A
Allan C Cybulskie
Guest
On Apr 15, 4:14 am, "Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsizemo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
PRIVATE EVENT or whatever the hell you want to call it. Could these
sentences be even LESS relevant to the point under discussion?
As far as an "internal event" goes, I don't use the term -
behaviour are YOU claiming what we are reporting?
someone. If killing someone meant that she committed murder, then
she'd be claimed to have committed murder. But you can kill someone
out of self-defense. So whether or not she committed murder is
determined by something other that simply killing someone. And so her
killing someone is irrelevant to whether or not that killing was
murder or self-defense.
So to recast this to my argument: Someone had a verbal response of
pain. If having a verbal response determined whether or not we had
the internal "response" of pain, then that person would have had to
have had an internal "response" of pain. But that person DIDN'T have
an internal "response" of pain. Therefore having an internal
"response" of pain is more than having a verbal response of pain. And
thus the verbal response of pain is irrelevant as to whether there was
an internal "response" of pain or if it was one of your other
"response classes".
experiences. I've never argued that you can't react to pain without
being conscious that you are in pain. I will argue that you
experience it, though.
One can't take a deliberate action based on pain without being aware
of pain. I'm not sure that your descriptions of the behaviour are
completely wrong, though, since they do seem to parallel the
consciousness of consciousness and just consciousness. This seems to
be devolving to arguing over terminology yet again.
phenomenal value -- as I want to do -- was doing in on the superficial
qualities of them and that dividing them into response classes -- as
you do -- was a functional description. That's criticizing my
research project. If that isn't what you meant, then I don't really
see what the point was.
imagine anyway, since they associate a word with the experience that
THEY have -- even if it's completely different than the one we have.
experience with a stimulus or class of stimuli, you have to have the
experiences first. Then agian, I'm not sure what you mean by
"awareness" here.
I think it's safe to assume that I have experiences without ever
getting "trained" in terms of behaviours or words since everything
that I know about the "environment" comes from experiences. Could be
wrong, but no one would ever know it ...
If I can get it wrong, then I'm associating the wrong experience with
the words I'm using to report it. That means that I had the
experience -- the wrong one -- before learning to report it, or else
I'd always be RIGHT about it. Or else how do we derive wrong
experiences from the same reproting behaviours.
Gee, a war of assertions. Loverly.
qualities nor do you explain why they feel the way they do. And those
are the problems of qualia.
Fine, but the difference, as I said IS THE INTERNAL EXPERIENCE or"Allan C Cybulskie" <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote in messagenews:1176564758.722792.138510@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...
No it isn't. You think it is because you don't understand the definition
of
an operant response class. If responses are affected differently by
independent variables they are, in general, different response classes.
Okay, and what's that independent variable that it's affected by
here? Oh, yeah, right ... it's the internal experience. Not
detectable from the outside. You can try to appeal to the fact that I
had a "reason" for giving the verbal response in the case I mentioned
that I don't have in the "normal" cases of pain, but then doesn't that
again just devolve to the fact that in the second case I have an
internal event happening of a specific type?
It is the same issue as a child pointing to water and saying "water" and a
person reading the word "water" and, thus, saying it. They are different
response classes.
PRIVATE EVENT or whatever the hell you want to call it. Could these
sentences be even LESS relevant to the point under discussion?
As far as an "internal event" goes, I don't use the term -
Which is ... ? In my view, it's a phenomenal experience. Whatthere is(are) some private behavioral event(s) occurring. But, other than
that, the answer is yes. When we "report pain" we are, according to my view,
reporting our own behavior.
behaviour are YOU claiming what we are reporting?
You got it completely wrong. My logic is this: A woman has killedIt's only if you
turn to the inside and introspection that you note that you need a
different explanation and get an inkling of what that explanation
might be. Thus, the verbal response is irrelevant.
That is nonsense. The conditions that generate the "verbal event" are what
generate the awareness. At least, that is my view. The fact that we may be
tricked, or other kinds of episodes may LOOK the same, but are not, is
irrelevant. Your logic is something like this: A woman claims to have killed
an attacker in self-defense but it was really premeditated murder.
Therefore, no woman ever kills an attacker in self-defense.
someone. If killing someone meant that she committed murder, then
she'd be claimed to have committed murder. But you can kill someone
out of self-defense. So whether or not she committed murder is
determined by something other that simply killing someone. And so her
killing someone is irrelevant to whether or not that killing was
murder or self-defense.
So to recast this to my argument: Someone had a verbal response of
pain. If having a verbal response determined whether or not we had
the internal "response" of pain, then that person would have had to
have had an internal "response" of pain. But that person DIDN'T have
an internal "response" of pain. Therefore having an internal
"response" of pain is more than having a verbal response of pain. And
thus the verbal response of pain is irrelevant as to whether there was
an internal "response" of pain or if it was one of your other
"response classes".
Well, you are conflating consciousness about consciousness with painSo, you are also saying that either we detect that we are acting as if
we are in pain, or we have some sort of private event that indicates
pain? Why not just take the private event roles AS pain? Especially
since you like to claim that you don't ignore them ...
Because we call other things pain. In the laboratory it is something like
"tail-flick" or "limb withdrawal" or more complicated behavior under more
complicated arrangements like escape and avoidance. But none of this means
that the person or animal is "aware of the private event." How many times do
I have to tell you that? True, most non-behavioristic researchers will think
that the responses that I mentioned are only possible if the animal "is
conscious of the private event," but I do not hold that view.
experiences. I've never argued that you can't react to pain without
being conscious that you are in pain. I will argue that you
experience it, though.
One can't take a deliberate action based on pain without being aware
of pain. I'm not sure that your descriptions of the behaviour are
completely wrong, though, since they do seem to parallel the
consciousness of consciousness and just consciousness. This seems to
be devolving to arguing over terminology yet again.
Your above statement implied that dividing up private events by theirThey are meaningful only if one assigns behavior to categories based, not
on
how it is altered as a function of independent variables, but on its
superficial appearance.
Glen, please stop criticizing other people's research projects. Hint:
that "superficial appearance" is also the "phenomenal experience" ...
and that's a critical component of consciousness and mind. Thus, for
people interested in consciousness, it's a very important thing. You
may not care about it, but that does not make any of us wrong FOR
caring about, and it means that YOU will never explain consciousness
in an acceptable way.
The above statements do not appear to even be about what was under
discussion. You claimed that a person acting emitted the same responses -
i.e., that the responses of a person acting were the SAME as the responses
of a person reporting the private event. My reply is that those "acting
responses" only seem relevant to those that do not understand the importance
of functional distinctions. The fact that someone may say they are in pain
and not be, has no bearing on the fact that sometimes a person is not acting
and they are responding to a private event.
phenomenal value -- as I want to do -- was doing in on the superficial
qualities of them and that dividing them into response classes -- as
you do -- was a functional description. That's criticizing my
research project. If that isn't what you meant, then I don't really
see what the point was.
We don't train them. They learn. And that isn't all that hard toIt is the more reasonable view because you cannot EVER tell what
someone is experiencing from the third person view,
Nevertheless, we manage to train people to "use pain language" accurately.
Or a least somewhat accurately.
imagine anyway, since they associate a word with the experience that
THEY have -- even if it's completely different than the one we have.
No, it doesn't, as I pointed out below: in order to associate anand so the
concerns of THAT perspective are not particularly important ... but in
order for someone to associate an experience with an action,
behaviour, or reaction they have to have at least a RAW form of that
experience to assign to the reaction.
There are so many assumptions tied up in this it is difficult to even say
that it rises to the level of being wrong. Your position simply assumes that
awareness is "automatic."
experience with a stimulus or class of stimuli, you have to have the
experiences first. Then agian, I'm not sure what you mean by
"awareness" here.
Are you trying to argue that feelings AREN'T automatic?In short, you couldn't train
them to associate a feeling of pain with saying "Ouch" if they didn't
have a feeling of pain to link with that behaviour in the first place.
Again, you are merely asserting that awareness is automatic.
I think it's safe to assume that I have experiences without ever
getting "trained" in terms of behaviours or words since everything
that I know about the "environment" comes from experiences. Could be
wrong, but no one would ever know it ...
Why not? Surely you can do better than simply a blanket dismissal ...This potentially causes confusions if
the child isn't really feeling pain and thus associates it with some
other feeling.
This is a sort of corollary of Skinner's view. The accuracy of reporting
a
private stimulus depends on how well correlated it is with what the
verbal
community uses to train the response.
Which means, by implication, that I can have an experience and report
the wrong one. This means that I have an experience before being
trained to report it.
No, that is not what it means.
If I can get it wrong, then I'm associating the wrong experience with
the words I'm using to report it. That means that I had the
experience -- the wrong one -- before learning to report it, or else
I'd always be RIGHT about it. Or else how do we derive wrong
experiences from the same reproting behaviours.
Except it isn't.You don't seem to know what "qualia" is as philosophers talk about.
Qualia is nothing more than the specific experience of a phenomenal
event, and the qualities that THAT has. Your explanation in no way
addresses qualia, even with the redefinition that you claimed I might
want to do. Which I wouldn't, since it wouldn't make it qualia\\
Your description of qualia is exactly what I am talking about.
Gee, a war of assertions. Loverly.
No, you haven't, since yoiu don't classify feelings by their feltBut this isn't quite right. What I'm saying is that, in your model, I
think that the "feeling" would BE a specific response, which we can
then react to. This means that I can examine the specific response of
the "feeling" and look at its qualities ... and examing THAT is the
problem of qualia and what is the key problem for "consciousness".
Then I have solved it.
qualities nor do you explain why they feel the way they do. And those
are the problems of qualia.