Follow along with the video below to see how to install our site as a web app on your home screen.
Note: This feature may not be available in some browsers.
Assuming we know what they really were since he was illiterate and they wereMuhammad was indeed a prophet for a profit. His "revelations"
were astonishingly skewed to meet his immediate lusts and greed.
Indeed. I actually said "seems to misunderstand"On Mar 31, 3:14 am, "Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsizemo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
"Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote in message
Yep it is. Debate finished with you. See above as to why.
Civil debate ended when you said: "From you comments below, it seems
that you misunerstand what the hard problem actually is."
Because, somehow, claiming that someone doesn't understand the issues
under debate is supposed to be the most heinous insult imaginable, no?
I certainly claim that the mind is a sole function of the physical brain,On Mar 24, 2:42 pm, c...@kcwc.com (Curt Welch) wrote:
"Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:
Consciousness can be defined in a non-circular way. It's brain
activity.
No, no, no, no. Consciousness is phenomenal experience. If you want
to claim that our phenomenal experiences are caused by or just are a
function of brain activity, you are free to prove that. However, you
have yet to even GRASP what proving that might entail, let alone
making any progress on showing that it is.
If you choose to reject that definition, then you are the one that
are choosing to believe it can't be defined simply because you
choose to reject the only definition that fits the facts.
Dualism fits the facts. It promotes the mind as being non-physical.
I disagree.Allan C Cybulskie says...
Your reply here then basically
saying: "Why do I care about some philosophical argument about
pseudo- socks?" To which the philosopher replies: "Because if your
theory was right and captured all there was to know about socks, you
should be able to tell the difference between socks and
pseudo-socks.".
That sounds completely backwards to me. I'm saying, in the case of
socks, that all you need to know about socks is the fact that they
fit on your feet and keep your feet warm. Such a view of socks makes
"pseudo-socks" impossible; if they appear to be socks, then they
*are* socks.
I asking why do we feel pain. Not why electrons don't. Not feeling pain isKevin Aylward says...
Electrons don't feel pain. We do. Why? Thats the hard problem.
"Electrons don't feel pain" is *NOT* an observation that
needs to be explained. It is an *assumption*.
The fundamental reason is 1st person, not 3rd person. I am conscious, they?The point of
a scientific theory is to explain our observations, not to
explain our assumptions. Unless you are talking about a
theory of human assumptions---in that case, "Humans do not believe
that electrons feel pain" is an observation about *humans*,
not about electrons.
That's actually the interesting observation that needs explanation:
Humans divide the world into conscious entities and non-conscious
entities. How do they do it, and why are these categories useful?
Oh?Note that this question does *not* involve any circularities of
the form "Pain hurts". We don't need to assume that consciousness
exists in order to explore why humans find it a useful concept,
any more than we need to assume that ghosts exist in order to
explore why humans have believed in them.
The reason it's useful to distinguish
conscious from unconscious entities is because for
conscious entities it is helpful to take *motivation*
into account: If you want to move a 10-ton elephant, you
can try offering it food some distance away. In contrast,
there is really nothing that can motivate a 10-ton boulder
to move where you want it.
Not at all. Consciousness, is apparently redundant for all externalAssuming that an entity is conscious allows you to predict
and in some cases control its behavior by taking into
account motivation. This allows a level of understanding
of an extremely complex system that could not be otherwise
understood.
Not to me. And I mean not to ME. *I* feel pain irrespective of how this pianWell, I think you're completely wrong about that.
Pardon?
I meant that you are completely wrong about the claim that
"external behavior is simply irrelevant".
Trivially, yes. Your sitll preaching to the converted. but this says nothingWhat makes a particular
electro-chemical signal "pain" as opposed to something else are
the causal connections describing how that signal typically arises
and how it typically influences behavior.
This is the external black box measurements are all there is assumption, toThe de-facto assumption is that I am discussing the complete complex
system of neurons wired up as a brain as a given. That is what the
internal mental state is.
Yes, and I'm disagreeing with that. What makes it pain is the way
that that system is typically connected with the rest of the world.
They are to the person inside the black box.You don't have observations that require explanation, either.
Tautologies (such as "Pain hurts") are *not* observations.
Yes they are.
They aren't *empirical* observations.
It isn't, and I didnt.Isn't that what I just said? If everything is in the service of
reproduction, then it's redundant to include that in the definition
of "emotion".
No it is not redundant. It is used to explain why emotions are
selfish.
The fact that emotions are selfish is an empirical *observation*.
It shouldn't be lumped into the *definition* of "emotion" so that
it is tautologically true.
Then how do you know that you love them as much as if theey were your own?After a man has a vasectomy,
he continues to have emotions, but they no longer have anything
to do with reproduction. The love of one's children is no less
strong when the children are adopted.
Not actually so
Yes, actually so. I'm speaking from experience here.
If you are telling me that you are bringing up someone else's child
and *all* the feelings are the same as if it were your own,
you are lying to me or lying to yourself.
Oh, go jump in a lake. All four of my children are adopted, and
I love them very much.
I don't understand where you are getting that from. I'm definingDaryl McCullough wrote:
Allan C Cybulskie says...
Your reply here then basically
saying: "Why do I care about some philosophical argument about
pseudo- socks?" To which the philosopher replies: "Because if your
theory was right and captured all there was to know about socks, you
should be able to tell the difference between socks and
pseudo-socks.".
That sounds completely backwards to me. I'm saying, in the case of
socks, that all you need to know about socks is the fact that they
fit on your feet and keep your feet warm. Such a view of socks makes
"pseudo-socks" impossible; if they appear to be socks, then they
*are* socks.
I disagree.
A root assumption here is that external measurements is all there is to an
object. The classic illustration is the "if a leaf falls of a tree in a
forest and no one hears it, doe it really fall". Consider a black box. It
may be true that external measurements are all that are relevant to the
external instrument, but that is not the case for those instruments inside
the box. The measurements matter to them. The further assumption is that
conditions that generate a specific solution are unique. This is obviously
false. There are many ways to produce the value 2.13.
Your sock argument would hold that a bunch of people living in a box, that
no one can open, or penetrate, do not exit at all. Certainly I agree that as
far as anything external to the box it might be "as if" they don't exist,
but for the people actually in the box they do, so it matters to them.
Well, you are, in my opinion, a little cavalier about attributingBecause, somehow, claiming that someone doesn't understand the issues
under debate is supposed to be the most heinous insult imaginable, no?
Indeed. I actually said "seems to misunderstand"
You're going to have to work a bit on just what you mean byI certainly claim that the mind is a sole function of the physical brain,
but I also claim that it is not a "thing" either.
I think the CLASSIC version of this ends in "does it make aA root assumption here is that external measurements is all there is to an
object. The classic illustration is the "if a leaf falls of a tree in a
forest and no one hears it, doe it really fall".
However, if there is absolutely no way for those "instruments inside"Consider a black box. It may be true that external measurements are all
that are relevant to the external instrument, but that is not the case for
those instruments inside the box. The measurements matter to them.
I'll answer that one the very MOMENT you define what youI asking why do we feel pain.
This assumption defines the thing called 'science'.A root assumption here is that external measurements
is all there is to an object.
You are confused regarding the scientificConsider a black box. It may be true that external
measurements are all that are relevant to the
external instrument, but that is not the case for those
instruments inside the box...
... a bunch of people living in a box, that no one
can open, or penetrate, do not exist at all. Certainly I agree
that as far as anything external to the box it might be
"as if" they don't exist, but for the people actually in
the box they do, so it matters to them.
Interesting. What is this LET?For example, we can consider Special Relativity (SR) and
the Lorenz Ether Theory (LET). SR is based on the
assumption that the speed of light is an
invariant and that all uniform motion is relative. LET is based on
contradictory axioms to SR, that the speed of light is a constant only
relative to an ether, and that motion is absolute.
If two theories make the same predictions,Mathematically, the theories are identical. There is no way, in
principle, to determine which theory is false.
Will you leave Godel out of it? His result wasWhat fits the facts better than postulating another entity, is simply to
note Godels theorem. That is, things can be true but not derivable.
I don't agree at all. From a scientific point of view,Daryl McCullough wrote:
?The point of
a scientific theory is to explain our observations, not to
explain our assumptions. Unless you are talking about a
theory of human assumptions---in that case, "Humans do not believe
that electrons feel pain" is an observation about *humans*,
not about electrons.
That's actually the interesting observation that needs explanation:
Humans divide the world into conscious entities and non-conscious
entities. How do they do it, and why are these categories useful?
The fundamental reason is 1st person, not 3rd person.
That isn't the reason that people find the categoryI am conscious, they look the same as me, so they are conscious
too.
I'm claiming that the capability of having such motivations *is*The reason it's useful to distinguish
conscious from unconscious entities is because for
conscious entities it is helpful to take *motivation*
into account: If you want to move a 10-ton elephant, you
can try offering it food some distance away. In contrast,
there is really nothing that can motivate a 10-ton boulder
to move where you want it.
Oh?
Motivation is this sense here, does not require the notion of consciousness
at all.
And that's what people are doing when they categorize some beingsWe can mechanical define motivation as the ability to instigate some action
from something that can actually take action (i.e. move). We can simple
distinguish based on that ability to move etc.
Well, your notion of consciousness seems not to have anyThe issue with consciousness is that at face level, it does not seem to be
required at all. No explanation of behaviour seems to require it.
Yes, and I think that there is nothing more to be said aboutSo, I disagree with your reason to distinguish consciousness.
There is only one reason, a kick in the balls hurts. Its that simple.
It doesn't appear that way to me.Assuming that an entity is conscious allows you to predict
and in some cases control its behavior by taking into
account motivation. This allows a level of understanding
of an extremely complex system that could not be otherwise
understood.
Not at all. Consciousness, is apparently redundant for all external
behaviour.
Listen, a scientific theory devoted to the way thingsI meant that you are completely wrong about the claim that
"external behavior is simply irrelevant".
Not to me. And I mean not to ME.
I would say that I know more about the subject than you do.Oh, go jump in a lake. All four of my children are adopted, and
I love them very much.
Then how do you know that you love them as much as if they were your own?
As I said, you are an idiot. Darwinian evolution doesn't sayObviously a sore point with you. A reason many can not stomach Darwian
evolution as it demands much that many find uncomfortable.
Then why did you add "Electrons don't feel pain"?Daryl McCullough wrote:
Kevin Aylward says...
Electrons don't feel pain. We do. Why? Thats the hard problem.
"Electrons don't feel pain" is *NOT* an observation that
needs to be explained. It is an *assumption*.
I asking why do we feel pain. Not why electrons don't.
Why should that be?Not feeling pain is the default.
No, it's not. The first person perspective is perhaps interesting toThat's actually the interesting observation that needs explanation:
Humans divide the world into conscious entities and non-conscious
entities. How do they do it, and why are these categories useful?
The fundamental reason is 1st person, not 3rd person.
I'm suggesting that the only interesting thing about conscious entitiesNote that this question does *not* involve any circularities of
the form "Pain hurts". We don't need to assume that consciousness
exists in order to explore why humans find it a useful concept,
any more than we need to assume that ghosts exist in order to
explore why humans have believed in them.
The reason it's useful to distinguish
conscious from unconscious entities is because for
conscious entities it is helpful to take *motivation*
into account: If you want to move a 10-ton elephant, you
can try offering it food some distance away. In contrast,
there is really nothing that can motivate a 10-ton boulder
to move where you want it.
Oh?
Motivation is this sense here, does not require the notion of consciousness
at all.
Maybe your notion of consciousness.Assuming that an entity is conscious allows you to predict
and in some cases control its behavior by taking into
account motivation. This allows a level of understanding
of an extremely complex system that could not be otherwise
understood.
Not at all. Consciousness, is apparently redundant for all external
behaviour.
Well, if you are interested in expressing how things seem to *YOU*,I meant that you are completely wrong about the claim that
"external behavior is simply irrelevant".
Not to me. And I mean not to ME. *I* feel pain irrespective of how this pian
is externalised.
As I said, go write that poem.What makes a particular
electro-chemical signal "pain" as opposed to something else are
the causal connections describing how that signal typically arises
and how it typically influences behavior.
Trivially, yes. Your sitll preaching to the converted. but this says nothing
about what *I* feel as pain...
I would say I know more about it than you do.Oh, go jump in a lake. All four of my children are adopted, and
I love them very much.
Then how do you know that you love them as much as if they were your own?
The fact that it might be an advantageObviously a sore point with you. A reason many can not stomach Darwian
evolution as it demands much that many find uncomfortable.
The evolution argument on this is pretty clear, those that loved adopted
children equally as their own genetic children, would be at a replication
disadvantage to those that loved their own child genes more.
Talk about the pot calling the kettle black...Maybe you should give up science altogether if you don't like what science
teaches.
Well, I have a two stage program using independent processes,"Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote in message
news:bTcQh.4327$e9.2414@newsfe6-gui.ntli.net...
I asking why do we feel pain.
I'll answer that one the very MOMENT you define what you
mean by "feel," and provide objective proof that YOU do, in
fact, "feel pain." I can't tell if you do simply by observing you,
although by golly, when you stub your toe you sure LOOK
a lot like I do when I do the same thing. Still, you could be
merely a clever simulation, and I really want to be sure about
this...
Bob M.
That would be an interesting question if it were non-rhetorical.Well, I have a two stage program using independent processes,
one set of processes sets the variable feel_pain where another
sets uses the variable and produces responses such as:
fprintf(vocal,"Oooohhhh\n");
How could this be a clever simulation when the variable is right
there for all to inspect? What more is there to feeling pain that
an internal variable to store its value?
It is my experience that the ability to detect sarcasmNow here's a conundrum for you - when standing on flat
ground, you feel your weight, i.e. there is a force
acting on you, yet you are not moving. Hence there
is a positive force, but zero acceleration!
Sure there is a positive force - but what made the force of gravity go away?
And if you include that guess what the net force is? Try thinking a little
clearer.
Chew on that one, Grasshopper... while Newton rolls
his eyes...
OK, we trust you, and we concede the debate to yourKevin, you have made claims about inertial frames of
reference, acceleration, and the equivalence principle,
containing 'fundamental, unresolved' logical problems.
GR contains no fundamental unresolved problems.
err, your kidding right?
I dont have time to go into it right now, but trust me, there are quite a
few unresolved issues.
If your trying this Ive noticed you need to wait a second or two forHeres a website that offers a free web page.
There are some good music templates.
http://download.gofour.co.uk
mgb
We FEEL like the earth is the center of the universe...This has relevance to the seemingly-endless "free will" debates; we
can argue forever as to whether or not free will "really" exists, but
I would claim the question itself is irrelevant. We FEEL as though
we have free will (which takes care of the internal concerns),
Not necessarily. If human behavior is the productand whether our actions as externally observed as the
result of "real" free will or random physical processes
makes no difference to any
external concerns - they are equally unpredictable either way.
We ask questions and try to understood things.So what, precisely, would the point of the discussion BE, then?