D
Don Y
Guest
We loan laptops to students as part of a STE(A)M program.
These laptops contain courseware for the program. We want
to minimize the cost (effort) to maintain these, during the
program (i.e., if one \"goes down\", then the student immediately
needs a replacement).
The most common way for a laptop to be compromised is via
malware, not hardware failures. So, we want to make it
\"very hard\" to install software on the laptops that would
require a system reinstall.
We also want to make the laptops \"valueless\" as pawnable items.
This population is disadvantaged so they -- or a family member,
friend, etc. -- could be enticed to converting a laptop to cash.
These laptops belong to The Program. (we aren\'t concerned about
the \"value\" being lost as much as the *effort* to create a
replacement -- labor is always in short supply)
On completion of the program (\"graduation\"), they are gifted
a \"real\" laptop. What the student does to -- or with -- THEIR
laptop is entirely up to them; it\'s *theirs*!
To make The Program\'s laptops more secure AND less valuable
(pawned, resold, etc.), I\'m trying to come up with a \"portable\"
means of altering them JUST ENOUGH that they won\'t install
software from DVD, over the network, etc. So, they boot into
*my* OS and run our applications. And, if stolen/sold/lost,
would prove to be of no value -- because they don\'t follow the
rules that a regular laptop would!
A cheap hack seems like just rearranging the BIOS entry points
could thwart the normal operations of \"a laptop\" -- yet still
allow all of that BIOS functionality to be accessed by our
applications (cuz we would use the corrected/broken binding).
This could be portable to different makes/models as the entry
points are standardized, even if the actual BIOS implementation
varies.
One notable problem would be if the (a) BIOS was signed and
my alterations rendered that signature invalid. Of course,
each vendor/model could have a different key so I\'d have
to solve this problem many times.
[I\'m not as worried about checksums as those can be bruteforced]
Any other suggestions for locking it down? Or, for working
around \"safeguards\" in the BIOS? (I\'ve also considered gluing the
optical drive shut with media in place and forcing that to
be the sole boot medium)
These laptops contain courseware for the program. We want
to minimize the cost (effort) to maintain these, during the
program (i.e., if one \"goes down\", then the student immediately
needs a replacement).
The most common way for a laptop to be compromised is via
malware, not hardware failures. So, we want to make it
\"very hard\" to install software on the laptops that would
require a system reinstall.
We also want to make the laptops \"valueless\" as pawnable items.
This population is disadvantaged so they -- or a family member,
friend, etc. -- could be enticed to converting a laptop to cash.
These laptops belong to The Program. (we aren\'t concerned about
the \"value\" being lost as much as the *effort* to create a
replacement -- labor is always in short supply)
On completion of the program (\"graduation\"), they are gifted
a \"real\" laptop. What the student does to -- or with -- THEIR
laptop is entirely up to them; it\'s *theirs*!
To make The Program\'s laptops more secure AND less valuable
(pawned, resold, etc.), I\'m trying to come up with a \"portable\"
means of altering them JUST ENOUGH that they won\'t install
software from DVD, over the network, etc. So, they boot into
*my* OS and run our applications. And, if stolen/sold/lost,
would prove to be of no value -- because they don\'t follow the
rules that a regular laptop would!
A cheap hack seems like just rearranging the BIOS entry points
could thwart the normal operations of \"a laptop\" -- yet still
allow all of that BIOS functionality to be accessed by our
applications (cuz we would use the corrected/broken binding).
This could be portable to different makes/models as the entry
points are standardized, even if the actual BIOS implementation
varies.
One notable problem would be if the (a) BIOS was signed and
my alterations rendered that signature invalid. Of course,
each vendor/model could have a different key so I\'d have
to solve this problem many times.
[I\'m not as worried about checksums as those can be bruteforced]
Any other suggestions for locking it down? Or, for working
around \"safeguards\" in the BIOS? (I\'ve also considered gluing the
optical drive shut with media in place and forcing that to
be the sole boot medium)