Chip with simple program for Toy

Mitchell Jones wrote:

Suppose, for example, that you are walking in the African veldt.
There is a tree about 10 feet to your left, and a lion leaps out of a
bush about 200 yards to your right, and charges. You have no weapon.
You anticipate what will happen if the lion catches you, and what
will happen if you run to the tree and climb out of his reach before
he gets to you. The former expectation has lots of pain. The latter
has a bit of exertion, but no pain. Result: you choose the follow the
expectation which has the highest satisfaction total--i.e., the
highest total of pleasure minus pain. That means you run for the
tree, and climb as fast as you can.
Hi Mitchell!



Nice theory.


You forgot the free will of the Lion. He might not eat you and turn
away for more important tasks. They are not all the time on food-search
(hunt)....

Other possibly, that he just wounds you seriously, when accessing
his/her Territory.


How do you determine your 'no weapon'. Which difference makes it with
or without a weapon? The human brain should be able to foresee, what's
happening when taking up with Lions and entering their territory.
Taking a weapon with you is just your own insight, the upcoming fear,
that it makes no sense going there otherwise. :)



Best Regards,

Daniel Mandic
 
"Salmon Egg" <salmonegg@sbcglobal.net> wrote in message news:C23253B7.6CA52%salmonegg@sbcglobal.net...
About 13 years ago, I developed 12 proofs that Muhammad was a false prophet.

Who gives a flying fuck, arsehole?
PISS OFF!
 
"Salmon Egg" <salmonegg@sbcglobal.net> wrote in message
news:C23253B7.6CA52%salmonegg@sbcglobal.net...
About 13 years ago, I developed 12 proofs that Muhammad was a false
prophet.
I noted brief summaries in the margin of a book I was reading.
Unfortunately, what was preeminently clear at the time has become very
obtuse now. Can anyone help me reconstruct the proofs?
There is no need to go into all that - they prove daily, he was a false
prophet and they're as phoney as they come.
 
On Mar 30, 2:14 am, Surfer <sur...@no.spam.net> wrote:
Further, if mind states and brain states were completely independent,
then how could the mind and brain interact with each other?

No, I didn't say they're completely independed. Here's my analogy:
The primitive people thought that feelings originate from the heart.
That's because a change in the heart's actions could be measured in
different feelings states (enthusiasm, excitements etc.). Modern
approach is that they originate from the brain, and affect the heart's
workings. Likewise, I claim thought, consciousness etc. originate from
the mind, and affect the brain, thus detectable.

It seems to me that mind/matter/energy must be based on one substance.

Not necessarily...

Cheers,
2u2
Surferhttp://www.pantheism.nethttp://www.pantheist.net
 
On Mar 30, 4:33 am, Wolf <ElLoboVi...@ruddy.moss> wrote:
part...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Mar 29, 9:07 pm, Wolf <ElLoboVi...@ruddy.moss> wrote:
part...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Mar 28, 10:20 pm, Wolf <ElLoboVi...@ruddy.moss> wrote:
part...@yahoo.com wrote:
[...]
Now it's obvious that free will can
force one of these following states to actually happen, preventing all
the rest, without violating any physical law.
It's not obvious at all. Unless of course "free will" is some sort of
physical force that acts at the quantum scale.
No, you don't have to assume that. What I wanted to say is that if
free will exists ('physical' or not), and if it affects the brain
workings by selection of quantum states as described, then there's no
contradiction to known laws of physics.
Oh, but there is. The known laws of physics do not allow for quantum
states to be selected as you describe.

Why not? take a simple example: a photon hits a surface. It can
either be reflected or not. What decides what it does? Nothing
physics knows about - physics knows only the probabilities.

Actually, physics knows pretty exactly what determines
reflection/absorption. A couple of the relevant factors are the angle of
approach and the energy of the photon. Heisenberg uncertainty prevents
us from knowing both of these precisely enough to predict the trajectory
of the photon after either of these factors has been measured. IOW, we
cannot precisely predict the trajectory of the photon. But all the same,
it is completely determined.

Light hitting glass at 0 angle (orthogonal the the surface) have 4%
probability of being reflected (depends on the exact n of the glass
etc.). Verify that by looking on the window, seeing the outside view
and a faint image of yourself. It has nothing to do with Heisenberg.

Partso2, I don't think you know enough physics to argue your point(s).

Enlighten me, please. Imagine a person who likes to open
Shroedinger's cat' boxes, announcing before each opening whether the
cat'll be dead or alive. Assume we find him to be always correct.
Assuming he's not a prophet, we conclude he can controll the
wavefunction collapsing. Will that contradict any physics law? if so,
please state the law.

- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -
 
On Fri, 30 Mar 2007 12:42:17 GMT, Salmon Egg
<salmonegg@sbcglobal.net> wrote:

About 13 years ago, I developed 12 proofs that Muhammad was a false prophet.
I noted brief summaries in the margin of a book I was reading.
Unfortunately, what was preeminently clear at the time has become very
obtuse now. Can anyone help me reconstruct the proofs?

If you're a Christian, and accept the Bible as the Word of God,
it seems that Muhammad fits the description of The Antichrist. If
we accept this, it seems Muhammad could not also be a prophet of
God. That pseudo god Allah, is NOT the same as the God of
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Gordon
 
"Gordon" <gordonlr@DELETEswbell.net> wrote in message news:sseq0397ifuvg9a14u806rbc9dgcetkffe@4ax.com...
On Fri, 30 Mar 2007 12:42:17 GMT, Salmon Egg
salmonegg@sbcglobal.net> wrote:

About 13 years ago, I developed 12 proofs that Muhammad was a false prophet.
I noted brief summaries in the margin of a book I was reading.
Unfortunately, what was preeminently clear at the time has become very
obtuse now. Can anyone help me reconstruct the proofs?

If you're a Christian,
I'm not. Nor am I a moslem, buddhist or fuckhead.

and accept the Bible as the Word of God,
I don't. Now take your crap out of sci.physics, you fucking ranting lunatic.
 
On 3/30/07 9:50 AM, in article DdbPh.7835$_Q.3450@fe2.news.blueyonder.co.uk,
"Androcles" <Engineer@hogwarts.physics.co.uk> wrote:

"Gordon" <gordonlr@DELETEswbell.net> wrote in message
news:sseq0397ifuvg9a14u806rbc9dgcetkffe@4ax.com...
On Fri, 30 Mar 2007 12:42:17 GMT, Salmon Egg
salmonegg@sbcglobal.net> wrote:

About 13 years ago, I developed 12 proofs that Muhammad was a false prophet.
I noted brief summaries in the margin of a book I was reading.
Unfortunately, what was preeminently clear at the time has become very
obtuse now. Can anyone help me reconstruct the proofs?

If you're a Christian,

I'm not. Nor am I a moslem, buddhist or fuckhead.
I think you are definitely a fuckhead.

and accept the Bible as the Word of God,

I don't. Now take your crap out of sci.physics, you fucking ranting lunatic.
You are the one who is ranting like a fuckhead lunatic. The fact that the
subject of this string doesn't belong on several boards to which it is
posted, does not excuse your rant.



 
"Don Bowey" <dbowey@comcast.net> wrote in message news:C23297CF.5E644%dbowey@comcast.net...
On 3/30/07 9:50 AM, in article DdbPh.7835$_Q.3450@fe2.news.blueyonder.co.uk,
"Androcles" <Engineer@hogwarts.physics.co.uk> wrote:


"Gordon" <gordonlr@DELETEswbell.net> wrote in message
news:sseq0397ifuvg9a14u806rbc9dgcetkffe@4ax.com...
On Fri, 30 Mar 2007 12:42:17 GMT, Salmon Egg
salmonegg@sbcglobal.net> wrote:

About 13 years ago, I developed 12 proofs that Muhammad was a false prophet.
I noted brief summaries in the margin of a book I was reading.
Unfortunately, what was preeminently clear at the time has become very
obtuse now. Can anyone help me reconstruct the proofs?

If you're a Christian,

I'm not. Nor am I a moslem, buddhist or fuckhead.

I think you are definitely a fuckhead.


and accept the Bible as the Word of God,

I don't. Now take your crap out of sci.physics, you fucking ranting lunatic.

You are the one who is ranting like a fuckhead lunatic. The fact that the
subject of this string doesn't belong on several boards to which it is
posted, does not excuse your rant.
You can fuck off, too.
 
"Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsizemore2@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:460c0832$0$15475$ed362ca5@nr2.newsreader.com...
"Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylward@ntlworld.com> wrote in message
news:AdTOh.25116$0Z1.4823@newsfe7-win.ntli.net...
Glen M. Sizemore wrote:
"Daryl McCullough" <stevendaryl3016@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:eueeep0rmt@drn.newsguy.com...
Kevin Aylward says...
I'm very close to proposing that any rational definition of
"consciousness" would have to include something about
"demonstrates the ability to trim posts all by themselves."

Bob M.
 
"RichD" <r_delaney2001@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1175239617.486358.310080@n59g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...
Feelings are separate from physical phenomena... the
feeling of pain, is independent of brain activity.

Suppose one had a substance which could suppress
the brain's pain receptors. This would not affect one's
consciousness, which is inexplicable by neural activity.

Therefore, no such thing as anesthesia is possible...
The above seems to be quite contradictory, so I have
to ask if it really says what you meant it to say; either that,
or I'm having some real problems understanding things
today.

If one had a substance which suppresses (presumably
through chemical means) the feeling of pain, then this
would itself be prima facie evidence that said feeling is
the result of purely physical/chemical action. Since
obviously we do have such substances which work
either with or without affecting consciousness, it's hard
to see how one can claim that "feelings are separate
from physical phenomena." or that "the feeling of pain
is independent of brain activity." Your last sentence,
which appears (perhaps rhetorically) to deny the
existence of something which is already known to exist,
could be taken as agreeing with that, but then I don't
understand the first part of the above (the aforementioned
claims).

Bob M.
 
<partso2@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1175264025.299384.166120@d57g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...
Likewise, I claim thought, consciousness etc. originate from
the mind, and affect the brain, thus detectable.
Since you appear to be distinguishing "mind" from "brain," I
am assuming you are taking the position of a dualist - you
believe these two are not only separable, but ARE in fact separate
and distinct things.

But having said that - how do you define "mind" such that it
isn't just a synonym for "thought" or "conciousness?" If you
can't, then the first part of the above statement doesn't
really say a whole lot. If you do make such a distinction,
then I would have to wonder if you might not be better off
using "soul" when you say "mind" - or do you further
distinguish THOSE somehow?

Bob M.
 
<partso2@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1175264360.178605.242390@n59g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...
Light hitting glass at 0 angle (orthogonal the the surface) have 4%
probability of being reflected (depends on the exact n of the glass
etc.). Verify that by looking on the window, seeing the outside view
and a faint image of yourself. It has nothing to do with Heisenberg.
On the contrary, what you are trying to claim has EVERYTHING to
do with Heisenberg, as Wolf very correctly pointed out. You make the
claim above as though the angle of incidence, the energy of the incoming
photons, etc., were all precisely known quantities, and were applicable
on the level of individual photons. (Not to mention the implication that
you also know that the surface of the glass is *perfectly* "flat", at the
atomic level, that the gross "angle of incidence" actually means something
here- clearly an impossibility - and so again these sorts of
statements continue to apply.) In other words, you're trying to use a
gross, ordinary-physical-level description of the overall average
behavior of an uncountably-large number of photons (a "beam of light")
to make some claim about the behavior of individual photons; sorry, but
it just can't work that way, again per the Gospel According to St.
Heisenberg.

Bob M.
 
"Gordon" <gordonlr@DELETEswbell.net> wrote in message
news:sseq0397ifuvg9a14u806rbc9dgcetkffe@4ax.com...
On Fri, 30 Mar 2007 12:42:17 GMT, Salmon Egg
salmonegg@sbcglobal.net> wrote:

About 13 years ago, I developed 12 proofs that Muhammad was a false
prophet.
I noted brief summaries in the margin of a book I was reading.
Unfortunately, what was preeminently clear at the time has become very
obtuse now. Can anyone help me reconstruct the proofs?

If you're a Christian, and accept the Bible as the Word of God,
it seems that Muhammad fits the description of The Antichrist.
Perhaps, but I believe the use of the word "proofs" here
implies that he was looking for a set of arguments made
from a rational position...

Bob M.
 
RichD wrote:
On Mar 29,"Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:
well how do we know what is an inertial frame or not?
Look mate these issues are pretty fundamental
and unresolved.

An inertial frame is a collection of objects
which are not accelerating with respect to
one another.

Er..how do you define acceleration?

Start with a measuring stick.
Then get a clock... tick, tick, tick...

Measure how far something went, in
a given number of ticks. Repeat,
later. If the distance is different,
for the same number of ticks, its
velocity changed, i.e. it accelerated.

I don't suppose that you are acquainted with that fact that under
General Relativity, a body free falling under a gravitational field
is not accelerating?

Is that a question?
I don't know what you suppose.

But if supposing is pertinent, you may suppose that
I am acquainted with the equivalence principle. A
body in free fall feels no forces, and constitutes
an inertial reference frame.

Whch was known before Einstein, but he saw deeper
than anyone else, inroducing geometry, and eliminating
the 'action at a distance'. Space is curved by mass,
and 'acceleration' depends on the co-ordinate system.
With a proper tensor transformation, you get the object
in free fall, moving at constant velocity.

So there aren't any 'issues' here.

if F=ma
How do you account for the fact that you feel the same in free
space when you are in a fixed position, i.e. not moving, as
when you do when falling off a cliff, i.e "accelerating".
i.e. weightless?

Because inertial mass equals gravitational mass.
Gravity = acceleration, as old Al posited; therefore, in
free fall, the effects cancel.

To wit, you don't feel any forces, your floatin, so, F=ma
seems a tad of a problem don't it.

Only to you

Kevin, you have made claims about inertial frames of
reference, acceleration, and the equivalence principle,
containing 'fundamental, unresolved' logical problems.
None of which stands up.
Oh dear...


--
Kevin Aylward
ka@anasoftEXTRACT.co.uk
www.anasoft.co.uk
SuperSpice
 
Glen M. Sizemore wrote:
snip

In the consciousness field, this is called the "Easy Problem".

Yes, well, the "Easy Problem" is hard enough. There is no
reason to go around making up new problems for oneself.

Actually, it is one of the other so-called "easy problems" that is at
the heart of the matter. This is the problem of how we come to talk
about subjective phenomena. This sets the stage for answering
questions concerning the physiological mediation of the behavioral
phenomena just described. Unfortunately, a physiological explanation
of this entails pretty much a physiological explanation of the
entirety of behavior. I agree, though, that the "hard-problem" is a
myth.
From you comments below, it seems that you misunerstand what the hard
problem actually is.

What we feel when we introspect is our own behavior, and that
includes the behavior called "seeing," "hearing," "tasting" etc. It
simply makes no sense to ask something like: "Why is 'seeing green'
the way it is?" What other way could it be?
Yes, such questons are of little value, but such questions have absolutly to
do with the hard problem.

The Hard Problem is how come a bunch of inanimate electrons, protons and
neutrons club together and give us that feeling we get when we get kicked in
the balls. electrons, protons and neutrons don't have feelings, so why do
we?

--
Kevin Aylward
ka@anasoftEXTRACT.co.uk
www.anasoft.co.uk
SuperSpice
 
Daryl McCullough wrote:
Kevin Aylward says...

Its not my problem. goggle "hard problem" consciousness.

Yes, I know the phrase has been around for a long time.
I used to have email discussions with David Chalmers about it.
But I still am not convinced that there is any "hard problem".

I simply fail to understand why you don't understand that the hard
problem is real.

Not all big name philosophers agree that it's real. For example,
Dennett http://www.imprint.co.uk/online/HP_dennett.html and
I have actually read this before. I was astounded. Astounded that some
respected name could be so de-facto wrong. He is simply clueless on the
matter. Dennets basic argument is that consciousness does not exist, despite
the fact that he gives it lip service by describing his own consciousness .

The hard problem is that we *feel* pain. End of story. Its incredible, he
esentially implies that that there is only a "belief" that experience exits.

Dennet, falls into the simple trap that of believing no proof, or no
independent evidence, implies no object. The evidence that consciousness
exists is overwhelming, for the reasons I have already noted.

Frankly, there is little point in critiquing the rest of that paper, as it
so fundamentally misguided.


...I'm suggesting that once you've explained a causal
connection between (A) getting kicked in the crotch, and (B)
the behaviors that I described, then you've explained all there
is to explain about pain. The fact that the same behaviors can
arise in other circumstances doesn't affect this. "Pain" is just
a name that we give for the causal relationship between
environmental stimuli and behaviours.

No it isn't. It a name we give to the *feeling* we get that
accompanies certain stimuli.

And a feeling is...? A feeling is a "loose" causal relation
between stimuli and behavior. I say "loose" because, as I
explain below, rather than stimulus directly causing behavior,
the feelings are intermediaries, informational states containing
something of the stimulus that caused them, and something of the
behavior that it predisposes the "feeler" to perform.
And a "... feelings are intermediaries, informational states containing..."
means exactly what?

The behaviour that occurs with this feeling, is incidental
to the feeling itself

I think that's completely wrong. Pain is only pain because
of the sort of behavior that it leads to.
No it isnt. I can get whiped and jump around squeeling, or I could become
poker face and take it like a man.

If you could completely
disconnect pain from behavior, it wouldn't be pain anymore.

Suppose that some sophisticated brain surgery rewired your
brain so that the sensation of tasting sweetness and
the sensation of pain were switched. So tasting sweetness
causes pain, and stubbing your toe causes you to taste
sweetness. But the rewiring also made the corresponding
change in behavior, so that you tend to flinch when you
taste sweetness, but you tend to seek out pain (especially
painful ice-cream).

I would say that such a rewiring is *meaningless*. There
is no meaning to "the feeling of tasting sweetness" other
than the typical causes of that mental state and the typical
behaviors that result. There *is* no such thing as a feeling
divorced from stimulus and behaviour.
I disagree, the internal metal state, (the elrctro-chemical signals) is all
there is that defines pain and sweetness. The external behaviour is simple
irrelevant.

We can be trained to behavioural respond opposite to that normally expected,
but this does not change the internal feeling.

Again, you are simply denying that there is something else, because
it can not be reduced to anything less than, pain is something we
feel.

It's actually a more complicated than that, but not in the
sense that the causal relationships are leaving anything out.

They do. Pain is something that hurts.

That's a tautology, and so conveys no information. If
an observation contains no information, then there is
nothing to explain.
Not at al. Tautologies are very, very, useful. Here we go...

"That which is mostly observed, is that which is replicated the most"

This particular tautology can be use to drive all sorts of things, like, why
are males and females behaviour so different, to wit,

http://www.kevinaylward.co.uk/replicators/malefemale.html

One asks the question, what condition will generate maximisation of numbers?

The point about *scientific* explanation is that it
has the power to unify diverse observations and to
predict future observations. Newton's law of gravity
unified the motion of the planets and that of a
dropped apple. It allowed people to calculate
and predict trajectories of cannon balls and rocket
ships. In contrast, a theory of "feelings" makes
no testable predictions. If you're wrong, or you're
right, it doesn't make *any* difference.
This is missing the point. The fact that we do not have enough theory yet to
make great predictions from feelings, is irrelevent.

Obviously, for a creature to be able to survive, it needs to
adjust its behavior based on environmental clues. If you touch
something really hot, you should yank away your hand before it
is damaged.

But why should there be the feeling of pain?

Because "feeling of pain" *is* a loose predisposition
for certain behaviors.
See somewher below...

The suggestion of Zombies, is that a machine could act
in the same manner as you described above, but not actually
*feel* the discomfort of pain. So, why the pain feeling?

I don't think that such a possibility really makes
any sense.

Which is actually an argument as to why consciousness evolved.
It is quite reasonable to suggest that this feeling of pain,
by a non Zombie, is more advantages to replication than non
pain of a Zombie. One wants to move ones hand because it
hurts, not because of the damage that is being done.

I agree that you don't move your hand *because* damage is
being done to it. Instead, pain is an intermediary information
state. Damage causes you to move into a state that predisposes
you to move your hand. It's certainly not a logical inference:
"If I want to avoid damage, I should move my hand."

Why are we *not* Zombies if the results are the same?

I don't accept that there is a meaningful distinction
between Zombies and non-Zombies.

However, an automatic, rule-like response is too inflexible.
Sometimes, the best strategy is to endure a small amount of damage
in order to prevent a much worse fate. For example, if you have to
walk barefoot over broken glass in order to escape from a deadly
predator, you'll do it.

All of this is trivial, and ignores the point.

It *is* the point. The word "pain" is simply a name for this
intermediary information state, caused (typically) by bodily
damage and causing (typically) avoidance behavior. The hard
problem (which you call the "Easy Problem") is how this all
works. How do sense organs recognize damage? How is this
recognition represented? How does this representation influence
behavior? Those are the interesting questions, to me. The question
of "why does pain hurt?" is not an interesting, or particularly
meaningful, question.

http://www.kevinaylward.co.uk/replicators/emotions.html

I *define* genes and memes. I derive properties of such genes and
memes, I mathematically, define emotions from these definitions and
properties, to wit

Definition of an Emotion - a conscious experienced trait of a
Replicator, such that that trait attempts to maximize its Replicator
numbers.

I don't agree with that definition. For one thing, the qualification
"...that trait attempts to maximize its Replicator numbers" doesn't
seem to be particularly about "emotion".
Its defined as a "conscious experienced trait". That's emotion. Period.

Nearly everything about
an evolved creature---the hardness of its teeth, the composition of
its blood, the strength of its muscles, the acuity of its vision---can
be said to serve reproduction.
They not satisfy the definition of "conscious experienced", therefore thy
are not an emotion. Of course, there are emotions associated with, e.g.
vision.

Indeed, *all* of the physical construction of an animal is "designed" to
serve replication. This is 101 evolution, mate.

I think you need to do a bit of reading on Dawinan evolution.

http://www.kevinaylward.co.uk/replicators/replicatortheory.html

One you have the properties, of replicants, random variation and selection,
its all down hill.. Consider a uniform advantage of replication rate of 1%
over 1000 generations etc.

On the flip side, when someone is
sad or happy or excited or bored, it very rarely has anything
*directly* to do with reproduction.
Yeah, sure, but again, you *really* do need to read up a bit on evolution.

After a man has a vasectomy,
he continues to have emotions, but they no longer have anything
to do with reproduction. The love of one's children is no less
strong when the children are adopted.
Not actually so, but you completely miss the point. Traits are designed
(selected, varied, copied) by evolution to maximise their numbers. This is
mathematical provable (see above paper). They do this on a statistical
basis.. All statements in evolution are statistical, and based on "natural"
selection. What's a pencil designed for? Suppose I use it to stab someone in
the heart, is it no longer designed to be a pencil?

The other thing I don't like is the qualifier "conscious". What
extra information is that conveying?
Oh dear...its specifically there to rule out hardness of teeth as an
emotion. dah...

I define emotions with reference to consciousness which is itself defined by
axiom.

I think that emotions are, like other feelings such as pain,
causal information representations that serve as an intermediary
between environmental stimulus and behavioral response.
Yes, they do this, but their function is strictly selfish, for the purpose
of maximising the interests of the emotion holder, as I highlight in the
paper.

To wit:

http://www.kevinaylward.co.uk/replicators/index.html

"Adaptability to all environments requires adaptable physical action. Fully
adaptable physical action requires programmable emotions as emotions
instigate physical action. Emotions (gene traits) are programmed by morals
(meme traits). Morals are programmed by the environment. Emotions require
consciousness."

I have been all thorough your arguments, extensively. None of them
explain conscious experience.

I haven't heard a good definition of what it would *mean* to explain
conscious experience.
consciousness = F(electrons, protons, quarks) ?

It would mean just the same as explaining conservation of momentum.

Note the difference with Newton explaining the
motion of the planets, or Bohr explaining the emission spectrum of
the hydrogen atom. Their explanations took the form of simple laws
from which the observations could be derived and from which new
testable predictions could be extracted. It seems that your notion of
explaining conscious behavior would *not* entail new testable
predictions.
See below on tests.

This is obviously just a sketch, and not a full theory of pain,
but I really don't see where you think that it becomes necessary
to introduce qualia.

Because it exists.

What evidence is there that qualia exist, above and beyond
the "causal informational intermediate representations" that
I talk about above?
Because *you* *feel* that kick in the balls. That feeling is a qualia. No
more evidence is required. Next you will be claiming that you dont exist.

This is getting so pointless. Look, just because physics has the assumption
that certain types of evidence should be mandated for something to be
meanfull, there is no god that says that this should be so. The universe is
just more complicated than which physics pretends it to be. Not all
properties can be explained by physics as it stands today. Its that simple
really.

And no, quaila doesn't physically do anything, so in one
sense, it isn't necessary to explain behaviour.

I disagree.
Here we go again..

?If you identify qualia with the information
state that is intermediate between processing sensory
information and producing behavior, then it *is* an
important part of explaining the complexity of animal
behavior.

So, here we go again, Godel tells us that there are new statements,
not derivable from existing knowledge.

Godel has no relevance here that I can see.

Oh dear...

Sorry, but it's a fact.
Sorry, but you are wrong. Period.

Godel has no relevance here.
As I said, the sorts of statements that Godel proves
are independent still have observable *consequences*.
The Godel statement G is a statement of the logical
form "Forall natural numbers n, Phi(n)". We can test
one by one Phi(0), Phi(1), etc. We can see that the
claim Forall n, Phi(n) is consistent with everything
we have seen so far, and that that statement makes
new predictions about what we are going to see in
the future. So it's like Popper's falsifiable claims.
We can't prove G, but we can disprove it.

In contrast, your claims about qualia and consciousness
have *no* testable consequences.
Not at all. You only claim that it has no testable consequences.

I reject Zombies. There is no evidence that such Zombies exist. That is, I
claim that a non conscious entity cannot perform all the behaviour in an
identical way as a conscious entity. On this basises, a conscious entity
can undertake behaviour that a Zombie cannot. This forms a test, in
principle. The fact that we do not have enough knowledge at this present
time to make such a determination, is irrelevant.

Secondly, you are missing the spirit of Godel. It is a statement that there
does not have to be anything missing just because there is no proof, That
is, it also gives a qualitative argument why a soul is not a necessity of
the lack of a physics explanation for consciousness.

We cannot derive the experience of "hurt" from knowledge of
elementary particle properties.

If we had a sophisticated enough model of a living creature,
we would be able to investigate, using no new physics, the
manner in which environmental stimulus causes changes to
the creature's brain states, and how those brain states lead
to future behavior (and future brain states).
Wonderfull, and exactly how does this explain pain?

Studying the behavior long enough, we might see that
it is very convenient to posit certain labelled brain
states: Happy, sad, in pain, in lust, etc. Then the
complex behavior of this creature could possibly be
easier to understand by separating the question of
how such states are produced, and what are the behavioral
predispositions of being in those states.

Introducing the concept of "feelings" helps us to
make *predictions* about the behavior of creatures.
That's the reason we *have* that concept, in my
opinion. The notions of "pleasure, pain, desire,
fear", etc. help give us rules of thumb for predicting
how other creatures act. If the concepts *didn't* help
us in that way, we never would have developed those
concepts.
If by concepts you mean by mechanical rationalisation, then no. Feelings
don't care how you rationalise them. They exist.

All you are doing is saying that consciousness don't
exist because you don't believe that there are any observable
consequences.

No, I'm not agreeing that consciousness has no observable
consequences. I think that consciousness is a sophisticated
type of behaviour.
So, then you now agree that consciousness can be measured with a different
value from non consciousness, hence you must now agree that Godel is valid
in application to consciousness, since consciousness, in principle, is
testable due to these differences.


It just seems to me that you have great difficulty in the actuall
principle of new axioms. Not everything we learn as children as self
evidence truths is enough to explain everything we see.

You haven't really explained what needs explaining, or what it would
mean to explain it.
Apparently you now admit that you do. You state that you find Zombies
objectionable, so you state that you believe consciousness and non conscious
entities behave differently. So, how do you distinguish the behaviour of
conscious entities and non conscious entities ? How do you actually mark up
or assign the behaviour to one or the other? Clearly, the only way to put
the behaviour into their respective bins is whether or not an entity has
experiences/feelings/qualia. That is, conscious behaviour is only *defined*
de-facto, by the behaviour that is associated with an entity that has
feelings. What is that something?

To say that conscious behaviour is that which is due to conscious behaviour,
seems to be your only escape root, which of course, explains nothing.

So, what is it that qualia is, that determines conscious behaviour from non
conscious behaviour? That's another equivalent statement of The Hard
Problem.


--
Kevin Aylward
ka@anasoft.co.uk
www.anasoft.co.uk
SuperSpice
 
Lawson English wrote:
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Lawson English" <LawsonE@nowhere.none> wrote in message
news:VHxOh.17280$nh4.11056@newsfe20.lga...
PD wrote:
On Mar 27, 3:08 pm, "RichD" <r_delaney2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Mar 24, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:

The universe and everything in it however isn't circular -
It indeed is.This is in fact very well known and understood.
yeah the speed of light is an invariant in an inertial frame,
well how do we know what is an inertial frame or not?
Look mate these issues are pretty fundamental and unresolved.
An inertial frame is a collection of objects
which are not accelerating with respect to one another.

What's the problem?
Your description is a problem.

Stomp on your gas pedal in your car.
During the acceleration, the passenger seat, the radio, the cup
holder, the steering wheel, and the door latch comprise a collection
of objects which are not accelerating with respect to one another.
Does this collection represent an inertial frame?

PD

The distinction made in elementary texts is flawed. An accelerating
car and a non-accelerating car are both already in a non-inertial
frame wrt to the perpendicular acceleration of gravity.

Sure - by definition inertial frames can not contain gravity. But it
is obvious such will not affect the outcome.

In an accelerating car, any and all objects fixed to a surface
perpendicular to the acceleration of the car are still in an inertial
frame of reference wrt that surface.

No they aren't - the acceleration breaks the isotopy of an inertial
frame regardless of its direction.


How is that a different situation than with gravity?
The answer of course, is:

there is no difference. If you construct that surface in the car to be
perpendicular to the vector sum of all constant accelerations, all
measurements taken of objects that are undergoing that constant
acceleration in the car are going to show as much an inertial frame of
reference as those taken at the surface of the earth in a car with
constant velocity.

If you drop an object, it falls straight to that surface. If you roll an
object on that surface, it rolls in a straight line. Etc. If you insist
on saying that objects on the surface of the earth are in an inertial
frame of reference, than objects in the car with constant acceleration
are also, with respect to the "ground" surface of the car.
 
On Mar 30, "Kevin Aylward" <kevin_aylw...@ntlworld.com> wrote:
The Hard Problem is how come a bunch of inanimate
electrons, protons and neutrons club together and give us
that feeling we get when we get kicked in the balls.
electrons, protons and neutrons don't have feelings, so
why do we?
Here's another hard problem: how come a bunch
of concrete and steel can club together, and
create walls and ceilings. Concrete and steel
don't have ceilings, so why do buildings?

--
Rich
 
On Fri, 30 Mar 2007 17:58:54 GMT, "Androcles"
<Engineer@hogwarts.physics.co.uk> wrote:

"Don Bowey" <dbowey@comcast.net> wrote in message news:C23297CF.5E644%dbowey@comcast.net...
(snip)

You are the one who is ranting like a fuckhead lunatic. The fact that the
subject of this string doesn't belong on several boards to which it is
posted, does not excuse your rant.

You can fuck off, too.

Such an awesome, intelligent, sophisticated response. You must
have an I.Q. of, what, 85? I'd better really listen up and
respect what you say. Words like this don't come along very
often! Wow!
 

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