Chip with simple program for Toy

[Daryl McCullough]

Allan C Cybulskie says...

stevendaryl3...@yahoo.com (Daryl McCullough) wrote:

Obviously, when people talk about zombies, they are
distinguishing between "as if" mental properties and
"real" mental properties. We can certainly all agree
that other humans behave as if they had sensation,
emotions, awareness, etc. But supposedly that isn't
enough to show that they have "real" mental experience.
But what does that mean? What does "real" mean in this
case? Presumably, it means "Like mine". But what notion
of "likeness" is appropriate here? Of course, no two
brains are alike, so no other brain is like mine, and
no other mind works precisely like mine. But what
range of differences is allowable for mentality to
be considered "real"?

The zombie example is clear on this: a case where there is no
experience at all.

To act like a human, the zombie must yank it's hand away
when it touches something hot. So *something* is monitoring the
zombie's environment and acting on that information. How
is such monitoring to be distinguished from "having experience"?

So: no inner speech, no inner reasoning, and no
phenomenal experiences. This is hard for us to imagine because almost
all of our knowledge and beliefs come from experience, so let me
clarify this slightly with an example: Imagine that all of your
experiences of colours come from a machine that pops up a set of text
in front of your eyes that says that the object is a particular
colour. The claimed experience of the zombie is something like
that ... except it doesn't even have the text.

Basically, for the zombie, all that happens is that the brain state
changes and the behaviour changes, with no inner states or experiences
occurring at all.

What is the distinction between "brain states" and "inner states"?

The further question is, why should anyone *care*
about the difference between "real" and "as if"
mentality?

Because what we want to explain when we want to explain mind is REAL
mentality. "As if" mentality is utterly meaningless when trying to
explain mind.

It depends on why you want such an explanation. If you are interested
in building intelligent robots, then "as if" mentality is good enough.

I'm using "as if" mentality as a generalization of human mentality.
So explaining as if mentality is explaining a general phenomenon
of which human mentality is a special case. Whether that is good
enough or not depends on whether you are interested in issues that
apply to humans, but not to other apparently conscious beings.

There certainly are many such issues: How exactly do neurons work,
how is the brain organized, etc.

Let me try an analogy. Suppose we're talking about
socks. Some philosopher has a theory that there are true
socks and there are pseudo-socks. This philosopher
doesn't yet have any physical test to distinguish
true socks from pseudo-socks, and he *also* doesn't
have any explanation for why anyone would care whether
they are wearing true socks or pseudo-socks. But he
insists that there is a property of "intrinsic sockness"
that is not reducible to the physical facts. Why would
such a theory of socks make any sense? Why is the
possibility of zombies any different from the possibility
of pseudo-socks?


You have the case backwards. Here, the philosopher's have put forward
the question of what socks are. The materialist has put forward a
solution to that question. The philosopher then points out that under
the materialist's theory, you could have socks and pseudo-socks and
not be able to tell the difference.

I'm not sure which position you are calling the materialist position,
but in *my* view of mind, there is no possibility of a distinction
between mentality and pseudo-mentality. A being is conscious if it
has certain behavioral capabilities.

The view that allows for the possibility of zombies is the view
that behavior is not sufficient for consciousness, that there are
necessary "inner states" that must accompany the behavior. I reject
that view, and I thereby reject the possibility of zombies.

Your reply here then basically
saying: "Why do I care about some philosophical argument about pseudo-
socks?" To which the philosopher replies: "Because if your theory was
right and captured all there was to know about socks, you should be
able to tell the difference between socks and pseudo-socks.".

That sounds completely backwards to me. I'm saying, in the case of
socks, that all you need to know about socks is the fact that they
fit on your feet and keep your feet warm. Such a view of socks makes
"pseudo-socks" impossible; if they appear to be socks, then they
*are* socks. An alternative theory of socks is that there is some
additional irreducible quality of "intrinsic sockness" that must
present for something to be a true sock.

If someone denies that there *is* such a thing as intrinsic
sockness, and therefore denies the possibility of pseudo-socks,
how does it make sense to ask him how he would distinguish
socks from pseudo-socks?

--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY

 

[Daryl McCullough]

Allan C Cybulskie says...

On Mar 29, 2:14 pm, stevendaryl3...@yahoo.com (Daryl McCullough)
wrote:

So what? I'm suggesting that once you've explained a causal
connection between (A) getting kicked in the crotch, and (B)
the behaviors that I described, then you've explained all there
is to explain about pain. The fact that the same behaviors can
arise in other circumstances doesn't affect this.

Sure it does: if I can fake those behaviours in those situations, it
means that you can't point at those situations and those behaviours
and say "That's pain." Because if the experience isn't there,
neither is the pain, as you've just admitted.

Look, let's consider a fire alarm. If there is a fire, you
pull the lever, an alarm sounds, and the fire department
shows up. There is a causal chain here: Presence of fire
gets you to pull the alarm, which brings the fire department.

Now, of course the fire department can show up even if
you *haven't* pulled the alarm.

Pain is like the fire alarm. It is an indication that
something needs to be done.

"Pain" is just
a name that we give for the causal relationship between
environmental stimuli and behaviors.

No, pain is the name we give to the phenomenal experience that occurs
due to certain environmental stimuli and causes certain behaviours to
occur.

I would say that it is a brain state that
occurs due to environmental stimuli and causes behaviors.
Adding "phenomenal experience" doesn't add anything.

--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY

 

[Lawson English]

Allan C Cybulskie wrote:
[...]

Also, what about sleep? Do you think that I'm awake all the time
while I'm asleep, but just don't remember it when I wake up?

Actually, there IS a state where that allegedly occurs, but it has
different physiological correlates than normal sleep...


Mason LI, Alexander CN, Travis FT, Marsh G, Orme-Johnson DW, Gackenbach
J, Mason DC, Rainforth M, Walton KG.
Electrophysiological correlates of higher states of consciousness during
sleep in long-term practitioners of the Transcendental Meditation program.
Sleep. 1997 Feb;20(2):102-10.

Standard ambulatory night sleep electroencephalograph (EEG) of 11
long-term practitioners of the Transcendental Meditation (TM) program
reporting "higher states of consciousness" during sleep (the
experimental group) was compared to that of nine short-term
practitioners and 11 non-practitioners.

EEG tracings during stages 3 and 4 sleep showed the experimental group
to have:

1) theta-alpha activity simultaneously with delta activity and

2) decreased chin electromyograph (EMG) during deep sleep (p = 0.002)
compared to short-term practitioners.

Spectral analysis fast Fourier transform (FFT) data of the first three
cycles showed that:

3) the experimental subjects had significantly greater theta 2 (6-8
Hz)-alpha 1 (8-10 Hz) relative power during stages 3 and 4 than the
combined control groups [t(30) = 5.5, p = 0.0000008] with no difference
in time in delta;

4) there was a graded difference across groups during stages 3 and 4 in
theta 2-alpha 1 power, with experimentals having greater power than
short-term practitioners, who in turn had greater power than
non-practitioners [t(30) = 5.08, p = 0.00002]; and

5) experimentals also had increased rapid eye movement (REM) density
during REM periods compared to short-term practitioners (p = 0.04).

Previous studies have found increased theta-alpha EEG activity during
reported periods of "transcendental consciousness" during the TM
technique. In the Vedic tradition, as described by Maharishi Mahesh
Yogi, transcendental consciousness is the first of a sequence of higher
states. The maintenance of transcendental consciousness along with deep
sleep is said to be a distinctive criterion of further, stabilized
higher states of consciousness. The findings of this study are
interpreted as physiological support for this model.

 

[Lawson English]

Allan C Cybulskie wrote:

On Mar 25, 7:33 am, stevendaryl3...@yahoo.com (Daryl McCullough)
wrote:
Bob Myers says...

...I would again point out
that we have no way of directly demonstrating "experience"
or "feelings" in ANYONE but ourselves - therefore, I am not
certain that they exist in anyone else. The rest of you may be
all zombies for all I know (which would raise troubling questions
about where you all came from, and why I'M here, but at
least it IS a possibility!).
I don't see how such a possibility has any meaning.
What would it *mean* for someone else to lack "feelings"
or "experience"?

Obviously, when people talk about zombies, they are
distinguishing between "as if" mental properties and
"real" mental properties. We can certainly all agree
that other humans behave as if they had sensation,
emotions, awareness, etc. But supposedly that isn't
enough to show that they have "real" mental experience.
But what does that mean? What does "real" mean in this
case? Presumably, it means "Like mine". But what notion
of "likeness" is appropriate here? Of course, no two
brains are alike, so no other brain is like mine, and
no other mind works precisely like mine. But what
range of differences is allowable for mentality to
be considered "real"?

The zombie example is clear on this: a case where there is no
experience at all. So: no inner speech, no inner reasoning, and no
phenomenal experiences. This is hard for us to imagine because almost
all of our knowledge and beliefs come from experience, so let me
clarify this slightly with an example: Imagine that all of your
experiences of colours come from a machine that pops up a set of text
in front of your eyes that says that the object is a particular
colour. The claimed experience of the zombie is something like
that ... except it doesn't even have the text.

Basically, for the zombie, all that happens is that the brain state
changes and the behaviour changes, with no inner states or experiences
occurring at all.

Gee, sounds like the hypothetical state of a fully enlightened human,
actually, save that allegedly there is always some "trace" of inner
activity remaining. "Samsara" is the technical term in the Yoga Sutras.

 

[Lawson English]

Daryl McCullough wrote:

Allan C Cybulskie says...
stevendaryl3...@yahoo.com (Daryl McCullough) wrote:

Obviously, when people talk about zombies, they are
distinguishing between "as if" mental properties and
"real" mental properties. We can certainly all agree
that other humans behave as if they had sensation,
emotions, awareness, etc. But supposedly that isn't
enough to show that they have "real" mental experience.
But what does that mean? What does "real" mean in this
case? Presumably, it means "Like mine". But what notion
of "likeness" is appropriate here? Of course, no two
brains are alike, so no other brain is like mine, and
no other mind works precisely like mine. But what
range of differences is allowable for mentality to
be considered "real"?
The zombie example is clear on this: a case where there is no
experience at all.

To act like a human, the zombie must yank it's hand away
when it touches something hot. So *something* is monitoring the
zombie's environment and acting on that information. How
is such monitoring to be distinguished from "having experience"?

Actually, such responses are reflexes that occur prior to qualia. IN
fact, the heat reflex generally doesn't even reach the brain at all or
even the spinal column, IIRC. There are feedback loops in the nerves
that attach to the muscles that connect directly to the muscles, so the
response time is virtually instantaneous by response time standards.

So: no inner speech, no inner reasoning, and no
phenomenal experiences. This is hard for us to imagine because almost
all of our knowledge and beliefs come from experience, so let me
clarify this slightly with an example: Imagine that all of your
experiences of colours come from a machine that pops up a set of text
in front of your eyes that says that the object is a particular
colour. The claimed experience of the zombie is something like
that ... except it doesn't even have the text.

Basically, for the zombie, all that happens is that the brain state
changes and the behaviour changes, with no inner states or experiences
occurring at all.

What is the distinction between "brain states" and "inner states"?

Many/most researchers think that the thalamus governs the
presence/absence of inner states, though of course, other mechanisms no
doubt play a part.

>

 

[Bill Hobba]

"Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylward@ntlworld.com> wrote in message
news:eYnPh.10506$Kk5.6302@newsfe1-win.ntli.net...

Bill Hobba wrote:
"RichD" <r_delaney2001@yahoo.com> wrote in message


Kevin, you have made claims about inertial frames of
reference, acceleration, and the equivalence principle,
containing 'fundamental, unresolved' logical problems.

GR contains no fundamental unresolved problems.

err, your kidding right?

I dont have time to go into it right now, but trust me, there are quite a
few unresolved issues.

Sure, I am not an expert, http://www.kevinaylward.co.uk/gr/index.html, but
I have formally studied it enough to know some of the issues.

I am not an expert either, but have formally studied it also, including the
mathematical technicalities, from many sources, such as Landau - Classical
Theory of Fields, MTW etc. And I am not aware of any fundamental unresolved
issues. So if you think there are please elucidate - be as technical as you
see fit. Are you talking about, for example, the fact one can not define
energy properly - ie it is a pseudo tensor and not a tensor? They are
interesting characteristics of the theory - but are not fundamental
unresolved issues. Or is that fact it can't be reconciled with QM your
issue? Such is actually not the case:
http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/gr-qc/9512024

There is the issue with a black hole singularity be physically 'silly' - but
we know long before such conditions are met GR needs to be replaced with
quantum gravity, just as long before the field of a point charge become
infinite it needs to be replaced with QED.

I suspect this is really an issue about what is meant 'by fundamental
unresolved issue'.

I you really want do take it further we can do a post asking a genuine
expert, Steve Carlip, for his input. He still occasionally posts to
sci.physics.relativity, and I am sure he can give us the good oil.

Thanks
Bill

--
Kevin Aylward
ka@anasoftEXTRACT.co.uk
www.anasoft.co.uk
SuperSpice

 

[Bill Hobba]

"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:z3kPh.5338$EJ6.4779@newsfe24.lga...

Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:yyEOh.56905$mJ1.11700@newsfe22.lga...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:VHxOh.17280$nh4.11056@newsfe20.lga...
PD wrote:
On Mar 27, 3:08 pm, "RichD" <r_delaney2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Mar 24, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:

The universe and everything in it however isn't circular -
It indeed is.This is in fact very well known and understood.
yeah the speed of light is an invariant in an inertial frame,
well how do we know what is an inertial frame or not?
Look mate these issues are pretty fundamental and unresolved.
An inertial frame is a collection of objects
which are not accelerating with respect to one another.

What's the problem?
Your description is a problem.

Stomp on your gas pedal in your car.
During the acceleration, the passenger seat, the radio, the cup
holder, the steering wheel, and the door latch comprise a collection
of objects which are not accelerating with respect to one another.
Does this collection represent an inertial frame?

PD

The distinction made in elementary texts is flawed. An accelerating
car and a non-accelerating car are both already in a non-inertial
frame wrt to the perpendicular acceleration of gravity.
Sure - by definition inertial frames can not contain gravity. But it
is obvious such will not affect the outcome.

In an accelerating car, any and all objects fixed to a surface
perpendicular to the acceleration of the car are still in an inertial
frame of reference wrt that surface.
No they aren't - the acceleration breaks the isotopy of an inertial
frame regardless of its direction.

How is that a different situation than with gravity?

When gravity is present space-time is curved. However by definition an
inertial frame obeys Euclidian geometry for stationary points and lines;
hence gravity is immediacy precluded. If you are accelerating wrt to an
inertial frame the force such a frame exerts on you will have a direction
and so break the assumed isotropy of an inertial frame - so such frames
can not be inertial. Inertial frames are very special and have specific
properties.

Sure, but you ignored the example of sitting on the Earth's surface in
your previous comment. Insomuch as the Earth is an inertial frame (yes I
know it isn't really, but it is dealt with as such on a regular basis in
textbooks and labs), so is the uniformly accelerating car with the slanted
surface as I described above.

No it is not inertial - even as a good approximation - you cant get rid of
the force eof acceleration that way. The only way to make an accelerating
car on the earth approximately inertial is to let it free fall - it will not
be strictly inertial due to tidal forces.

Bill

 

[Lawson English]

Bill Hobba wrote:

"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:z3kPh.5338$EJ6.4779@newsfe24.lga...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:yyEOh.56905$mJ1.11700@newsfe22.lga...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:VHxOh.17280$nh4.11056@newsfe20.lga...
PD wrote:
On Mar 27, 3:08 pm, "RichD" <r_delaney2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Mar 24, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:

The universe and everything in it however isn't circular -
It indeed is.This is in fact very well known and understood.
yeah the speed of light is an invariant in an inertial frame,
well how do we know what is an inertial frame or not?
Look mate these issues are pretty fundamental and unresolved.
An inertial frame is a collection of objects
which are not accelerating with respect to one another.

What's the problem?
Your description is a problem.

Stomp on your gas pedal in your car.
During the acceleration, the passenger seat, the radio, the cup
holder, the steering wheel, and the door latch comprise a collection
of objects which are not accelerating with respect to one another.
Does this collection represent an inertial frame?

PD

The distinction made in elementary texts is flawed. An accelerating
car and a non-accelerating car are both already in a non-inertial
frame wrt to the perpendicular acceleration of gravity.
Sure - by definition inertial frames can not contain gravity. But it
is obvious such will not affect the outcome.

In an accelerating car, any and all objects fixed to a surface
perpendicular to the acceleration of the car are still in an inertial
frame of reference wrt that surface.
No they aren't - the acceleration breaks the isotopy of an inertial
frame regardless of its direction.

How is that a different situation than with gravity?
When gravity is present space-time is curved. However by definition an
inertial frame obeys Euclidian geometry for stationary points and lines;
hence gravity is immediacy precluded. If you are accelerating wrt to an
inertial frame the force such a frame exerts on you will have a direction
and so break the assumed isotropy of an inertial frame - so such frames
can not be inertial. Inertial frames are very special and have specific
properties.
Sure, but you ignored the example of sitting on the Earth's surface in
your previous comment. Insomuch as the Earth is an inertial frame (yes I
know it isn't really, but it is dealt with as such on a regular basis in
textbooks and labs), so is the uniformly accelerating car with the slanted
surface as I described above.

No it is not inertial - even as a good approximation - you cant get rid of
the force eof acceleration that way. The only way to make an accelerating
car on the earth approximately inertial is to let it free fall - it will not
be strictly inertial due to tidal forces.

But that is true of any other object or set of objects on the surface of
the Earth as well. My slanted surface inside the car takes the place of
the surface of the earth. What fundamental difference is there?

 

[Bill Hobba]

"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:%PEPh.163745$ia7.125119@newsfe14.lga...

Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:z3kPh.5338$EJ6.4779@newsfe24.lga...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:yyEOh.56905$mJ1.11700@newsfe22.lga...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:VHxOh.17280$nh4.11056@newsfe20.lga...
PD wrote:
On Mar 27, 3:08 pm, "RichD" <r_delaney2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Mar 24, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:

The universe and everything in it however isn't circular -
It indeed is.This is in fact very well known and understood.
yeah the speed of light is an invariant in an inertial frame,
well how do we know what is an inertial frame or not?
Look mate these issues are pretty fundamental and unresolved.
An inertial frame is a collection of objects
which are not accelerating with respect to one another.

What's the problem?
Your description is a problem.

Stomp on your gas pedal in your car.
During the acceleration, the passenger seat, the radio, the cup
holder, the steering wheel, and the door latch comprise a
collection
of objects which are not accelerating with respect to one another.
Does this collection represent an inertial frame?

PD

The distinction made in elementary texts is flawed. An accelerating
car and a non-accelerating car are both already in a non-inertial
frame wrt to the perpendicular acceleration of gravity.
Sure - by definition inertial frames can not contain gravity. But it
is obvious such will not affect the outcome.

In an accelerating car, any and all objects fixed to a surface
perpendicular to the acceleration of the car are still in an
inertial frame of reference wrt that surface.
No they aren't - the acceleration breaks the isotopy of an inertial
frame regardless of its direction.

How is that a different situation than with gravity?
When gravity is present space-time is curved. However by definition an
inertial frame obeys Euclidian geometry for stationary points and
lines; hence gravity is immediacy precluded. If you are accelerating
wrt to an inertial frame the force such a frame exerts on you will have
a direction and so break the assumed isotropy of an inertial frame - so
such frames can not be inertial. Inertial frames are very special and
have specific properties.
Sure, but you ignored the example of sitting on the Earth's surface in
your previous comment. Insomuch as the Earth is an inertial frame (yes I
know it isn't really, but it is dealt with as such on a regular basis in
textbooks and labs), so is the uniformly accelerating car with the
slanted surface as I described above.

No it is not inertial - even as a good approximation - you cant get rid
of the force eof acceleration that way. The only way to make an
accelerating car on the earth approximately inertial is to let it free
fall - it will not be strictly inertial due to tidal forces.

But that is true of any other object or set of objects on the surface of
the Earth as well. My slanted surface inside the car takes the place of
the surface of the earth. What fundamental difference is there?

It is an inertial frame contain factious forces, and gravity modelled as a
force. Either one breaks the isotropy of an inertial frame. An inertial
frame containing gravity is not inertial - it is an inertial frame
containing gravity. A class full of water is not an empty class - it is a
class containing water. But for many considerations we can ignore the water
and consider it the same as an empty class eg in saying - see that glass
over there? A frame attached to the earth is not an inertial frame - it is
an inertial frame containing gravity. For many practical purposes we can
consider it inertial and ignore the gravity eg since the gravity is so weak
it will have negligible effect on light so we can consider it inertial for
the purpose of measuring the speed of light. I am sure you think of
countless others. As I said before you are confused about semantic
context.. When considering experiments done on earth as being in an
inertial frame we are assuming the fact it is not strictly inertial has no
practical effect eg if demonstrating conservation of momentum using dry ice
pucks we are not considering movement vertically so in that context it can
be considered inertial. That is not to say it is an inertial frame in a
direction perpendicular to the vertical as you are asserting - a non
inertial frame in non inertial regardless of how you look at it - but in
certain contexts it can be considered inertial.

Thanks
Bill

 

[Lawson English]

Bill Hobba wrote:

"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:%PEPh.163745$ia7.125119@newsfe14.lga...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:z3kPh.5338$EJ6.4779@newsfe24.lga...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:yyEOh.56905$mJ1.11700@newsfe22.lga...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:VHxOh.17280$nh4.11056@newsfe20.lga...
PD wrote:
On Mar 27, 3:08 pm, "RichD" <r_delaney2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Mar 24, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:

The universe and everything in it however isn't circular -
It indeed is.This is in fact very well known and understood.
yeah the speed of light is an invariant in an inertial frame,
well how do we know what is an inertial frame or not?
Look mate these issues are pretty fundamental and unresolved.
An inertial frame is a collection of objects
which are not accelerating with respect to one another.

What's the problem?
Your description is a problem.

Stomp on your gas pedal in your car.
During the acceleration, the passenger seat, the radio, the cup
holder, the steering wheel, and the door latch comprise a
collection
of objects which are not accelerating with respect to one another.
Does this collection represent an inertial frame?

PD

The distinction made in elementary texts is flawed. An accelerating
car and a non-accelerating car are both already in a non-inertial
frame wrt to the perpendicular acceleration of gravity.
Sure - by definition inertial frames can not contain gravity. But it
is obvious such will not affect the outcome.

In an accelerating car, any and all objects fixed to a surface
perpendicular to the acceleration of the car are still in an
inertial frame of reference wrt that surface.
No they aren't - the acceleration breaks the isotopy of an inertial
frame regardless of its direction.

How is that a different situation than with gravity?
When gravity is present space-time is curved. However by definition an
inertial frame obeys Euclidian geometry for stationary points and
lines; hence gravity is immediacy precluded. If you are accelerating
wrt to an inertial frame the force such a frame exerts on you will have
a direction and so break the assumed isotropy of an inertial frame - so
such frames can not be inertial. Inertial frames are very special and
have specific properties.
Sure, but you ignored the example of sitting on the Earth's surface in
your previous comment. Insomuch as the Earth is an inertial frame (yes I
know it isn't really, but it is dealt with as such on a regular basis in
textbooks and labs), so is the uniformly accelerating car with the
slanted surface as I described above.
No it is not inertial - even as a good approximation - you cant get rid
of the force eof acceleration that way. The only way to make an
accelerating car on the earth approximately inertial is to let it free
fall - it will not be strictly inertial due to tidal forces.
But that is true of any other object or set of objects on the surface of
the Earth as well. My slanted surface inside the car takes the place of
the surface of the earth. What fundamental difference is there?

It is an inertial frame contain factious forces, and gravity modelled as a
force. Either one breaks the isotropy of an inertial frame. An inertial
frame containing gravity is not inertial - it is an inertial frame
containing gravity. A class full of water is not an empty class - it is a
class containing water. But for many considerations we can ignore the water
and consider it the same as an empty class eg in saying - see that glass
over there? A frame attached to the earth is not an inertial frame - it is
an inertial frame containing gravity. For many practical purposes we can
consider it inertial and ignore the gravity eg since the gravity is so weak
it will have negligible effect on light so we can consider it inertial for
the purpose of measuring the speed of light. I am sure you think of
countless others. As I said before you are confused about semantic
context.. When considering experiments done on earth as being in an
inertial frame we are assuming the fact it is not strictly inertial has no
practical effect eg if demonstrating conservation of momentum using dry ice
pucks we are not considering movement vertically so in that context it can
be considered inertial. That is not to say it is an inertial frame in a
direction perpendicular to the vertical as you are asserting - a non
inertial frame in non inertial regardless of how you look at it - but in
certain contexts it can be considered inertial.

Which was my point. Whatever experiments you can conduct on the surface
of the earth, you could conduct on the slanted surface inside the
accelerating car with the same results/caveats.

 

[Glen M. Sizemore]

"Daryl McCullough" <stevendaryl3016@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:eumk5d02lp9@drn.newsguy.com...

Allan C Cybulskie says...

On Mar 29, 2:14 pm, stevendaryl3...@yahoo.com (Daryl McCullough)
wrote:

So what? I'm suggesting that once you've explained a causal
connection between (A) getting kicked in the crotch, and (B)
the behaviors that I described, then you've explained all there
is to explain about pain. The fact that the same behaviors can
arise in other circumstances doesn't affect this.

Sure it does: if I can fake those behaviours in those situations, it
means that you can't point at those situations and those behaviours
and say "That's pain." Because if the experience isn't there,
neither is the pain, as you've just admitted.

Look, let's consider a fire alarm. If there is a fire, you
pull the lever, an alarm sounds, and the fire department
shows up. There is a causal chain here: Presence of fire
gets you to pull the alarm, which brings the fire department.

Now, of course the fire department can show up even if
you *haven't* pulled the alarm.

Pain is like the fire alarm. It is an indication that
something needs to be done.

"Pain" is just
a name that we give for the causal relationship between
environmental stimuli and behaviors.

No, pain is the name we give to the phenomenal experience that occurs
due to certain environmental stimuli and causes certain behaviours to
occur.

I would say that it is a brain state that
occurs due to environmental stimuli and causes behaviors.

We do not identify pain in others by examining their brain. We respond to
their behavior (i.e., "labeling" someone as "being in pain" is a verbal
operant under stimulus control of another person's publicly-observable
behavior). Even when the importance of the nervous system is known, we
continue to respond to behavior (and not the brain) when we identify pain in
others. Thus, "pain" is, in many cases, simply a name for certain events. To
say that "pain is a brain state" is, quite clearly, a category error.

Adding "phenomenal experience" doesn't add anything.

Ahh, but it does. You are, curiously, sort of taking the position of
Methodological behaviorism (MB). Watson's position (and I do not call a
Watson a MB) was simply that there was no such thing as subjective
experience). Exceptions to Watson's position led both to methodological
behaviorism (MB) and to radical behaviorism (RB), MB holding that subjective
events were real but could not be studied by a science, and RB holding that
subjective events were real, were behavior, and could be handled by a
science by inference. You seem to hedge a little bit, though; you want to
say that pain is a "brain state" that causes observable behavior, and it
appears that you want to say that we detect such "brain states" when we
report we are in pain (unless you want to argue that we are always observing
our own publicly-observable behavior when we report that we are in pain).
This, of course, raises the issue of how one feels one's brain. All of this,
of course, points to the problem with your brief sentence above; the
self-report of pain must be explained. Leaving aside the problem of "feeling
one's brain" there is the problem of how one comes to talk about anything
that is private. We have some idea how we are trained to call one thing
"red" and another "blue," (at least, I hope, we can agree that we must, in
some sense, be trained) but how can we be "instructed" when the thing or
event in question is private? And then we have a very important question:
when we are trained, say, to "tell red from blue" are we merely trained to
label a difference we already see, or does the training establish the
difference? If the latter is correct, then it is possible for non-human
animals to behave in MANY of the ways that we call "feeling pain" but to not
"be aware" of either their own "brain states" (as you seem to want to say)
or their own (behavioral) responses to the conditions (my view). That is,
the latter position holds that non-human animals are, in fact, temporary
philosophical zombies. The difference is that they can be "made aware of
pain" by exposing them to the proper training conditions. Let me ask you
something (even though it is clear that you won't answer): why would someone
describe a pain that results from a NON-OBSERVABLE source as "sharp" or
"burning"? How do such responses come about?

 

[Daryl McCullough]

Glen M. Sizemore says...

We do not identify pain in others by examining their brain. We respond to
their behavior (i.e., "labeling" someone as "being in pain" is a verbal
operant under stimulus control of another person's publicly-observable
behavior).

Yes, I agree. As I said in another post, there are three
levels of description at work. There is uninterpreted
behavior, which is just what the creature does, without
regard to why or what it means. There is interpreted
behavior, where we assign the behavior categories such
as "being in pain", or "being angry". Then there is the
physical description in terms of what goes on in the
brain.

I claim that the word "pain" is appropriate at the middle
level. However, there must be the right sorts of things
happening at the physical level in order for the middle
level to work the way it does.

Even when the importance of the nervous system is known, we
continue to respond to behavior (and not the brain) when we
identify pain in others. Thus, "pain" is, in many cases, simply
a name for certain events. To say that "pain is a brain state"
is, quite clearly, a category error.

I sort of agree, but there must be correlations between
the physical brain state and the publicly observable events.

Adding "phenomenal experience" doesn't add anything.

Ahh, but it does. You are, curiously, sort of taking the position of
Methodological behaviorism (MB). Watson's position (and I do not call a
Watson a MB) was simply that there was no such thing as subjective
experience). Exceptions to Watson's position led both to methodological
behaviorism (MB) and to radical behaviorism (RB), MB holding that subjective
events were real but could not be studied by a science, and RB holding that
subjective events were real, were behavior, and could be handled by a
science by inference. You seem to hedge a little bit, though; you want to
say that pain is a "brain state" that causes observable behavior, and it
appears that you want to say that we detect such "brain states" when we
report we are in pain (unless you want to argue that we are always observing
our own publicly-observable behavior when we report that we are in pain).

Actually, I think that there is some of that going on.

This, of course, raises the issue of how one feels one's brain. All of this,
of course, points to the problem with your brief sentence above; the
self-report of pain must be explained. Leaving aside the problem of "feeling
one's brain" there is the problem of how one comes to talk about anything
that is private. We have some idea how we are trained to call one thing
"red" and another "blue," (at least, I hope, we can agree that we must, in
some sense, be trained) but how can we be "instructed" when the thing or
event in question is private?

Yes, that's a very interesting question. How, for instance, do
children learn what it means to have a headache? It's more complicated
than learning what "red" or "ball" means, but I don't think it's
too terribly mysterious. A child produces certain behavior (crying,
for example) and the parent works to figure out what hurts, and then
informs the child that he has a headache. So even though a "headache"
reflects something internal, the way that the word "headache" is attached
to it is purely behavioral. If children didn't behave in predictable
ways when they had headaches, they would never learn the word.

And then we have a very important question:
when we are trained, say, to "tell red from blue" are we merely trained to
label a difference we already see, or does the training establish the
difference? If the latter is correct, then it is possible for non-human
animals to behave in MANY of the ways that we call "feeling pain" but to not
"be aware" of either their own "brain states" (as you seem to want to say)
or their own (behavioral) responses to the conditions (my view). That is,
the latter position holds that non-human animals are, in fact, temporary
philosophical zombies. The difference is that they can be "made aware of
pain" by exposing them to the proper training conditions.

Okay, that's an interesting perspective. I can buy that. However,
the zombies discussed in articles on the philosophy of AI often
are described as behaviorally indistinguishable from ordinary
humans. So these zombies are able to *identify* feelings and
thoughts and so forth, even though they don't really have such
things. I can't make any sense of such a possibility.

Certainly I can believe that there is a big difference between
language-using beings and those that can't use language.

Let me ask you something (even though it is clear that you won't
answer):

Why do you say I won't answer? Do you mean I want
answer *correctly*? Are you making a comment about
my willingness to answer questions, or my competence
in doing so?

why would someone describe a pain that results from a
NON-OBSERVABLE source as "sharp" or "burning"? How do such
responses come about?

I think it's a very imprecise thing, and I think it takes a
long time to actually use those concepts. Until you've actually
had "heartburn", you really don't know what people mean by the
phrase. The first time, you don't know what's wrong with you,
and what people have said in the past about heartburn doesn't
necessarily clue you in that what they were talking about is
the same thing as you are experiencing. But then, if you try
a bunch of different remedies, and the heartburn medicine
actually makes you feel better, then you conclude that you
must have had heartburn. There are other clues, such as the
typical *causes* (eating spicy food, or whatever the typical
causes are). There is also the use of analogies. People can
ask you "Does your pain feel like somebody is poking you
in the stomach with a sharp stick?" Of course, you may
have never *actually* been poked in the stomach with a sharp
stick, but presumably you have been poked in other places,
and you can see similarities between the two situations.

--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY

 

[Daniel Mandic]

Daryl McCullough wrote:

I think it's a very imprecise thing, and I think it takes a
long time to actually use those concepts. Until you've actually
had "heartburn", you really don't know what people mean by the
phrase. The first time, you don't know what's wrong with you,
and what people have said in the past about heartburn doesn't
necessarily clue you in that what they were talking about is
the same thing as you are experiencing. But then, if you try
a bunch of different remedies, and the heartburn medicine
actually makes you feel better, then you conclude that you
must have had heartburn. There are other clues, such as the
typical causes (eating spicy food, or whatever the typical
causes are). There is also the use of analogies. People can
ask you "Does your pain feel like somebody is poking you
in the stomach with a sharp stick?" Of course, you may
have never actually been poked in the stomach with a sharp
stick, but presumably you have been poked in other places,
and you can see similarities between the two situations.

Hi Daryl!


All relative and experience based. If you don't have the experience in
an unknown pain, an other experience (e.g. pokin with a stick) might
help to enlight.

There a human on world they never saw other Human, they are even more
capable to talk to animals.
Leaving a human without any living mammals, cause serious disfunctions,
up to death....


Best regards,

Daniel Mandic

 

[Glen M. Sizemore]

"Daryl McCullough" <stevendaryl3016@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:euofr70604@drn.newsguy.com...

Glen M. Sizemore says...

We do not identify pain in others by examining their brain. We respond to
their behavior (i.e., "labeling" someone as "being in pain" is a verbal
operant under stimulus control of another person's publicly-observable
behavior).

Yes, I agree. As I said in another post, there are three
levels of description at work. There is uninterpreted
behavior, which is just what the creature does, without
regard to why or what it means. There is interpreted
behavior, where we assign the behavior categories such
as "being in pain", or "being angry". Then there is the
physical description in terms of what goes on in the
brain.

I claim that the word "pain" is appropriate at the middle
level. However, there must be the right sorts of things
happening at the physical level in order for the middle
level to work the way it does.

Even when the importance of the nervous system is known, we
continue to respond to behavior (and not the brain) when we
identify pain in others. Thus, "pain" is, in many cases, simply
a name for certain events. To say that "pain is a brain state"
is, quite clearly, a category error.

I sort of agree, but there must be correlations between
the physical brain state and the publicly observable events.

That is reasonably certain. However, these matters are so complicated that
we are led astray by our language if we are not extremely careful. The
upshot of chronic category errors has been the notion that folk psychology
has relevance to a physiology of behavior - as if somehow it is meaningful
to say that "pain is in the brain" etc. This is especially troublesome with
notions like "knowledge" and "ideas" etc. These notions shed no light
whatsoever on the physiology of behavior.

Adding "phenomenal experience" doesn't add anything.

Ahh, but it does. You are, curiously, sort of taking the position of
Methodological behaviorism (MB). Watson's position (and I do not call a
Watson a MB) was simply that there was no such thing as subjective
experience). Exceptions to Watson's position led both to methodological
behaviorism (MB) and to radical behaviorism (RB), MB holding that
subjective
events were real but could not be studied by a science, and RB holding
that
subjective events were real, were behavior, and could be handled by a
science by inference. You seem to hedge a little bit, though; you want to
say that pain is a "brain state" that causes observable behavior, and it
appears that you want to say that we detect such "brain states" when we
report we are in pain (unless you want to argue that we are always
observing
our own publicly-observable behavior when we report that we are in pain).

Actually, I think that there is some of that going on.

As do I - especially in children. However, it appears clear that eventually
the response "I am in pain" comes largely under stimulus control of aspects
of our behavior that are private.

This, of course, raises the issue of how one feels one's brain. All of
this,
of course, points to the problem with your brief sentence above; the
self-report of pain must be explained. Leaving aside the problem of
"feeling
one's brain" there is the problem of how one comes to talk about anything
that is private. We have some idea how we are trained to call one thing
"red" and another "blue," (at least, I hope, we can agree that we must,
in
some sense, be trained) but how can we be "instructed" when the thing or
event in question is private?

Yes, that's a very interesting question. How, for instance, do
children learn what it means to have a headache? It's more complicated
than learning what "red" or "ball" means, but I don't think it's
too terribly mysterious. A child produces certain behavior (crying,
for example) and the parent works to figure out what hurts, and then
informs the child that he has a headache. So even though a "headache"
reflects something internal, the way that the word "headache" is attached
to it is purely behavioral. If children didn't behave in predictable
ways when they had headaches, they would never learn the word.

Very good. This is correct. Careful or you may become a radical behaviorist.
This pattern is, incidentally, what is going on when we learn to report that
we are seeing (or hearing, or feeling etc.) something. We acquire behavior
that is under stimulus control of visual stimuli, but we do not necessarily
"see that we see." This is a separate operant. As Skinner said, the response
"rainbow," and the response "I see a rainbow," are not the same; the former
is a response to a rainbow, and the latter is a response to other responses.
Here the verbal community must have observable behavior in order to teach
the phrase "I see a rainbow." The verbal community must have evidence that
the child IS seeing what, in fact, they claim they see. Often we may rely on
the orientation of the child's eyes and other postural details, but
sometimes the evidence may be verbal. Child: "Birdy!" Parent: "Yes! You are
seeing a birdy!"

And then we have a very important question:
when we are trained, say, to "tell red from blue" are we merely trained to
label a difference we already see, or does the training establish the
difference? If the latter is correct, then it is possible for non-human
animals to behave in MANY of the ways that we call "feeling pain" but to
not
"be aware" of either their own "brain states" (as you seem to want to say)
or their own (behavioral) responses to the conditions (my view). That is,
the latter position holds that non-human animals are, in fact, temporary
philosophical zombies. The difference is that they can be "made aware of
pain" by exposing them to the proper training conditions.

Okay, that's an interesting perspective. I can buy that.

Uh-oh. That philosophical position is sometimes regarded as the hallmark of
radical behaviorism.

However,
the zombies discussed in articles on the philosophy of AI often
are described as behaviorally indistinguishable from ordinary
humans. So these zombies are able to *identify* feelings and
thoughts and so forth, even though they don't really have such
things. I can't make any sense of such a possibility.

I think, in a way, you have just agreed that you could make sense of it.
That is, non-human animals not trained to respond to their own pain
responses will still show pain reflexes, operant escape and avoidance, and
punishment effects. They do not, however, have feelings in the sense of
responding to their own pain responses. I have toyed with the notion that
the zombie argument can be undone by asking if the zombie's behavior could
simulate the behavior of a person or non-human animal in a so-called
drug-discrimination experiment. What would we say about something that HAD
TO BE, by definition, a zombie in the philosophical sense, but could,
nonetheless, simulate all the effects we see in drug-discrimination? The
issue is probably not worth pursuing however, for two reasons. The first is
that, no matter how absurd such a mechanism (the zombie) would have to be,
the philosopher can always argue that the zombie need not "feel the drug" at
all. The second is that the zombie argument has no relation to real animals;
the most parsimonious explanation of DD experiments is that the subject is
responding to its own private behavior produced by the drug. The fact that
we can imagine zombies has nothing to do with the fact that self-awareness
in humans is a matter of responding to one's own behavior, some of it
private.

Certainly I can believe that there is a big difference between
language-using beings and those that can't use language.

But in a DD experiment we are making a non-human animal a limited member of
our verbal community. Certainly, though, no non-human species spontaneously
develop verbal behavior.

Let me ask you something (even though it is clear that you won't
answer):

Why do you say I won't answer? Do you mean I want
answer *correctly*? Are you making a comment about
my willingness to answer questions, or my competence
in doing so?

I was assuming we must have become enemies somewhere along the line, but
that I couldn't remember when. I said that because I made a couple of
comments on your recent posts and you did not respond - except for one
sentence.

why would someone describe a pain that results from a
NON-OBSERVABLE source as "sharp" or "burning"? How do such
responses come about?

I think it's a very imprecise thing, and I think it takes a
long time to actually use those concepts. Until you've actually
had "heartburn", you really don't know what people mean by the
phrase. The first time, you don't know what's wrong with you,
and what people have said in the past about heartburn doesn't
necessarily clue you in that what they were talking about is
the same thing as you are experiencing. But then, if you try
a bunch of different remedies, and the heartburn medicine
actually makes you feel better, then you conclude that you
must have had heartburn. There are other clues, such as the
typical *causes* (eating spicy food, or whatever the typical
causes are). There is also the use of analogies. People can
ask you "Does your pain feel like somebody is poking you
in the stomach with a sharp stick?" Of course, you may
have never *actually* been poked in the stomach with a sharp
stick, but presumably you have been poked in other places,
and you can see similarities between the two situations.

Close. Sharp pains are, of course, those that are produced by sharp objects.
We must be exposed to a variety of kinds of "pain-generating stimuli" to
acquire the generalized response "pain," and we must be exposed to enough
exemplars to generate the generalized response "sharp." Later, when pain is
generated by unobservable causes, it may share some properties with pains
produced by sharp objects.

--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY

 

[Alpha]

"Allan C Cybulskie" <allan_c_cybulskie@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:1175372890.594719.94810@q75g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...

On Mar 24, 6:10 pm, c...@kcwc.com (Curt Welch) wrote:
"Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:
Curt Welch wrote:
Look, mate, suppose I kick you in the balls. Now explain to me how
inanimate electrons and protons give you that experience that you
attribute as pain. What is experience. The electrical impulses
co-incident with that kick in the balls simply does not explain the
fact
that you don't like it. That it *hurts*.

Unfortunetaly for you, you can't present any evidence to support this
belief of yours.

I don't have to prove anything because it is you who is suggesting that
pain is not explained by the electrical impulses. I say it is. Prove me
wrong.

Why does he have to prove you wrong? You have no evidence beyond a
correlation to show that the brain is involved AT ALL. You have given
no evidence that that electrical impulses explain the experience of
pain. And then you demand that he prove that your view CANNOT be
correct in order to claim that you haven't supported YOUR claim? Give
me a break.


Show me the scientific experiment to prove what you suggest. If you
can't
show it to me, then there is no evidence to support your belief. It is,
just a belief.

Show me the scientific experiment to prove your claim. I'll guarantee
that it in no way TOUCHES the actual phenomenal experience. And in
doing so, I think that his point would be proven: electrical activity
cannot explain the phenomenal experience because we cannot find an
experiment that would show that the two of them have to go together,
and aren't just correlated.

Again, this is something, like a God, that you have simply chosen to
believe in. I don't. I believe physics explains everything we need to
know about what pain is.

Then, please, prove it.


But, I don't have to prove this. I don't have to be right, for you to be
wrong.

But if you aren't right, then why would you believe your own claim?
Why do you believe your claim if you can't prove your own claim?

It does exist in the behavior of electrons. You simply choose to believe
it doesn't even though there is no evidence to support this belief.

I've argued these points for years so don't tell me I've not thought
about
them. You can find over a 1000 messages posted by me on these subjects
in
cap.

And all of them prove exactly that: you HAVEN'T thought about them.
Instead, you've simply asserted them in the face of argumentation in
comments in the same manner as the most rabid theist.

Yes, Curt does seem to resemble a theist in many respects.

You say we can have brain activity without consciousness. How can you
prove that? It's totally fucking impossible.

Put someone under anaesthetic. The brain still functions, or else
they'd die. Ain't no evidence of consciousness at that point in any
way.

Or deep Non-REM sleep!

There are drugs that make our memory stop working. They prevent us from
remembering what happened to us or what type of conscious experience we
were having 10 minutes in the past. Where they consciousness at that
time?
If they can't remember it does that means they weren't conscious? I
think
most people would argue that they were conscious but that they simply
couldn't remember it.

So, let's take general anaesthetics. Do they knock me unconscious, or
do they just stop me from remembering that I WAS conscious while
they're cutting me open?

I prefer to believe the more likely answer, that they actually make me
unconscious. If you don't, then I hope you never actually become a
doctor [grin].

Also, what about sleep? Do you think that I'm awake all the time
while I'm asleep, but just don't remember it when I wake up?

--
Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com

 

[Alpha]

"Allan C Cybulskie" <allan_c_cybulskie@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:1175374977.580490.281700@p15g2000hsd.googlegroups.com...

On Mar 31, 3:14 am, "Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsizemo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
"Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote in message
Yep it is. Debate finished with you. See above as to why.

Civil debate ended when you said: "From you comments below, it seems that
you misunerstand what the hard problem actually is."

Because, somehow, claiming that someone doesn't understand the issues
under debate is supposed to be the most heinous insult imaginable, no?

I wonder how I've managed to remain relatively civil to you all these
years, which all the "insults" you toss at me in much less polite
terms.

Indeed, Sizeless's posts in most cases are the epitome of invective. Sadly,
its all he has left after repeating the behaviorist dogma nigh all these
years with nothing to show for it.





--
Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com

 

[Daniel Mandic]

Alpha wrote:

Yes, Curt does seem to resemble a theist in many respects.

What does he meant at all ;-)

Brain is still (yet) an open end story. Almost the wrong NG for Brain
studies, theoretic, hypothetically etc. discussion.

Or deep Non-REM sleep!

ppl fly frequently (in dream) in this phase, I guess...

Having some delightful memory in my rememberance, having had a
discussion with a friend of mine (C, Assembler Programmer, and
Akkordeon Player AFAIK), about flying and dreaming.



Kind regards,

Daniel Mandic

 

[Bill Hobba]

"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:zJIPh.5459$EJ6.924@newsfe24.lga...

Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:%PEPh.163745$ia7.125119@newsfe14.lga...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:z3kPh.5338$EJ6.4779@newsfe24.lga...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:yyEOh.56905$mJ1.11700@newsfe22.lga...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:VHxOh.17280$nh4.11056@newsfe20.lga...
PD wrote:
On Mar 27, 3:08 pm, "RichD" <r_delaney2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Mar 24, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:

The universe and everything in it however isn't circular -
It indeed is.This is in fact very well known and understood.
yeah the speed of light is an invariant in an inertial frame,
well how do we know what is an inertial frame or not?
Look mate these issues are pretty fundamental and unresolved.
An inertial frame is a collection of objects
which are not accelerating with respect to one another.

What's the problem?
Your description is a problem.

Stomp on your gas pedal in your car.
During the acceleration, the passenger seat, the radio, the cup
holder, the steering wheel, and the door latch comprise a
collection
of objects which are not accelerating with respect to one
another.
Does this collection represent an inertial frame?

PD

The distinction made in elementary texts is flawed. An
accelerating car and a non-accelerating car are both already in a
non-inertial frame wrt to the perpendicular acceleration of
gravity.
Sure - by definition inertial frames can not contain gravity. But
it is obvious such will not affect the outcome.

In an accelerating car, any and all objects fixed to a surface
perpendicular to the acceleration of the car are still in an
inertial frame of reference wrt that surface.
No they aren't - the acceleration breaks the isotopy of an inertial
frame regardless of its direction.

How is that a different situation than with gravity?
When gravity is present space-time is curved. However by definition
an inertial frame obeys Euclidian geometry for stationary points and
lines; hence gravity is immediacy precluded. If you are accelerating
wrt to an inertial frame the force such a frame exerts on you will
have a direction and so break the assumed isotropy of an inertial
frame - so such frames can not be inertial. Inertial frames are very
special and have specific properties.
Sure, but you ignored the example of sitting on the Earth's surface in
your previous comment. Insomuch as the Earth is an inertial frame (yes
I know it isn't really, but it is dealt with as such on a regular
basis in textbooks and labs), so is the uniformly accelerating car
with the slanted surface as I described above.
No it is not inertial - even as a good approximation - you cant get rid
of the force eof acceleration that way. The only way to make an
accelerating car on the earth approximately inertial is to let it free
fall - it will not be strictly inertial due to tidal forces.
But that is true of any other object or set of objects on the surface of
the Earth as well. My slanted surface inside the car takes the place of
the surface of the earth. What fundamental difference is there?

It is an inertial frame contain factious forces, and gravity modelled as
a force. Either one breaks the isotropy of an inertial frame. An
inertial frame containing gravity is not inertial - it is an inertial
frame containing gravity. A class full of water is not an empty class -
it is a class containing water. But for many considerations we can
ignore the water and consider it the same as an empty class eg in
saying - see that glass over there? A frame attached to the earth is not
an inertial frame - it is an inertial frame containing gravity. For many
practical purposes we can consider it inertial and ignore the gravity eg
since the gravity is so weak it will have negligible effect on light so
we can consider it inertial for the purpose of measuring the speed of
light. I am sure you think of countless others. As I said before you
are confused about semantic context.. When considering experiments done
on earth as being in an inertial frame we are assuming the fact it is not
strictly inertial has no practical effect eg if demonstrating
conservation of momentum using dry ice pucks we are not considering
movement vertically so in that context it can be considered inertial.
That is not to say it is an inertial frame in a direction perpendicular
to the vertical as you are asserting - a non inertial frame in non
inertial regardless of how you look at it - but in certain contexts it
can be considered inertial.

Which was my point. Whatever experiments you can conduct on the surface of
the earth, you could conduct on the slanted surface inside the
accelerating car with the same results/caveats.

So?

Bill

 

[Lawson English]

Bill Hobba wrote:

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PD wrote:
On Mar 27, 3:08 pm, "RichD" <r_delaney2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Mar 24, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:

The universe and everything in it however isn't circular -
It indeed is.This is in fact very well known and understood.
yeah the speed of light is an invariant in an inertial frame,
well how do we know what is an inertial frame or not?
Look mate these issues are pretty fundamental and unresolved.
An inertial frame is a collection of objects
which are not accelerating with respect to one another.

What's the problem?
Your description is a problem.

Stomp on your gas pedal in your car.
During the acceleration, the passenger seat, the radio, the cup
holder, the steering wheel, and the door latch comprise a
collection
of objects which are not accelerating with respect to one
another.
Does this collection represent an inertial frame?

PD

The distinction made in elementary texts is flawed. An
accelerating car and a non-accelerating car are both already in a
non-inertial frame wrt to the perpendicular acceleration of
gravity.
Sure - by definition inertial frames can not contain gravity. But
it is obvious such will not affect the outcome.

In an accelerating car, any and all objects fixed to a surface
perpendicular to the acceleration of the car are still in an
inertial frame of reference wrt that surface.
No they aren't - the acceleration breaks the isotopy of an inertial
frame regardless of its direction.

How is that a different situation than with gravity?
When gravity is present space-time is curved. However by definition
an inertial frame obeys Euclidian geometry for stationary points and
lines; hence gravity is immediacy precluded. If you are accelerating
wrt to an inertial frame the force such a frame exerts on you will
have a direction and so break the assumed isotropy of an inertial
frame - so such frames can not be inertial. Inertial frames are very
special and have specific properties.
Sure, but you ignored the example of sitting on the Earth's surface in
your previous comment. Insomuch as the Earth is an inertial frame (yes
I know it isn't really, but it is dealt with as such on a regular
basis in textbooks and labs), so is the uniformly accelerating car
with the slanted surface as I described above.
No it is not inertial - even as a good approximation - you cant get rid
of the force eof acceleration that way. The only way to make an
accelerating car on the earth approximately inertial is to let it free
fall - it will not be strictly inertial due to tidal forces.
But that is true of any other object or set of objects on the surface of
the Earth as well. My slanted surface inside the car takes the place of
the surface of the earth. What fundamental difference is there?
It is an inertial frame contain factious forces, and gravity modelled as
a force. Either one breaks the isotropy of an inertial frame. An
inertial frame containing gravity is not inertial - it is an inertial
frame containing gravity. A class full of water is not an empty class -
it is a class containing water. But for many considerations we can
ignore the water and consider it the same as an empty class eg in
saying - see that glass over there? A frame attached to the earth is not
an inertial frame - it is an inertial frame containing gravity. For many
practical purposes we can consider it inertial and ignore the gravity eg
since the gravity is so weak it will have negligible effect on light so
we can consider it inertial for the purpose of measuring the speed of
light. I am sure you think of countless others. As I said before you
are confused about semantic context.. When considering experiments done
on earth as being in an inertial frame we are assuming the fact it is not
strictly inertial has no practical effect eg if demonstrating
conservation of momentum using dry ice pucks we are not considering
movement vertically so in that context it can be considered inertial.
That is not to say it is an inertial frame in a direction perpendicular
to the vertical as you are asserting - a non inertial frame in non
inertial regardless of how you look at it - but in certain contexts it
can be considered inertial.
Which was my point. Whatever experiments you can conduct on the surface of
the earth, you could conduct on the slanted surface inside the
accelerating car with the same results/caveats.

So?

Bill

Amd the surface of the earth is often pointed to as an inertial frame of
reference, even though it really isn't.

 

[HMSBeagle]

On 28 Mar 2007 03:06:06 -0700, partso2@yahoo.com wrote:

None of you materialists have referred to my previous post on March
25, on free will, so I guess this matter is closed. On now.

Some materialists here have seem to claim that consciousness isn't a
separate, non-physical entity, so that brain states = mind states
completely. This can be refuted by a (relatively) simple experiment,
which has been done.

Monitoring the brains of moving people, can show which electric
currents, and where, correspond to each motoric act. E.g., we can see,
brainwise, what it means to 'lift an arm'. More than that, putting
electrodes in the right places we can artificially create these
currents, and the arm of the patient will really be lifted. Now, had
consciousness been only a state of the brain, and 'a person's will'
were no more than currents in the brain, this patient (whose arm had
been lifted) would feel as if s/he WANTED to lift it, as his/her brain
is no different from one who really wants to lift it. Actually, in
experience, patients report that they feel as if someone has forced
them to lift their arms. IMHO it proves the point.

You forgot to mention the experiment where they stimulate a part of
the brain that makes people look around the room as if they lost
something. When asked what they are doing, they CONCOCT an excuse. "I
forgot where I put my shoes." "I thought I saw something." etc.
Although the scientist who just stimulated their brain with
electricity knows that he made them do it. Have you ever seen a
grade school teacher get angry at a student who is "too wound up" and
they yell at them "Why did you do that?" and they look at the scolding
teacher totally confused and are silent. Think of the question.

---> "WHY DID YOU DO THAT?"

The kid can't answer the question any more than a team of
neuroscientists could. It's a complex question and I will get back to
this issue later after I cover some other ground.

See, in science we make models of the world that unify knowledge and
predict things. We don't sit around making up unfalsifiable
statements and then getting angry at "Materialists" who can't falsify
them. If you demand that we have a SOUL and that this SOUL makes
decisions independent of the rest of the brain, you need to show us
why we need this "soul" in our model. You have to show what your
"Decision-Making Soul Model" predicts about behavior and so forth.
Every single scientist from history that you named off who came up
with a crazy idea that turned out correct was UNIFYING OUR KNOWLEDGE
ABOUT THE WORLD and creating a valid MODEL. You are doing neither.

And I guess my question is, what are you doing? And more importantly,
WHY ARE YOU DOING IT? So look deep into yourself like you always
have and concoct an excuse for your behavior (like you always have).

And look what I just did! I just responded to your rant without ever
making any references to what "can and can't be measured by science".
Nor did I make a single reference to things that "do or do not exist".
I must not be one of those you-know-who materialists that are making
you whine like a baby.