 seconds/year) = (1/30) * ((2^64)/(2^20) (2^44)/30 = (1/3)(2^43) years. I must have made a math error, because
that's a lot longer than 149 trillion years. It looks more like the
256-bit crack-time that you gave.

However, I have almost no idea how many keys per second could be
tried, by a large, well-financed, tech- and crypto-savvy adversary.
That is the key (pun intended). But it looks like it would be a lot
cheaper for them to just buy or steal the key.

Cheers,

Tom

 

[Le Chaud Lapin]

On Dec 19, 11:36 pm, Son of a Sea Cook
<NotaBrews...@thebarattheendoftheuniverse.org> wrote:

  Boeing and many others are currently working on such systems.  You have
not even been paying attention to some of the references made in this
very thread.

Uhh...Boeing, if you have been reading the news, was Public Enemy #1
in all of this. The senate appropriates committees were so angry with
being duped by them over a period of six years, that the military was
forced to send Boeing a "show cause" letter, basically saying, "You
need to give us a reason to continue giving you hundreds of millions
of dollars because what you have 'given' us so far stinks." :

http://mobiledevdesign.com/hardware_news/cluster_contract_cancelled/

Essentially, over a period from 1999-2005, Boeing was milking the cow
while everyone slept. When it came time to show, they had nothing, a
perplexing phenomenon that exist unto this day.

The military also gave a significant portion of the JTRS $37 billion
contract to another prime contractor, which incensed Boeing and
normally would have resulted in a lawsuit by Boeing against the US
Government, but in this case, Boeing was helpless to do anything,
because they had already received the show cause letter, and an
investigation would have exposed the other fraud/waste/and-or/abuse
that they were already engaged in. So they watched helplessly as the
other conctractor took the bacon.

  Since the idiot that referenced it was more concerned with putting down
the government, it is not surprising that you may have missed his
reference since it was framed inside a slew of insults.

I must be the idiot that you are referring to. If your pseudonym is
indicative of what your mother/father does for a living, it would not
be surprising that you think that I am an idiot for critizing the
military.

  Anyway, it is common knowledge what IS used, AND what WILL be used, as
well as the wish list for an entire, new constellation of satellites.

Wish lists are nice. There is no less than $1 billion in research
annually being spent annually to find solutions to problems in
computer networking:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_Internet

That does not mean that the military-industrial complex will produce
the solutions.

Let's face it: JTRS is a real program that has been really with us
since 1999. That's 10 years. They have had plenty of funds from US
Government to produce. There was and is sufficient interest.
Sufficient media attention. All the essential ingredients that would
make a company like Boeing/Honeywell/Thales/etc. highly motivated to
produce..they are present. And here we are, 2009, and the most that
any of these companies have produced can best be described as a
traditional "ManPack" radio, where transceiver is under software
control, something that really has little to do with solving the
problems and does not really solve problem of networking the radios.
Frankly, the people running JTRS need to have a long talk with the
IEEE people who created Wi-Fi. This will clear the air, and force the
JTRS people to realize just how deep in it they are.

 It is only some of what is online now, and what is coming online and
what may come online...

_http://jpeojtrs.mil/files/org_info/SBIR_STTR_FINAL_PAGE_FLIP_LAYOUT_s...- Hide quoted text -

About a year ago, I read between 1250 and 1300 pages of documentation
on this program, because I could not believe what I was reading. In a
nutshell, the biggest problem with JTRS is that making software-
defined radio is ~not~ the same as making a computer network of
packets. It took them 6 years and $11 billon to discover this, while
IEEE 802.11 committee members have known for decades and could have
told them in the very first meeting in 1999 while the senators/etc.
where getting all giddy about digitizing old field radios.

Now that they realize their mistake - thinking that, just because
waveform is under software control, everything will magically "talk"
to each other in a glorified computer network - they are too proud to
ask for help. If they were to simply go to IEEE 802.11 meetings, and
say, "Hey guys...we have $5 billion to solve this problem we really
screwed up. Can you help us salvage all the promises of fantastic
radio network that we made...", one of first things that a Wi-Fi
engineer will want to see:

1. The spectral bandwidth that they have available
2. The bit rates they have been promising people
3. Situational parameters (SINAD - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SINAD)

....and immediately conclude that the spectral bandwidth is
horrifically out-of-line with the bit rates promised. [Perhaps this is
the primary reason why JTRS refuses to talk to real experts in doing
this kind of thing - the truth is too frightening]. Oddly, some people
at the Pentagon and elsewhere, who have experienced using convential
PDA's to communicate over Wi-Fi, have been asking a very basic
question - "Why not use Wi-Fi?" This angers some in the JTRS's program
because they view succumbing to Wi-Fi as personal failure. They
generally invoke the argument that Wi-Fi is not secure, which is
ridiculously misleading and irrelevant to the final architecture.

I am not the only one critical of JTRS and other programs. Here is
what the US GAO had to say, after a thorough, multi-month review of
JTRS:

"The JTRS program has encountered a number of problems, resulting in
significant delays and cost increases. The proram is currently
estimated to total about $37 billion.":

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06955.pdf

If you read this document, and skip through the euphemisms, you will
see that it essentially says, "These guys did not think about what
they were doing before they started doing it."

There are other peoeple, who have questioned the vision of JTRS and
its associated program. Just go to Goole and look up "JTRS failure",
and there are numerous criticisms especially from inside the military:

http://tinyurl.com/yknd9pn

I was also told by a high-ranking official at the Pentagon who has
been involved in this since the very beginning that, at present, in
2009, the program should not be taken seriously by small companies
hoping to receive funding, whether they are able to provide capability
or not. The prime contractors, very large corporations, have already
been chosen [the same ones that you see in the "JTRS failure" hits
above], and the outstanding solicitations have been fielded as a
matter of procedure.

Note that there is nothing wrong with the highly-vague vision of JTRS:
anything can communicate with anything else over highly dynamic world-
wide network that especially includes mobile, secured, radios in the
field. There are people the world over who will not disagree that this
is a good idea.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_Internet

The problem is that there is a huge gap between vagueness and
specificity, and for the past 10 years, the prime contractors and
DARPA have earned a D+ on the specifics, IMO

For those of you in sci.electronics.design and comp.dsp, for
amusement, you might want to take a look at JTRS promised bit-rates,
given the width and location of spectrum allocated to the military:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Tactical_Radio_System

-Le Chaud Lapin-

 

[Son of a Sea Cook]

On Sun, 20 Dec 2009 10:30:29 -0800 (PST), Le Chaud Lapin
<jaibuduvin@gmail.com> wrote:

Uhh...Boeing, if you have been reading the news, was Public Enemy #1
in all of this. The senate appropriates committees were so angry with
being duped by them over a period of six years, that the military was
forced to send Boeing a "show cause" letter, basically saying, "You
need to give us a reason to continue giving you hundreds of millions
of dollars because what you have 'given' us so far stinks." :

Uuhh... asshole, the system works, idiot.

Dumbfucks like you are public enemy #1.

 

[Son of a Sea Cook]

On Sun, 20 Dec 2009 10:30:29 -0800 (PST), Le Chaud Lapin
<jaibuduvin@gmail.com> wrote:

Essentially, over a period from 1999-2005, Boeing was milking the cow
while everyone slept. When it came time to show, they had nothing, a
perplexing phenomenon that exist unto this day.

That's funny, because all of the other PDFs I saw on the site you felt
so important to show us a discrepancy form from, showed all the gear and
all the links that ARE being accomplished in the program.

YOU are in the dark.

YOU are likely some chump that failed to get a contract. Everything is
on time with the current schedule, and that schedule morphed ONLY because
the requisites were increased dramatically from the initial concept.

 

[Son of a Sea Cook]

On Sun, 20 Dec 2009 10:30:29 -0800 (PST), Le Chaud Lapin
<jaibuduvin@gmail.com> wrote:

and an
investigation would have exposed the other fraud/waste/and-or/abuse
that they were already engaged in. So they watched helplessly as the
other conctractor took the bacon.

You're a goddamned idiot. If Boeing was committing fraud, they would
lose contracts. ALL of them.

 

[Son of a Sea Cook]

On Sun, 20 Dec 2009 10:30:29 -0800 (PST), Le Chaud Lapin
<jaibuduvin@gmail.com> wrote:

I must be the idiot that you are referring to. If your pseudonym is
indicative of what your mother/father does for a living, it would not
be surprising that you think that I am an idiot for critizing the
military.

No. I think that you are an idiot because of the insulting guesswork
you inject into your claims about what others are doing in an industry
that you are obviously angry about being excluded from.

 

[Son of a Sea Cook]

On Sun, 20 Dec 2009 10:30:29 -0800 (PST), Le Chaud Lapin
<jaibuduvin@gmail.com> wrote:

And here we are, 2009, and the most that
any of these companies have produced can best be described as a
traditional "ManPack" radio, where transceiver is under software
control, something that really has little to do with solving the
problems and does not really solve problem of networking the radios.
Frankly, the people running JTRS need to have a long talk with the
IEEE people who created Wi-Fi. This will clear the air, and force the
JTRS people to realize just how deep in it they are.

You're an idiot. There are several pieces of the hardware in place.
There are several that are already in the field, and there are several
that are on track for their trials.

I think the big problem here is that you just do not know the depth to
which such a system must be developed.

You have no clue what the term "mission critical" refers to, and you
have no clue how long equipment takes to get through an approval process,
much less the bog down that the government causes whenever a change needs
to be made.

 

[Son of a Sea Cook]

On Sun, 20 Dec 2009 10:30:29 -0800 (PST), Le Chaud Lapin
<jaibuduvin@gmail.com> wrote:

It took them 6 years and $11 billon to discover this,

You're an idiot. The system is working. You just cannot handle the
fact that it is.

 

[krw]

On Sun, 20 Dec 2009 12:29:48 -0800, Son of a Sea Cook
<NotaBrewster@thebarattheendoftheuniverse.org> wrote:

On Sun, 20 Dec 2009 10:30:29 -0800 (PST), Le Chaud Lapin
jaibuduvin@gmail.com> wrote:

It took them 6 years and $11 billon to discover this,

You're an idiot. The system is working. You just cannot handle the
fact that it is.

Wow! A DimBulb six-pack spotted! While certainly not unheard of
(seven is still the record, I believe), you don't see these every day.

 

[Son of a Sea Cook]

On Sun, 20 Dec 2009 10:30:29 -0800 (PST), Le Chaud Lapin
<jaibuduvin@gmail.com> wrote:

...and immediately conclude that the spectral bandwidth is
horrifically out-of-line with the bit rates promised.

100Mb/s is not a slow link, idiot.

Do you even know the problems associated with making a gyro stabilized
mobile tracking antenna system with a slew rate fast enough to handle the
bumps caused in a vehicle?

They are far greater than those associated with doing it in an
airframe. THAT is why the mobile units need to stop to facilitate links
in some pieces of gear.

Even the manpack has a stationary antenna that gets planted before the
link is established.

The handheld is the only thing that is onmi broadcast from that segment
of the system. That waveform is easy to integrate into the rest, and
those handhelds have been in the field for years, proving the function of
that segment of the system.

 

[Son of a Sea Cook]

On Sun, 20 Dec 2009 10:30:29 -0800 (PST), Le Chaud Lapin
<jaibuduvin@gmail.com> wrote:

why JTRS refuses to talk to real experts in doing
this kind of thing -

They ARE 'the real experts', idiot.

 

[Bungalow Bill]

On Sun, 20 Dec 2009 10:30:29 -0800 (PST), Le Chaud Lapin
<jaibuduvin@gmail.com> wrote:

This angers some in the JTRS's program
because they view succumbing to Wi-Fi as personal failure.

Using the public system presents a severe security breach in several
segment of the implementation that would be required, and it would also
be quite susceptible to attack, and jamming.

 

[Son of a Sea Cook]

On Sun, 20 Dec 2009 10:30:29 -0800 (PST), Le Chaud Lapin
<jaibuduvin@gmail.com> wrote:

They
generally invoke the argument that Wi-Fi is not secure, which is
ridiculously misleading and irrelevant to the final architecture.

You're an idiot. Folks are eavesdropping on cell phone and wifi links
all the time. And no, I do NOT need to correctly spell that nym.

 

[Son of a Sea Cook]

On Sun, 20 Dec 2009 10:30:29 -0800 (PST), Le Chaud Lapin
<jaibuduvin@gmail.com> wrote:

"The JTRS program has encountered a number of problems, resulting in
significant delays and cost increases. The proram is currently
estimated to total about $37 billion.":

You conveniently ALWAYS forget the FACT that they requites for the
system were MORE than doubled, and yet the cost has not. So, if
anything, the program should be commends for NOT following the standard
model where such huge requisite switching horseshit results in a tripling
of the cost and an additional ten years.

You have no clue what all has been added to the system or even how the
joint forces have evolved since the onset. The entire world has moved
forward in electronics, and you are still talking like we are all on '91
era gear.

Essentially, regardless of all the reading you have done or claim to
have done on it, what you have missed is that the reasons given for the
time and cost extensions are 100% legitimate.

Obama's promised absence of pork spending that fell on it's face, right
out of the other side of his mouth, to the tune of far more than that.

You should complain about crap like that, not about programs that are
actually part of our defense, and that are actually working.

 

[Le Chaud Lapin]

On Dec 20, 12:29 pm, Tom Gootee <t...@fullnet.com> wrote:

On Dec 19, 11:01 pm, Le Chaud Lapin <jaibudu...@gmail.com> wrote:





On Dec 19, 9:02 pm, Tom Gootee <t...@fullnet.com> wrote:

On Dec 18, 3:22 pm, spop...@speedymail.org (Steve Pope) wrote:

Eric Jacobsen  <eric.jacob...@ieee.org> wrote:

On 12/18/2009 1:55 AM, Steve Pope wrote:
Le Chaud Lapin<jaibudu...@gmail.com>  wrote:
It should be noted that decrypting in non-real time, right now, in
December, 2009, is impossible using 256-bit AES.
WTF are you talking about?
I think he meant cracking it in real time.  Certainly decryption in
real-time isn't a big deal.  

Thanks, that makes sense.  I (as usual) was reading the sentence
too literally.

Steve

I think that he did mean what he said, that EVEN cracking it in NON-
real-time is also impossible.  However, that's probably wrong.
Someone told me that the time it takes to crack it might be down to
about 40 years or so, nowadays.

That's what I meant, but whoever told you 40 years probably needs to
do a little more work with crypto.

Unless the fundamental AES algorithm is cracked, a determination not
yet made by the top cryptographers in the world, no one will be
cracking 256-bit AES any time soon.

A attempted brute-force attack on 256-bit AES would border on
insanity.

See the following link:

http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/releases/aesq&a.htm

"Assuming that one could build a machine that could recover a DES key
in a second (i.e., try 2^55 keys per second), then it would take that
machine approximately 149 thousand-billion (149 trillion) years to
crack a 128-bit AES key. To put that into perspective, the universe is
believed to be less than 20 billion years old."

That's 128-bit AES. I leave it to the reader to figure out how long it
would take to brute-force search on 256-bit AES.

 Hint: It's greater than 149 trillion years. Add 30+ zeros.

Also note in the paragraph above that 2^55=36,028,797,018,963,968, so
this is a conservative proposition. You're talking about a machine
that can do 36 quadrillion decipherments per second. Having every
computational device on the planet at one's disposal would help a
little bit, but you're still talking about billions of trillions of
quadrillions of...yada..the age of the universe.

-Le Chaud Lapin-- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

How do you calculate those times?

Let's see.  Just optimistically assuming that we could try 2^64 keys
per second, for simplicity, and that we have a 128-bit key, that would
take 2^64 seconds, since there would be 2^128 possible keys of 128
bits, and (2^128 keys) / (2^64 keys/sec) = 2^(128-64) seconds = 2^64
seconds.  There are 60*60*24*365.25 = 31.5576x10^6 seconds per year.
If I "round that off" to 30x2^20 (= 31.45728x10^6), then it would take
2^64 seconds / (30x2^20 seconds/year) = (1/30) * ((2^64)/(2^20) > (2^44)/30 = (1/3)(2^43) years.  I must have made a math error, because
that's a lot longer than 149 trillion years.  It looks more like the
256-bit crack-time that you gave.

However, I have almost no idea how many keys per second could be
tried, by a large, well-financed, tech- and crypto-savvy adversary.
That is the key (pun intended).  But it looks like it would be a lot
cheaper for them to just buy or steal the key.

Cheers,

Yes, the money is best spend trying other things.

Assuming 2^64 crypto operations per second, 128-bit crack would take,
in years:

2^64/2/amount-of-time-in-year.

You have to do / 2 on bit-width to eliminate half the key space. The
right key will either be in upper-half of keyspace or the lower-half.
If you check only lower-half, sometimes you will get lucky, sometimes
not, so on average, you check half the keys.

Continuing...

2^64/2/60/60/25/365 = 292,471,208,677 years.

But this assumes 2^64 ops/second. NIST only claimed 2^55 ops per
second. That's 9-bits slower, or 512 times slower, so to get their 149
trillion ops per second, we do:

292,471,208,677 * 512 = 149,745,258,842,898.

-Le Chaud Lapin-