D
Daryl McCullough
Guest
Bob Myers says...
to be conscious, but he doesn't really have any experiences."
What do those words mean? You may say that you have, through
introspection, direct knowledge of your own consciousness.
Fine. But what does it mean for *Joe* to have, or not have
that? He can't have *your* consciousness. The best he can
have is something *analogous* to your consciousness. But
you haven't specified which analogies count and which don't.
reformulate morality, and ethics so that it doesn't rely on
the existence of some intrinsic, though undetectable and
indefinable "essence". It's much better, in my opinion, to
formulate the question of how we morally treat systems that
exhibit "as if" consciousness.
because the concept of "real consciousness" doesn't have a determinate
meaning. You're trying to define a concept by generalization from
one example. There are infinitely many ways to generalize from one
example, and there are *no* criteria for preferring one way over
another way.
--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY
I'm talking about the meaning of the words "Joe appears"Daryl McCullough" <stevendaryl3016@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:eu5q6v0c0k@drn.newsguy.com...
...I would again point out
that we have no way of directly demonstrating "experience"
or "feelings" in ANYONE but ourselves - therefore, I am not
certain that they exist in anyone else. The rest of you may be
all zombies for all I know (which would raise troubling questions
about where you all came from, and why I'M here, but at
least it IS a possibility!).
I don't see how such a possibility has any meaning.
What would it *mean* for someone else to lack "feelings"
or "experience"?
I don't know, but why does it NECESSARILY have to
mean anything? There are any number of things which I
can show exist (through direct experience), but of which I
cannot claim any understanding of their "meaning."
to be conscious, but he doesn't really have any experiences."
What do those words mean? You may say that you have, through
introspection, direct knowledge of your own consciousness.
Fine. But what does it mean for *Joe* to have, or not have
that? He can't have *your* consciousness. The best he can
have is something *analogous* to your consciousness. But
you haven't specified which analogies count and which don't.
Yes, I agree. But in my opinion, the correct response is toThe further question is, why should anyone *care*
about the difference between "real" and "as if"
mentality?
Clearly at this point it's just a mental exercise, with little if
any practical value. But as I noted earlier in this thread, I
expect at some point that we will be faced with non-human
entities which exhibit the characteristics of "intelligence,"
"self-awareness," AND "consciousness." At that point, we
face serious moral, ethical, and legal questions as to whether or
not these entities should be granted "personhood."
reformulate morality, and ethics so that it doesn't rely on
the existence of some intrinsic, though undetectable and
indefinable "essence". It's much better, in my opinion, to
formulate the question of how we morally treat systems that
exhibit "as if" consciousness.
I think that there *can't* be any evidence in favor or opposed,Some will no doubt claim that these cannot be "persons," cannot be
conscious entities worthy of moral consideration, simply because
they are NOT human - they're of some other kind, and so are
at best a clever simulation of conscious persons. The most
likely place I see this coming up in the short term at least is in
the area of artificial intelligences, where it will be claimed that
these are "obviously" just assembleges of non-conscious
components mixed in with a little programming. At what point
was the "consciousness" added. We could claim that it IS in
fact an "emergent" property and so is "real" in these systems, but
there is precious little evidence on which to base this claim.
because the concept of "real consciousness" doesn't have a determinate
meaning. You're trying to define a concept by generalization from
one example. There are infinitely many ways to generalize from one
example, and there are *no* criteria for preferring one way over
another way.
--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY