Empirical Beliefs & Hypothesis; Do they terminate in some be

[Immortalist]

A central concept in science and the scientific method is that all
evidence must be empirical, or empirically based, that is, dependent
on evidence or consequences that are observable by the senses.
Empirical data are data that are produced by experiment or
observation.

"Empirical" as an adjective or adverb is used in conjunction with both
the natural and social sciences, and refers to the use of working
hypotheses that are testable using observation or experiment. In this
sense of the word, scientific statements are subject to and derived
from our experiences or observations.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empirical

1. Suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical
beliefs (a) which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose
justification does not depend on that of any further emperical
beliefs.

2. For a belief to be episemically justified requires that there be a
reason why it is likely to be true.

3. A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive
possession of such a reason.

4. A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he
believes with justification the premises from which it follows that
the belief is likely to be true.

5. The premises of such a justifying argument must include at least
one empirical premise.

6. So, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends
on the justification of at least one other empirical belief,
contradicting 1.

7. So, there can be no basic empirical beliefs.

This seems to eliminate the possibility of emperical justification of
any and all emperical beliefs. But it can lead to this untruthfullness
of human beliefs in three ways which deal with the apparent "regress"
of one belief depending upon another which depends upon another and so
on:

If the regress of emperical justification does not terminate in basic
emperical beliefs, then it must either:

(1) terminate in unjustified beleifs

(2) go on infinitely (without circularity)

(3) circle back upon itself in some way.

If there is no way to justify emperical beliefs apart from an appeal
to other justified emperical beliefs, and if an infinite sequence of
distinct justified beliefs is ruled out, then the presumably finite
system of justified emperical beliefs can only be justified from
within, by birtue of the relations of its component beliefs to each
other. Coherence theory is of the variey (3) seemingly circular if
veiwed in an linear fasion, merely indicated by whatever
"property" (or complex of properties) is requisite for the
justification of such a system of beliefs. Degrees of justification
emerge out of the relations of groups of beliefs.

http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoHowa.htm

 

[John Jones]

Immortalist wrote:

A central concept in science and the scientific method is that all
evidence must be empirical, or empirically based, that is, dependent
on evidence or consequences that are observable by the senses.
Empirical data are data that are produced by experiment or
observation.

"Empirical" as an adjective or adverb is used in conjunction with both
the natural and social sciences, and refers to the use of working
hypotheses that are testable using observation or experiment. In this
sense of the word, scientific statements are subject to and derived
from our experiences or observations.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empirical

1. Suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical
beliefs (a) which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose
justification does not depend on that of any further emperical
beliefs.

2. For a belief to be episemically justified requires that there be a
reason why it is likely to be true.

3. A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive
possession of such a reason.

4. A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he
believes with justification the premises from which it follows that
the belief is likely to be true.

5. The premises of such a justifying argument must include at least
one empirical premise.

6. So, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends
on the justification of at least one other empirical belief,
contradicting 1.

7. So, there can be no basic empirical beliefs.

This seems to eliminate the possibility of emperical justification of
any and all emperical beliefs. But it can lead to this untruthfullness
of human beliefs in three ways which deal with the apparent "regress"
of one belief depending upon another which depends upon another and so
on:

If the regress of emperical justification does not terminate in basic
emperical beliefs, then it must either:

(1) terminate in unjustified beleifs

(2) go on infinitely (without circularity)

(3) circle back upon itself in some way.

If there is no way to justify emperical beliefs apart from an appeal
to other justified emperical beliefs, and if an infinite sequence of
distinct justified beliefs is ruled out, then the presumably finite
system of justified emperical beliefs can only be justified from
within, by birtue of the relations of its component beliefs to each
other. Coherence theory is of the variey (3) seemingly circular if
veiwed in an linear fasion, merely indicated by whatever
"property" (or complex of properties) is requisite for the
justification of such a system of beliefs. Degrees of justification
emerge out of the relations of groups of beliefs.

http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoHowa.htm

woof

 

[Sir Frederick]

On Thu, 21 Aug 2008 13:16:58 -0500, Publius <m.publius@nospam.comcast.net>
wrote:

Immortalist <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in news:89ed31b5-4cf0-49cc-
806e-dc4d6d752c84@v39g2000pro.googlegroups.com:

A central concept in science and the scientific method is that all
evidence must be empirical, or empirically based, that is, dependent
on evidence or consequences that are observable by the senses.
Empirical data are data that are produced by experiment or
observation.

"Empirical" as an adjective or adverb is used in conjunction with both
the natural and social sciences, and refers to the use of working
hypotheses that are testable using observation or experiment. In this
sense of the word, scientific statements are subject to and derived
from our experiences or observations.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empirical

1. Suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical
beliefs (a) which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose
justification does not depend on that of any further emperical
beliefs.

2. For a belief to be episemically justified requires that there be a
reason why it is likely to be true.

3. A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive
possession of such a reason.

4. A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he
believes with justification the premises from which it follows that
the belief is likely to be true.

5. The premises of such a justifying argument must include at least
one empirical premise.

6. So, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends
on the justification of at least one other empirical belief,
contradicting 1.

7. So, there can be no basic empirical beliefs.

This seems to eliminate the possibility of emperical justification of
any and all emperical beliefs. But it can lead to this untruthfullness
of human beliefs in three ways which deal with the apparent "regress"
of one belief depending upon another which depends upon another and so
on:

If the regress of emperical justification does not terminate in basic
emperical beliefs, then it must either:

(1) terminate in unjustified beleifs

(2) go on infinitely (without circularity)

(3) circle back upon itself in some way.

The argument goes astray with #4. If I perceive a red apple, then I believe
the apple perceived is red. That belief is not a conclusion derived from
any premises, but from the percept itself. Empirical beliefs are self-
justifying; I cannot doubt that I am perceiving something red in the shape
of an apple. I may well have doubts about what causes that percept, but I
cannot doubt that I have it. What may be causing it is another question.

What if you know you have a brain tumor that is causing you to
perceive things as red, though you "believe" them to be green?

 

[John Jones]

John Jones wrote:

Immortalist wrote:
A central concept in science and the scientific method is that all
evidence must be empirical, or empirically based, that is, dependent
on evidence or consequences that are observable by the senses.
Empirical data are data that are produced by experiment or
observation.

"Empirical" as an adjective or adverb is used in conjunction with both
the natural and social sciences, and refers to the use of working
hypotheses that are testable using observation or experiment. In this
sense of the word, scientific statements are subject to and derived
from our experiences or observations.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empirical

1. Suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical
beliefs (a) which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose
justification does not depend on that of any further emperical
beliefs.

2. For a belief to be episemically justified requires that there be a
reason why it is likely to be true.

3. A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive
possession of such a reason.

4. A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he
believes with justification the premises from which it follows that
the belief is likely to be true.

5. The premises of such a justifying argument must include at least
one empirical premise.

6. So, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends
on the justification of at least one other empirical belief,
contradicting 1.

7. So, there can be no basic empirical beliefs.

This seems to eliminate the possibility of emperical justification of
any and all emperical beliefs. But it can lead to this untruthfullness
of human beliefs in three ways which deal with the apparent "regress"
of one belief depending upon another which depends upon another and so
on:

If the regress of emperical justification does not terminate in basic
emperical beliefs, then it must either:

(1) terminate in unjustified beleifs

(2) go on infinitely (without circularity)

(3) circle back upon itself in some way.

If there is no way to justify emperical beliefs apart from an appeal
to other justified emperical beliefs, and if an infinite sequence of
distinct justified beliefs is ruled out, then the presumably finite
system of justified emperical beliefs can only be justified from
within, by birtue of the relations of its component beliefs to each
other. Coherence theory is of the variey (3) seemingly circular if
veiwed in an linear fasion, merely indicated by whatever
"property" (or complex of properties) is requisite for the
justification of such a system of beliefs. Degrees of justification
emerge out of the relations of groups of beliefs.

http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoHowa.htm

woof

doublewoof

 

[nada]

Another idiot who doesn't know what the subject line is supposed to be
used for!

 

[John Larkin]

On Thu, 21 Aug 2008 09:41:19 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist
<reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote:

A central concept in science and the scientific method is that all
evidence must be empirical, or empirically based, that is, dependent
on evidence or consequences that are observable by the senses.
Empirical data are data that are produced by experiment or
observation.

"Empirical" as an adjective or adverb is used in conjunction with both
the natural and social sciences, and refers to the use of working
hypotheses that are testable using observation or experiment. In this
sense of the word, scientific statements are subject to and derived
from our experiences or observations.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empirical

1. Suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical
beliefs (a) which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose
justification does not depend on that of any further emperical
beliefs.

2. For a belief to be episemically justified requires that there be a
reason why it is likely to be true.

3. A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive
possession of such a reason.

4. A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he
believes with justification the premises from which it follows that
the belief is likely to be true.

5. The premises of such a justifying argument must include at least
one empirical premise.

6. So, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends
on the justification of at least one other empirical belief,
contradicting 1.

7. So, there can be no basic empirical beliefs.

This seems to eliminate the possibility of emperical justification of
any and all emperical beliefs. But it can lead to this untruthfullness
of human beliefs in three ways which deal with the apparent "regress"
of one belief depending upon another which depends upon another and so
on:

If the regress of emperical justification does not terminate in basic
emperical beliefs, then it must either:

(1) terminate in unjustified beleifs

(2) go on infinitely (without circularity)

(3) circle back upon itself in some way.

If there is no way to justify emperical beliefs apart from an appeal
to other justified emperical beliefs, and if an infinite sequence of
distinct justified beliefs is ruled out, then the presumably finite
system of justified emperical beliefs can only be justified from
within, by birtue of the relations of its component beliefs to each
other. Coherence theory is of the variey (3) seemingly circular if
veiwed in an linear fasion, merely indicated by whatever
"property" (or complex of properties) is requisite for the
justification of such a system of beliefs. Degrees of justification
emerge out of the relations of groups of beliefs.

http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoHowa.htm

So what you need is a system of observations and theories that all
hang together. So far, in the physical sciences, the Standard Model
does that very well, and nothing else does, so we go with that.

Sounds reasonable to me.

John

 

[nada]

Roll back the subject header!

 

[nada]

On Aug 21, 11:21 am, nada <dwalters...@gmail.com> wrote:

Another idiot who doesn't know what the subject line is supposed to be
used for!

 

[John Popelish]

John Larkin wrote:

So what you need is a system of observations and theories that all
hang together. So far, in the physical sciences, the Standard Model
does that very well, and nothing else does, so we go with that.

Sounds reasonable to me.

Subject to improvement upon confirmed new observations that
were not predicted by the standard model, of course.

--
Regards,

John Popelish

 

[John Larkin]

On Thu, 21 Aug 2008 20:34:26 -0400, John Popelish <jpopelish@rica.net>
wrote:

John Larkin wrote:

So what you need is a system of observations and theories that all
hang together. So far, in the physical sciences, the Standard Model
does that very well, and nothing else does, so we go with that.

Sounds reasonable to me.

Subject to improvement upon confirmed new observations that
were not predicted by the standard model, of course.

Sure, but there's no reason to get into a philosophical snit because
of some perceived failing of logic. If a system of theories works, and
there are no glaring exceptions, that's probably about the way the
universe is built.

Gravity is still a problem, in the sense that quantum mechanics can't
explain it. But that's not a contradiction of QM, it just something
that's left out, sort of orthogonal.

John

 

[John Larkin]

On Thu, 21 Aug 2008 13:16:58 -0500, Publius
<m.publius@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:

Immortalist <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in news:89ed31b5-4cf0-49cc-
806e-dc4d6d752c84@v39g2000pro.googlegroups.com:

A central concept in science and the scientific method is that all
evidence must be empirical, or empirically based, that is, dependent
on evidence or consequences that are observable by the senses.
Empirical data are data that are produced by experiment or
observation.

"Empirical" as an adjective or adverb is used in conjunction with both
the natural and social sciences, and refers to the use of working
hypotheses that are testable using observation or experiment. In this
sense of the word, scientific statements are subject to and derived
from our experiences or observations.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empirical

1. Suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical
beliefs (a) which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose
justification does not depend on that of any further emperical
beliefs.

2. For a belief to be episemically justified requires that there be a
reason why it is likely to be true.

3. A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive
possession of such a reason.

4. A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he
believes with justification the premises from which it follows that
the belief is likely to be true.

5. The premises of such a justifying argument must include at least
one empirical premise.

6. So, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends
on the justification of at least one other empirical belief,
contradicting 1.

7. So, there can be no basic empirical beliefs.

This seems to eliminate the possibility of emperical justification of
any and all emperical beliefs. But it can lead to this untruthfullness
of human beliefs in three ways which deal with the apparent "regress"
of one belief depending upon another which depends upon another and so
on:

If the regress of emperical justification does not terminate in basic
emperical beliefs, then it must either:

(1) terminate in unjustified beleifs

(2) go on infinitely (without circularity)

(3) circle back upon itself in some way.

The argument goes astray with #4. If I perceive a red apple, then I believe
the apple perceived is red. That belief is not a conclusion derived from
any premises, but from the percept itself. Empirical beliefs are self-
justifying; I cannot doubt that I am perceiving something red in the shape
of an apple. I may well have doubts about what causes that percept, but I
cannot doubt that I have it. What may be causing it is another question.

What causes "red" is the predominant wavelength of the light that
bounces off the apple. That can be measured and quantified, if there's
any doubt.

There's nothing subjective about "red."

You'll never get anything done if you keep getting tangled up in
fuzziness.

John

 

[John Popelish]

John Larkin wrote:

What causes "red" is the predominant wavelength of the light that
bounces off the apple. That can be measured and quantified, if there's
any doubt.

There's nothing subjective about "red."
(snip)

The experience of red is what is subjective. There is no
way to know that anyone else experiences red exactly as you
do. I suspect that most people experience red about like I
do, but I also suspect there are some interesting (various
flavors of colorblindness) and even some extreme exceptions,
especially in those who experience synesthesia.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synesthesia

--
Regards,

John Popelish

 

[nada]

On Aug 21, 1:44 pm, John Larkin
<jjlar...@highNOTlandTHIStechnologyPART.com> wrote:

On Thu, 21 Aug 2008 09:41:19 -0700 (PDT), Immortalist



reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
A central concept in science and the scientific method is that all
evidence must be empirical, or empirically based, that is, dependent
on evidence or consequences that are observable by the senses.
Empirical data are data that are produced by experiment or
observation.

"Empirical" as an adjective or adverb is used in conjunction with both
the natural and social sciences, and refers to the use of working
hypotheses that are testable using observation or experiment. In this
sense of the word, scientific statements are subject to and derived
from our experiences or observations.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empirical

1. Suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical
beliefs (a) which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose
justification does not depend on that of any further emperical
beliefs.

2. For a belief to be episemically justified requires that there be a
reason why it is likely to be true.

3. A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive
possession of such a reason.

4. A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he
believes with justification the premises from which it follows that
the belief is likely to be true.

5. The premises of such a justifying argument must include at least
one empirical premise.

6. So, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends
on the justification of at least one other empirical belief,
contradicting 1.

7. So, there can be no basic empirical beliefs.

This seems to eliminate the possibility of emperical justification of
any and all emperical beliefs. But it can lead to this untruthfullness
of human beliefs in three ways which deal with the apparent "regress"
of one belief depending upon another which depends upon another and so
on:

If the regress of emperical justification does not terminate in basic
emperical beliefs, then it must either:

(1) terminate in unjustified beleifs

(2) go on infinitely (without circularity)

(3) circle back upon itself in some way.

If there is no way to justify emperical beliefs apart from an appeal
to other justified emperical beliefs, and if an infinite sequence of
distinct justified beliefs is ruled out, then the presumably finite
system of justified emperical beliefs can only be justified from
within, by birtue of the relations of its component beliefs to each
other. Coherence theory is of the variey (3) seemingly circular if
veiwed in an linear fasion, merely indicated by whatever
"property" (or complex of properties) is requisite for the
justification of such a system of beliefs. Degrees of justification
emerge out of the relations of groups of beliefs.

http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoHowa.htm

So what you need is a system of observations and theories that all
hang together. So far, in the physical sciences, the Standard Model
does that very well, and nothing else does, so we go with that.

Sounds reasonable to me.

John

OK

 

[John Larkin]

On Thu, 21 Aug 2008 21:27:30 -0400, John Popelish <jpopelish@rica.net>
wrote:

John Larkin wrote:

What causes "red" is the predominant wavelength of the light that
bounces off the apple. That can be measured and quantified, if there's
any doubt.

There's nothing subjective about "red."
(snip)

The experience of red is what is subjective. There is no
way to know that anyone else experiences red exactly as you
do.

That's fuzzy. We can agree on whether any given apple is red or green,
and we can consult a spectrograph if there's a dispute.

I suspect that most people experience red about like I
do,

Yes, but that may be completely meaningless.

but I also suspect there are some interesting (various
flavors of colorblindness) and even some extreme exceptions,
especially in those who experience synesthesia.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synesthesia

 

[John Larkin]

On Thu, 21 Aug 2008 18:27:06 -0700, DB <abc@some.net> wrote:

John Larkin wrote:
On Thu, 21 Aug 2008 20:34:26 -0400, John Popelish <jpopelish@rica.net
wrote:

John Larkin wrote:

So what you need is a system of observations and theories that all
hang together. So far, in the physical sciences, the Standard Model
does that very well, and nothing else does, so we go with that.

Sounds reasonable to me.
Subject to improvement upon confirmed new observations that
were not predicted by the standard model, of course.

Sure, but there's no reason to get into a philosophical snit because
of some perceived failing of logic. If a system of theories works, and
there are no glaring exceptions, that's probably about the way the
universe is built.

Gravity is still a problem, in the sense that quantum mechanics can't
explain it. But that's not a contradiction of QM, it just something
that's left out, sort of orthogonal.

Or, an assumption there is a GUT.

That would be nice, but we really don't need it. We can use QM in its
domain, and GR in its, and 99.9% of the time we can accurately predict
outcomes. I think there are only a few situations where the
orthogonality breaks down, like in the guts of neutron stars and such,
but that hardly keeps us from doing electronic design.

John

 

[John Popelish]

John Larkin wrote:

On Thu, 21 Aug 2008 21:27:30 -0400, John Popelish <jpopelish@rica.net
wrote:

John Larkin wrote:

What causes "red" is the predominant wavelength of the light that
bounces off the apple. That can be measured and quantified, if there's
any doubt.

There's nothing subjective about "red."
(snip)

The experience of red is what is subjective. There is no
way to know that anyone else experiences red exactly as you
do.

That's fuzzy. We can agree on whether any given apple is red or green,
and we can consult a spectrograph if there's a dispute.

Yes, after we survey enough eye responses to define a
generic (if somewhat arbitrary) standard definition of red.
I am just saying that any particular person may not agree,
subjectively with our standard.

I suspect that most people experience red about like I
do,

Yes, but that may be completely meaningless.

If by "completely meaningless", you mean difficult to
understand, intellectually and mechanistically, I agree.

Another somewhat similarly "completely meaningless" aspect
is whether specific hues produce innate or learned emotional
or otherwise biochemical responses.

--
Regards,

John Popelish

 

[nada]

d

 

[zinnic]

On Aug 21, 9:31 pm, Publius <m.publ...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:

John Popelish <jpopel...@rica.net> wrote innews:2LCdncPkf4WMiDPVnZ2dnUVZ_rPinZ2d@comcast.com:

There's nothing subjective about "red."
(snip)

The experience of red is what is subjective.  There is no
way to know that anyone else experiences red exactly as you
do.  I suspect that most people experience red about like I
do, but I also suspect there are some interesting (various
flavors of colorblindness) and even some extreme exceptions,
especially in those who experience synesthesia.

Quite correct, although we really have no basis for an assumption that
others' experience of red is anything like ours. It is an assumption of
convenience only, and harmless for the most part.

There is even some empirical evidence that different persons experience red
differently. The gene for the red photopigment is carried on the X
chromosome. There are two variants of this pigment, due two variants of  
that gene, which respond optimally to slightly different wavelengths. Men
have only one X, so they carry one version of this gene or the other (and
presumably perceive the same frequency differenly). Women, however, have
two X's, and so may possess both versions of the red pigment, making them
quadchromats. Their color perception may be quite different from us
"normal" trichromats.

Green is also carried on the X. but there is only one version of that
pigment.

I do not believe that there are genes for colors. There are multiple
genes that control electrochemical neuronal patterns responding to
an eye cell's reaction to impingement of light frequencies. There is
no reason for different brains to respond identically to signals from
eye cells. That billions of neurons make identical connections in
every brain is IMO impossible. A specific stimulation induces a
neurochemical pattern that is unique to that stimulation and to the
connective pattern of a specific brain. Repetition of the same
stimulus and its corresponding neuronal pattern, cements the two into
recognition.
That cemented neuronal pattern of one brain function is not
necessarily identical to the cemented neuronal pattern of a different
brain.
Thus one brain may recognise red with a neurological pattern that
difffers from that recognised as red by a second brain. The ony
requirement is that each brain remains consistent in the recognition
of its neuronal pattern code. No is no in English, Nien is nein in
German.. The Morse and Semaphor codes are totally different
patterns, yet they can signify the same.
Zinnic

 

[Sevenhundred Elves]

On Thu, 21 Aug 2008 18:05:34 -0700, John Larkin
<jjlarkin@highNOTlandTHIStechnologyPART.com> wrote:

On Thu, 21 Aug 2008 13:16:58 -0500, Publius
m.publius@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:

Immortalist <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in news:89ed31b5-4cf0-49cc-
806e-dc4d6d752c84@v39g2000pro.googlegroups.com:

A central concept in science and the scientific method is that all
evidence must be empirical, or empirically based, that is, dependent
on evidence or consequences that are observable by the senses.
Empirical data are data that are produced by experiment or
observation.

"Empirical" as an adjective or adverb is used in conjunction with both
the natural and social sciences, and refers to the use of working
hypotheses that are testable using observation or experiment. In this
sense of the word, scientific statements are subject to and derived
from our experiences or observations.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empirical

1. Suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical
beliefs (a) which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose
justification does not depend on that of any further emperical
beliefs.

2. For a belief to be episemically justified requires that there be a
reason why it is likely to be true.

3. A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive
possession of such a reason.

4. A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he
believes with justification the premises from which it follows that
the belief is likely to be true.

5. The premises of such a justifying argument must include at least
one empirical premise.

6. So, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends
on the justification of at least one other empirical belief,
contradicting 1.

7. So, there can be no basic empirical beliefs.

This seems to eliminate the possibility of emperical justification of
any and all emperical beliefs. But it can lead to this untruthfullness
of human beliefs in three ways which deal with the apparent "regress"
of one belief depending upon another which depends upon another and so
on:

If the regress of emperical justification does not terminate in basic
emperical beliefs, then it must either:

(1) terminate in unjustified beleifs

(2) go on infinitely (without circularity)

(3) circle back upon itself in some way.

The argument goes astray with #4. If I perceive a red apple, then I believe
the apple perceived is red. That belief is not a conclusion derived from
any premises, but from the percept itself. Empirical beliefs are self-
justifying; I cannot doubt that I am perceiving something red in the shape
of an apple. I may well have doubts about what causes that percept, but I
cannot doubt that I have it. What may be causing it is another question.

What causes "red" is the predominant wavelength of the light that
bounces off the apple. That can be measured and quantified, if there's
any doubt.

There's nothing subjective about "red."

I beg to differ. Colour perception is not merely an act of measuring
wavelengths. Take a look at this interesting optical illusion:

http://www.grand-illusions.com/opticalillusions/square/

Not only colour, but even our perception of lightness/darkness is
influenced by circumstances surrounding the observation:

http://www.grand-illusions.com/opticalillusions/chequer_board/

And here's a peculiar one:

http://www.grand-illusions.com/opticalillusions/disappearing_colours/

You'll never get anything done if you keep getting tangled up in
fuzziness.

John

It's a fuzzy world we live in...

S.

 

[ZerkonX]

On Thu, 21 Aug 2008 09:41:19 -0700, Immortalist wrote:

A central concept in science and the scientific method is that all
evidence must be empirical, or empirically based, that is, dependent on
evidence or consequences that are observable by the senses.

... and results that are able to be duplicated. Consensus.
Here is the beginning, I do believe.

It is in the consensus, not the evidence itself.

"Science is a social disease"