Original Equipment Needs To Shut Down Or Alert If the Circui

[Bret Cahill]

Temperature might be one way of doing it. Any subsequent history of soldering would flag a problem.

Board watching cameras might be the easiest cheapest way to preserve the integrity of a device.

https://www.wired.com/story/plant-spy-chips-hardware-supermicro-cheap-proof-of-concept/

 

[Cursitor Doom]

On Thu, 17 Oct 2019 09:20:36 -0700, Bret Cahill wrote:

Temperature might be one way of doing it. Any subsequent history of
soldering would flag a problem.

Board watching cameras might be the easiest cheapest way to preserve the
integrity of a device.

https://www.wired.com/story/plant-spy-chips-hardware-supermicro-cheap-
proof-of-concept/

I read the other day you can take a "signature" of any given board for
just such purposes with this particular device. It only takes a few
seconds to run the check and one single component change on a board of
several hundred components will flag up a different signature. It's kind
of like an analogue version of the software integrity tests such as the
histogram and bit parity check.
I just wish I could remember who makes it and what it's called; should
have made a note at the time I guess.




--
This message may be freely reproduced without limit or charge only via
the Usenet protocol. Reproduction in whole or part through other
protocols, whether for profit or not, is conditional upon a charge of
GBP10.00 per reproduction. Publication in this manner via non-Usenet
protocols constitutes acceptance of this condition.

 

[Bret Cahill]

Temperature might be one way of doing it. Any subsequent history of
soldering would flag a problem.

Board watching cameras might be the easiest cheapest way to preserve the
integrity of a device.

https://www.wired.com/story/plant-spy-chips-hardware-supermicro-cheap-
proof-of-concept/

I read the other day you can take a "signature" of any given board for
just such purposes with this particular device. It only takes a few
seconds to run the check and one single component change on a board of
several hundred components will flag up a different signature. It's kind
of like an analogue version of the software integrity tests such as the
histogram and bit parity check.
I just wish I could remember who makes it and what it's called; should
have made a note at the time I guess.

There may be some way to do that online.

 

[default]

On Thu, 17 Oct 2019 14:45:52 -0700 (PDT), Bret Cahill
<bretcahill@aol.com> wrote:

Temperature might be one way of doing it. Any subsequent history of
soldering would flag a problem.

Board watching cameras might be the easiest cheapest way to preserve the
integrity of a device.

https://www.wired.com/story/plant-spy-chips-hardware-supermicro-cheap-
proof-of-concept/

I read the other day you can take a "signature" of any given board for
just such purposes with this particular device. It only takes a few
seconds to run the check and one single component change on a board of
several hundred components will flag up a different signature. It's kind
of like an analogue version of the software integrity tests such as the
histogram and bit parity check.
I just wish I could remember who makes it and what it's called; should
have made a note at the time I guess.

There may be some way to do that online.

We were doing this since WW2.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempest_(codename)

 

[whit3rd]

Testing for 'altered in any way' will catch cosmic ray tracks, temperature/pressure changes,
and half a thousand other irrelevancies. It will likely miss a bugging device that is powered by
beamed microwaves.

What CAN work, is a standard, generic hardware base with a firmware personality; a multiplicity
of signatures can be applied to the firmware, and a one-time-buy of hardware can be
carefully scrutinized. Even so, I've seen systems where it was ALL working, but (because
of a failing hard drive) some timings were WAY off; the hard drive wasn't going to admit
failure until it couldn't succeed-after-retry. The problem of hidden firmware (like inside that
traitorous hard drive) has become endemic, in modern devices.

They're too smart.

 

[default]

A High-Tech Solution for Rooting Out Counterfeit Goods

Mobile optical scanners can check the authenticity of an object with
unprecedented speed

https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/a-high-tech-solution-for-rooting-out-counterfeit-goods/

 

[Bret Cahill]

A High-Tech Solution for Rooting Out Counterfeit Goods

Mobile optical scanners can check the authenticity of an object with
unprecedented speed

https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/a-high-tech-solution-for-rooting-out-counterfeit-goods/

Most counterfeiters are inherently lazy so you don't expect them to do a good job. Decades ago Dad showed up for doubles and asked if anyone liked his new Prince. One opponent walks up to the net demanding a better look at the racquet and immediately announces, "that ain't no Prince." I compared the 3 ball logo later and they didn't even get the Prince logo right. A few years ago I received some designer pen supposedly worth $100 or more. I checked it out on line and that was a sloppy counterfeit as well.

This didn't require any HD signal processing.

Optical, one of the earlier suggestions, may be a way to force them to actually replace a chip with something that looks and does the same and, of course, a bit more.


Bret Cahill


When Rembrandt discovered his students were making more money selling fake Rembrandts than Rembrandt originals Rembrandt inquired if he could start painting fake Rembrandts.

-- Joseph Heller _Picture This_