Chip with simple program for Toy

[Gordon]

On Fri, 30 Mar 2007 19:23:54 GMT, "Bob Myers"
<nospamplease@address.invalid> wrote:

"Gordon" <gordonlr@DELETEswbell.net> wrote in message
news:sseq0397ifuvg9a14u806rbc9dgcetkffe@4ax.com...
On Fri, 30 Mar 2007 12:42:17 GMT, Salmon Egg
salmonegg@sbcglobal.net> wrote:

About 13 years ago, I developed 12 proofs that Muhammad was a false
prophet.
I noted brief summaries in the margin of a book I was reading.
Unfortunately, what was preeminently clear at the time has become very
obtuse now. Can anyone help me reconstruct the proofs?

If you're a Christian, and accept the Bible as the Word of God,
it seems that Muhammad fits the description of The Antichrist.

Perhaps, but I believe the use of the word "proofs" here
implies that he was looking for a set of arguments made
from a rational position...

Bob M.

True, but "proofs" on this subject matter will probably be

limited to the Bible and the Muslim Koran and its associated
writings. The one that stands out most is that Muhammad
recognized Jesus of Nazareth as an honorable prophet, then calls
Him a liar and a deceiver in that he was not crucified but had a
likeness crucified in his place, then deceived the people into
thinking He had been crucified and raised from the dead. Gordon

 

[Daryl McCullough]

Kevin Aylward says...

Daryl McCullough wrote:

Not all big name philosophers agree that it's real. For example,
Dennett http://www.imprint.co.uk/online/HP_dennett.html and

I have actually read this before. I was astounded. Astounded that some
respected name could be so de-facto wrong.

I don't think he's wrong.

The hard problem is that we *feel* pain. End of story.

That's only a hard problem because you refuse to say what
"feel" and "pain" mean.

And a feeling is...? A feeling is a "loose" causal relation
between stimuli and behavior. I say "loose" because, as I
explain below, rather than stimulus directly causing behavior,
the feelings are intermediaries, informational states containing
something of the stimulus that caused them, and something of the
behavior that it predisposes the "feeler" to perform.

And a "... feelings are intermediaries, informational states
containing..." means exactly what?

I'm just repeating the description of the two-step process:
Environmental conditions affect brain states.
Brain states affect behavior. Mental terms such
as "pain", "pleasure", "qualia", etc. are just
labels for particular brain state patterns.

Those patterns have no significance in and of themselves.
They only acquire meaning through (A) the typical sorts
of environmental conditions that give rise to them, and
(B) the typical sorts of behavior that follow from them.

The behaviour that occurs with this feeling, is incidental
to the feeling itself

I think that's completely wrong. Pain is only pain because
of the sort of behavior that it leads to.

No it isnt.

Yes, it is.

I can get whiped and jump around squeeling, or I could become
poker face and take it like a man.

That sort of flexibility is possible because of the two-step
process. The pain records the essential information that the
body is (likely) being damaged. What you do with that information
can be modified by willpower or training.

If you could completely
disconnect pain from behavior, it wouldn't be pain anymore.

Suppose that some sophisticated brain surgery rewired your
brain so that the sensation of tasting sweetness and
the sensation of pain were switched. So tasting sweetness
causes pain, and stubbing your toe causes you to taste
sweetness. But the rewiring also made the corresponding
change in behavior, so that you tend to flinch when you
taste sweetness, but you tend to seek out pain (especially
painful ice-cream).

I would say that such a rewiring is *meaningless*. There
is no meaning to "the feeling of tasting sweetness" other
than the typical causes of that mental state and the typical
behaviors that result. There *is* no such thing as a feeling
divorced from stimulus and behaviour.

I disagree, the internal metal state, (the elrctro-chemical signals) is all
there is that defines pain and sweetness. The external behaviour is simple
irrelevant.

Well, I think you're completely wrong about that. If you have
a test tube full of neurons, you could induce them to fire, but
that firing doesn't indicate pain, or pleasure, or tasting sweetness,
or anything in particular until those neurons are connected up with
a more complete system that can act on those electrochemical signals.

We can be trained to behavioural respond opposite to that normally expected,
but this does not change the internal feeling.

I think that's completely wrong.

The point about *scientific* explanation is that it
has the power to unify diverse observations and to
predict future observations. Newton's law of gravity
unified the motion of the planets and that of a
dropped apple. It allowed people to calculate
and predict trajectories of cannon balls and rocket
ships. In contrast, a theory of "feelings" makes
no testable predictions. If you're wrong, or you're
right, it doesn't make *any* difference.

This is missing the point. The fact that we do not
have enough theory yet to make great predictions from
feelings, is irrelevent.

You don't have observations that require explanation, either.
Tautologies (such as "Pain hurts") are *not* observations.

Nearly everything about
an evolved creature---the hardness of its teeth, the composition of
its blood, the strength of its muscles, the acuity of its vision---can
be said to serve reproduction...

Indeed, *all* of the physical construction of an animal is "designed" to
serve replication. This is 101 evolution, mate.

Isn't that what I just said? If everything is in the service of
reproduction, then it's redundant to include that in the definition
of "emotion".

I think you need to do a bit of reading on Dawinan evolution.

http://www.kevinaylward.co.uk/replicators/replicatortheory.html

Are you suggesting that your own paper is the best source
to learn about Darwinian evolution?

After a man has a vasectomy,
he continues to have emotions, but they no longer have anything
to do with reproduction. The love of one's children is no less
strong when the children are adopted.

Not actually so

Yes, actually so. I'm speaking from experience here.

but you completely miss the point. Traits are designed
(selected, varied, copied) by evolution to maximise their numbers.

Of course they are. That doesn't mean that emotions are
about maximizing offspring, any more than it means that
teeth are about maximizing offspring.

Let me give an analogy. The military is presumably all about
winning wars. But part of winning wars involves bureaucracy,
and bureaucracy nowadays involves sending email. Does that mean that
email is about winning wars?

The fact that emotions contribute towards reproductive success
does *not* imply that "reproductive success" is part of the
definition of what it means to be an emotion.

This is mathematical provable (see above paper). They do this on a
statistical basis.. All statements in evolution are statistical,
and based on "natural" selection. What's a pencil designed for?
Suppose I use it to stab someone in the heart, is it no longer
designed to be a pencil?

I don't know the history of pencils, but suppose that pencils
were first designed for use by merchants. Does that mean that
a pencil is about helping merchants? No, it's more general than
that.

The other thing I don't like is the qualifier "conscious". What
extra information is that conveying?

Oh dear...its specifically there to rule out hardness of teeth as an
emotion. dah...

Then that's a very bad definition, if the only way it can
distinguish teeth from emotions is by invoking an undefined
notion of "consciousness".

I define emotions with reference to consciousness which is itself defined by
axiom.

Yes, I know. It's a very poor definition.

I think that emotions are, like other feelings such as pain,
causal information representations that serve as an intermediary
between environmental stimulus and behavioral response.

Yes, they do this, but their function is strictly selfish, for the purpose
of maximising the interests of the emotion holder, as I highlight in the
paper.

To wit:

http://www.kevinaylward.co.uk/replicators/index.html

"Adaptability to all environments requires adaptable physical action. Fully
adaptable physical action requires programmable emotions as emotions
instigate physical action. Emotions (gene traits) are programmed by morals
(meme traits). Morals are programmed by the environment. Emotions require
consciousness."

The last sentence is not contributing anything to the explanation.

I have been all thorough your arguments, extensively. None of them
explain conscious experience.

I haven't heard a good definition of what it would *mean* to explain
conscious experience.

consciousness = F(electrons, protons, quarks) ?

It would mean just the same as explaining conservation of momentum.

No, it would not. Conservation of momentum is an actual
observation. "Consciousness" is not.

What evidence is there that qualia exist, above and beyond
the "causal informational intermediate representations" that
I talk about above?

Because *you* *feel* that kick in the balls.

What is the evidence that "feeling" is anything more than
causal relations between environment and behavior?

In contrast, your claims about qualia and consciousness
have *no* testable consequences.

Not at all. You only claim that it has no testable consequences.

Well, then what is a testable consequence of your claims?

I reject Zombies. There is no evidence that such Zombies exist.

What could possibly count as evidence one way or the other?

That is, I claim that a non conscious entity cannot perform
all the behaviour in an identical way as a conscious entity.

That's not a testable claim until you have an *independent*
test for consciousness. If I claim that only chemicals with
soporific powers can induce sleep, and the only test I have
that something has soporific powers is to see if it induces
sleep, then I haven't actually made any testable claims.

For a prediction of the form "Only entities with consciousness
can do X", to be testable, you need to have a test for consciousness,
and you need to have a *different* test for doing X.

Introducing the concept of "feelings" helps us to
make *predictions* about the behavior of creatures.
That's the reason we *have* that concept, in my
opinion. The notions of "pleasure, pain, desire,
fear", etc. help give us rules of thumb for predicting
how other creatures act. If the concepts *didn't* help
us in that way, we never would have developed those
concepts.

If by concepts you mean by mechanical rationalisation,
then no. Feelings don't care how you rationalise them.
They exist.

You're the one who goes on about things serving evolutionary
purposes. I'm claiming that the *concepts* of pain, fear,
pleasure, anger, etc. were developed by humans because they
served a purpose. That purpose was to understand and predict
the behavior of their fellow creatures.

No, I'm not agreeing that consciousness has no observable
consequences. I think that consciousness is a sophisticated
type of behaviour.

So, then you now agree that consciousness can be measured with a different
value from non consciousness, hence you must now agree that Godel is valid
in application to consciousness, since consciousness, in principle, is
testable due to these differences.

Not at all. If I claim that perfectly round three-dimensional objects
are always spheres, I haven't made a testable. I'm just explaining how
I use the word "sphere" if it's an unfamiliar word.

When I say that conscious entities behave in certain ways when
placed in such-and-such a circumstances, I'm explaining what I
mean by the phrase "conscious entity".

Apparently you now admit that you do. You state that you find Zombies
objectionable, so you state that you believe consciousness and non conscious
entities behave differently.

I think that "conscious entity" simply *means* an entity capable
of certain sophisticated behaviors.

So, how do you distinguish the behaviour of
conscious entities and non conscious entities ?

Basically, a conscious entity is one exhibiting goal-directed
behavior that is affected by changes of the environment. Obviously,
there is more to it than that, to put into words exactly how I
sort things into conscious and unconscious entities, but one thing's
for sure: I *never* need to consult any "qualia" in order to make
a judgement about it. I make a judgement about whether something
is conscious based on its behavior, and if I ever revise my judgement
the revision is because I learn something new about its behavior.

How do you actually mark up or assign the behaviour to one or the other?

Now, *that's* a good question. How do you human beings make such
judgements about other entities? The answer to that question is
worth pursuing. Unlike the "hard problem".

Clearly, the only way to put
the behaviour into their respective bins is whether or not an entity has
experiences/feelings/qualia. That is, conscious behaviour is only *defined*
de-facto, by the behaviour that is associated with an entity that has
feelings. What is that something?

I don't agree.

To say that conscious behaviour is that which is due to conscious behaviour,
seems to be your only escape root, which of course, explains nothing.

That seems what *you* are saying. I'm not saying that.

--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY

 

[RichD]

On Mar 30, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:

That's a tautology, and so conveys no information. If
an observation contains no information, then there is
nothing to explain.

Not at al. Tautologies are very, very, useful. Here we go...
"That which is mostly observed, is that which is
replicated the most"

The universe is composed of 5% visible matter,
and 25% dark matter...


--
Rich

 

[Lawson English]

Daryl McCullough wrote:

Kevin Aylward says...
Daryl McCullough wrote:

Not all big name philosophers agree that it's real. For example,
Dennett http://www.imprint.co.uk/online/HP_dennett.html and
I have actually read this before. I was astounded. Astounded that some
respected name could be so de-facto wrong.

I don't think he's wrong.

The hard problem is that we *feel* pain. End of story.

That's only a hard problem because you refuse to say what
"feel" and "pain" mean.

And a feeling is...? A feeling is a "loose" causal relation
between stimuli and behavior. I say "loose" because, as I
explain below, rather than stimulus directly causing behavior,
the feelings are intermediaries, informational states containing
something of the stimulus that caused them, and something of the
behavior that it predisposes the "feeler" to perform.
And a "... feelings are intermediaries, informational states
containing..." means exactly what?

I'm just repeating the description of the two-step process:
Environmental conditions affect brain states.
Brain states affect behavior. Mental terms such
as "pain", "pleasure", "qualia", etc. are just
labels for particular brain state patterns.

Those patterns have no significance in and of themselves.
They only acquire meaning through (A) the typical sorts
of environmental conditions that give rise to them, and
(B) the typical sorts of behavior that follow from them.

Well, "qualia," as I understand them, MUST have "significance in and of
themselves" or they wouldn't be "qualia."

 

[RichD]

On Mar 30, part...@yahoo.com wrote:

Imagine a person who likes to open
Shroedinger's cat' boxes, announcing before each opening whether the
cat'll be dead or alive. Assume we find him to be always correct.
Assuming he's not a prophet, we conclude he can controll the
wavefunction collapsing. Will that contradict any physics law?

Assume your grandmother had testicles...

--
Rich

 

[Lawson English]

RichD wrote:

On Mar 30, part...@yahoo.com wrote:
Imagine a person who likes to open
Shroedinger's cat' boxes, announcing before each opening whether the
cat'll be dead or alive. Assume we find him to be always correct.
Assuming he's not a prophet, we conclude he can controll the
wavefunction collapsing. Will that contradict any physics law?

Assume your grandmother had testicles...

--
Rich

Are all hermaphrodites sterile?

 

[RichD]

On Mar 30, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:

This is obviously just a sketch, and not a full theory of pain,
but I really don't see where you think that it becomes necessary
to introduce qualia.

Because it exists.

What evidence is there that qualia exist, above and beyond
the "causal informational intermediate representations" that
I talk about above?

Because *you* *feel* that kick in the balls. That feeling
is a qualia. No more evidence is required.

Once, during a camping trip, I took some LSD.
And things got weird in that forest... the trees were
slithering, dancing, funking out every which way.

It was real, I saw them. And still today, the memory
is vivid, I *feel* it. That is definite qualia. Anybody
who tries to deny the reality of those trees doing the
Lambada, is in a state of denial. It's that simple really.

Not all properties can be explained by physics as it stands
today. Its that simple really.

Totally.
Can physics, as it stands today, explain those undulating trees?
We need new axioms.

--
Rich

 

[RichD]

On Mar 29, part...@yahoo.com wrote:

"Don't believe everything you think." (Maxine)-

I think I believe in that quote.

What if you believed you believed something,
but didn't actually believe it, i.e. your belief
(that you believed it) was false?

--
Rich

 

[Glen M. Sizemore]

"Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylward@ntlworld.com> wrote in message
newsEdPh.21840$NK3.15810@newsfe6-win.ntli.net...

Glen M. Sizemore wrote:
snip

In the consciousness field, this is called the "Easy Problem".

Yes, well, the "Easy Problem" is hard enough. There is no
reason to go around making up new problems for oneself.

Actually, it is one of the other so-called "easy problems" that is at
the heart of the matter. This is the problem of how we come to talk
about subjective phenomena. This sets the stage for answering
questions concerning the physiological mediation of the behavioral
phenomena just described. Unfortunately, a physiological explanation
of this entails pretty much a physiological explanation of the
entirety of behavior. I agree, though, that the "hard-problem" is a
myth.

From you comments below, it seems that you misunerstand what the hard
problem actually is.

I don't think so. I can tell that you're pretty much an idiot, though.

What we feel when we introspect is our own behavior, and that
includes the behavior called "seeing," "hearing," "tasting" etc. It
simply makes no sense to ask something like: "Why is 'seeing green'
the way it is?" What other way could it be?

Yes, such questons are of little value, but such questions have absolutly
to do with the hard problem.

On the contrary, they are closely related to Chalmer's discussion.

The Hard Problem is how come a bunch of inanimate electrons, protons and
neutrons club together and give us that feeling we get when we get kicked
in the balls. electrons, protons and neutrons don't have feelings, so why
do we?

No, you are mistaken. This is not the hard problem.

--
Kevin Aylward
ka@anasoftEXTRACT.co.uk
www.anasoft.co.uk
SuperSpice

 

[Glen M. Sizemore]

"Bob Myers" <nospamplease@address.invalid> wrote in message
news:G1dPh.1806$6M5.408@news.cpqcorp.net...

partso2@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1175264025.299384.166120@d57g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...
Likewise, I claim thought, consciousness etc. originate from
the mind, and affect the brain, thus detectable.

Since you appear to be distinguishing "mind" from "brain," I
am assuming you are taking the position of a dualist - you
believe these two are not only separable, but ARE in fact separate
and distinct things.

Saying that the alleged "mind" is really the brain does not escape dualism;
it merely disguises it.

But having said that - how do you define "mind" such that it
isn't just a synonym for "thought" or "conciousness?"

What about the notion of the "unconscious mind"? That's pretty standard
usage. It is a serious mistake to think that the modern instantiation of
animism (i.e., cognitive "science") is all about "conscious awareness" or
"visual imagery" or any other term that is related to introspection. The
"mind" is supposed to be a collection of mechanisms, some of them frankly
"unconscious." My point is, of course, different than the one expressed by
"partso2."

If you

can't, then the first part of the above statement doesn't
really say a whole lot. If you do make such a distinction,
then I would have to wonder if you might not be better off
using "soul" when you say "mind" - or do you further
distinguish THOSE somehow?

The whole discussion is sophomoric. Nobody but idiots think that there could
be something "nonphysical." What is really at issue is epistemology, and
simply replacing "mind" with "brain" does not necessarily alter that.

Bob M.

 

[Daniel Mandic]

Kevin Aylward wrote:

The Hard Problem is how come a bunch of inanimate electrons, protons
and neutrons club together and give us that feeling we get when we
get kicked in the balls. electrons, protons and neutrons don't have
feelings, so why do we?

Back communication. Our 'Axiom', called 'Life', is vice versa.


Who knows how much Handles the axiom carries....

Studying only the Brain itself, is the half way.

Just listen to all that fantastic astronomers, physics, philosopy and
electronic enthusiasts and some professionists, how they bind the
happenings in the Universe with Magic words, Theology (bez, we do not
know all, nor do we know nothing) nicely described with Mathematics.

The three base-directions.


(Magic -Everyone likes it and want to be; Theology; Mathematics -can it
be somehow described that it makes sense, even I do not understand the
former two sciences.... [who does it ;-)!?])


Are Quarks the smallest physical object? Are 2-element Stars the oldest?




The middle is the source.... you'll never reach, never, hehe



Best regards,

Daniel Mandic

 

[Daniel Mandic]

RichD wrote:

It was real, I saw them. And still today, the memory
is vivid, I feel it. That is definite qualia. Anybody
who tries to deny the reality of those trees doing the
Lambada, is in a state of denial. It's that simple really.

Hi RichD!


Ah, that's nothing.

A 1000y old Oak tried to speak Latin with me.


(I can't... not fluent..)



Best regards,

Daniel Mandic

 

[rscan@nycap.rr.com]

On Mar 30, 6:06 pm, "Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsizemo...@yahoo.com> wrote:

No, you are mistaken. This is not the hard problem.

I thought that the hard problem was, "Can a computer, robot, whatever,
be conscious, have feelings?" The question as to why a human is
conscious, has feelings, is entirely
different. In the one case, we question whether it is possible, In the
other case, we know it is possible, we only ask how?

Am I missing something?

Ray

 

[rscan@nycap.rr.com]

On Mar 30, 6:30 pm, "Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsizemo...@yahoo.com> wrote:

Saying that the alleged "mind" is really the brain does not escape dualism;
it merely disguises it.

Why not try to always write soul (mind)? I mostly manage to do it.

The whole discussion is sophomoric. Nobody but idiots think that there could
be something "nonphysical." What is really at issue is epistemology, and
simply replacing "mind" with "brain" does not necessarily alter that.

This is making dialogue by pounding the table. Those who don't agree
are simply idiots by definition.

Materialists must talk about a Big Bang and the beginning of time.
What came before? Or, is there to be a Big Crunch and the end of time?
What comes after?

Fiddle-Dee-Dee.

Ray

 

[Wolf]

rscan@nycap.rr.com wrote:
[...]

Materialists must talk about a Big Bang and the beginning of time.
What came before? Or, is there to be a Big Crunch and the end of time?
What comes after?

Fiddle-Dee-Dee.

Ray

Meaningless questions, as St Augustine pointed out in his discussion of
creation. He also pointed out that eternity is not the same as "endless
time." He was a Christian, and in no way a materialist.

Fiddle-Dee-Dee to you, too.

--


Wolf

"Don't believe everything you think." (Maxine)

 

[Bill Hobba]

"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:yyEOh.56905$mJ1.11700@newsfe22.lga...

Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:VHxOh.17280$nh4.11056@newsfe20.lga...
PD wrote:
On Mar 27, 3:08 pm, "RichD" <r_delaney2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Mar 24, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:

The universe and everything in it however isn't circular -
It indeed is.This is in fact very well known and understood.
yeah the speed of light is an invariant in an inertial frame,
well how do we know what is an inertial frame or not?
Look mate these issues are pretty fundamental and unresolved.
An inertial frame is a collection of objects
which are not accelerating with respect to one another.

What's the problem?
Your description is a problem.

Stomp on your gas pedal in your car.
During the acceleration, the passenger seat, the radio, the cup
holder, the steering wheel, and the door latch comprise a collection
of objects which are not accelerating with respect to one another.
Does this collection represent an inertial frame?

PD

The distinction made in elementary texts is flawed. An accelerating car
and a non-accelerating car are both already in a non-inertial frame wrt
to the perpendicular acceleration of gravity.

Sure - by definition inertial frames can not contain gravity. But it is
obvious such will not affect the outcome.

In an accelerating car, any and all objects fixed to a surface
perpendicular to the acceleration of the car are still in an inertial
frame of reference wrt that surface.

No they aren't - the acceleration breaks the isotopy of an inertial frame
regardless of its direction.


How is that a different situation than with gravity?

When gravity is present space-time is curved. However by definition an
inertial frame obeys Euclidian geometry for stationary points and lines;
hence gravity is immediacy precluded. If you are accelerating wrt to an
inertial frame the force such a frame exerts on you will have a direction
and so break the assumed isotropy of an inertial frame - so such frames can
not be inertial. Inertial frames are very special and have specific
properties.

Thanks
Bill

Bill

Only in the special case of "Free fall" can you have a truly inertial
frame of reference,
leaving aside micro-gravity issues.

 

[Bill Hobba]

"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:UcePh.13858$Ng1.10827@newsfe19.lga...

Lawson English wrote:
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:VHxOh.17280$nh4.11056@newsfe20.lga...
PD wrote:
On Mar 27, 3:08 pm, "RichD" <r_delaney2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Mar 24, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:

The universe and everything in it however isn't circular -
It indeed is.This is in fact very well known and understood.
yeah the speed of light is an invariant in an inertial frame,
well how do we know what is an inertial frame or not?
Look mate these issues are pretty fundamental and unresolved.
An inertial frame is a collection of objects
which are not accelerating with respect to one another.

What's the problem?
Your description is a problem.

Stomp on your gas pedal in your car.
During the acceleration, the passenger seat, the radio, the cup
holder, the steering wheel, and the door latch comprise a collection
of objects which are not accelerating with respect to one another.
Does this collection represent an inertial frame?

PD

The distinction made in elementary texts is flawed. An accelerating car
and a non-accelerating car are both already in a non-inertial frame wrt
to the perpendicular acceleration of gravity.

Sure - by definition inertial frames can not contain gravity. But it is
obvious such will not affect the outcome.

In an accelerating car, any and all objects fixed to a surface
perpendicular to the acceleration of the car are still in an inertial
frame of reference wrt that surface.

No they aren't - the acceleration breaks the isotopy of an inertial
frame regardless of its direction.


How is that a different situation than with gravity?


The answer of course, is:

there is no difference. If you construct that surface in the car to be
perpendicular to the vector sum of all constant accelerations, all
measurements taken of objects that are undergoing that constant
acceleration in the car are going to show as much an inertial frame of
reference as those taken at the surface of the earth in a car with
constant velocity.

If you drop an object, it falls straight to that surface. If you roll an
object on that surface, it rolls in a straight line. Etc. If you insist on
saying that objects on the surface of the earth are in an inertial frame
of reference, than objects in the car with constant acceleration are also,
with respect to the "ground" surface of the car.

 

[Lawson English]

Bill Hobba wrote:

"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:yyEOh.56905$mJ1.11700@newsfe22.lga...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:VHxOh.17280$nh4.11056@newsfe20.lga...
PD wrote:
On Mar 27, 3:08 pm, "RichD" <r_delaney2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Mar 24, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:

The universe and everything in it however isn't circular -
It indeed is.This is in fact very well known and understood.
yeah the speed of light is an invariant in an inertial frame,
well how do we know what is an inertial frame or not?
Look mate these issues are pretty fundamental and unresolved.
An inertial frame is a collection of objects
which are not accelerating with respect to one another.

What's the problem?
Your description is a problem.

Stomp on your gas pedal in your car.
During the acceleration, the passenger seat, the radio, the cup
holder, the steering wheel, and the door latch comprise a collection
of objects which are not accelerating with respect to one another.
Does this collection represent an inertial frame?

PD

The distinction made in elementary texts is flawed. An accelerating car
and a non-accelerating car are both already in a non-inertial frame wrt
to the perpendicular acceleration of gravity.
Sure - by definition inertial frames can not contain gravity. But it is
obvious such will not affect the outcome.

In an accelerating car, any and all objects fixed to a surface
perpendicular to the acceleration of the car are still in an inertial
frame of reference wrt that surface.
No they aren't - the acceleration breaks the isotopy of an inertial frame
regardless of its direction.

How is that a different situation than with gravity?

When gravity is present space-time is curved. However by definition an
inertial frame obeys Euclidian geometry for stationary points and lines;
hence gravity is immediacy precluded. If you are accelerating wrt to an
inertial frame the force such a frame exerts on you will have a direction
and so break the assumed isotropy of an inertial frame - so such frames can
not be inertial. Inertial frames are very special and have specific
properties.

Sure, but you ignored the example of sitting on the Earth's surface in
your previous comment. Insomuch as the Earth is an inertial frame (yes I
know it isn't really, but it is dealt with as such on a regular basis in
textbooks and labs), so is the uniformly accelerating car with the
slanted surface as I described above.

 

[Bill Hobba]

"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:UcePh.13858$Ng1.10827@newsfe19.lga...

Lawson English wrote:
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:VHxOh.17280$nh4.11056@newsfe20.lga...
PD wrote:
On Mar 27, 3:08 pm, "RichD" <r_delaney2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Mar 24, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:

The universe and everything in it however isn't circular -
It indeed is.This is in fact very well known and understood.
yeah the speed of light is an invariant in an inertial frame,
well how do we know what is an inertial frame or not?
Look mate these issues are pretty fundamental and unresolved.
An inertial frame is a collection of objects
which are not accelerating with respect to one another.

What's the problem?
Your description is a problem.

Stomp on your gas pedal in your car.
During the acceleration, the passenger seat, the radio, the cup
holder, the steering wheel, and the door latch comprise a collection
of objects which are not accelerating with respect to one another.
Does this collection represent an inertial frame?

PD

The distinction made in elementary texts is flawed. An accelerating car
and a non-accelerating car are both already in a non-inertial frame wrt
to the perpendicular acceleration of gravity.

Sure - by definition inertial frames can not contain gravity. But it is
obvious such will not affect the outcome.

In an accelerating car, any and all objects fixed to a surface
perpendicular to the acceleration of the car are still in an inertial
frame of reference wrt that surface.

No they aren't - the acceleration breaks the isotopy of an inertial
frame regardless of its direction.


How is that a different situation than with gravity?


The answer of course, is:

there is no difference. If you construct that surface in the car to be
perpendicular to the vector sum of all constant accelerations, all
measurements taken of objects that are undergoing that constant
acceleration in the car are going to show as much an inertial frame of
reference as those taken at the surface of the earth in a car with
constant velocity.

Regardless of how you look at it an accelerating frame exerts forces on
objects in that frame, and those forces have a particular direction - hence
the assumed isotropy of an inertial frame is broken ie it is no longer
inertial by definition.

If you drop an object, it falls straight to that surface. If you roll an
object on that surface, it rolls in a straight line. Etc. If you insist on
saying that objects on the surface of the earth are in an inertial frame
of reference,

No one claims that it is. They claim to very high precision is can be
considered as inertial, but containing a gravitational field. It reality is
isn't. You are confused between what is being claimed exactly, and what is
being clamed as a very good approximation. Such semantic issues crop up all
the time, but a little careful reflection nearly always resolves them. I
suggest you give this issue that little bit of 'reflection'.

Thanks
Bill

than objects in the car with constant acceleration are also, with respect
to the "ground" surface of the car.

 

[Bill Hobba]

"RichD" <r_delaney2001@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1175239017.450116.217180@y66g2000hsf.googlegroups.com...

On Mar 29,"Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:
well how do we know what is an inertial frame or not?
Look mate these issues are pretty fundamental
and unresolved.

An inertial frame is a collection of objects
which are not accelerating with respect to
one another.

Er..how do you define acceleration?

Start with a measuring stick.
Then get a clock... tick, tick, tick...

Measure how far something went, in
a given number of ticks. Repeat,
later. If the distance is different,
for the same number of ticks, its
velocity changed, i.e. it accelerated.

I don't suppose that you are acquainted with that fact that under
General Relativity, a body free falling under a gravitational field
is not accelerating?

Is that a question?
I don't know what you suppose.

But if supposing is pertinent, you may suppose that
I am acquainted with the equivalence principle. A
body in free fall feels no forces, and constitutes
an inertial reference frame.

That is not the claim. Exercise - go away and find out the equivalence
principle actually says. Hint - you will find the word 'locally' is
critical.

Whch was known before Einstein, but he saw deeper
than anyone else, inroducing geometry, and eliminating
the 'action at a distance'. Space is curved by mass,
and 'acceleration' depends on the co-ordinate system.
With a proper tensor transformation, you get the object
in free fall, moving at constant velocity.

So there aren't any 'issues' here.

if F=ma
How do you account for the fact that you feel the same in free
space when you are in a fixed position, i.e. not moving, as
when you do when falling off a cliff, i.e "accelerating".
i.e. weightless?

Because inertial mass equals gravitational mass.
Gravity = acceleration, as old Al posited; therefore, in
free fall, the effects cancel.

To wit, you don't feel any forces, your floatin, so, F=ma
seems a tad of a problem don't it.

Only to you.

Kevin, you have made claims about inertial frames of
reference, acceleration, and the equivalence principle,
containing 'fundamental, unresolved' logical problems.

GR contains no fundamental unresolved problems.

None of which stands up.

It's good that you question dogma, think for yourself...
the problem is, at the end of the day, you look like a
snake swallowing its tail...

Now here's a conundrum for you - when standing on flat
ground, you feel your weight, i.e. there is a force
acting on you, yet you are not moving. Hence there
is a positive force, but zero acceleration!

Sure there is a positive force - but what made the force of gravity go away?
And if you include that guess what the net force is? Try thinking a little
clearer.

Bill

Chew on that one, Grasshopper... while Newton rolls
his eyes...

--
Rich